Results
Title |
Author![]() |
Citation | Summary |
---|---|---|---|
SAVING APES WITH THE LAWS OF MEN: GREAT APE PROTECTION IN A PROPERTY-BASED ANIMAL LAW SYSTEM | Alexandra B. Rhodes | 20 Animal L. 191 (2013) | This Note evaluates the methods advocates have taken toward furthering great ape protection in the United States (U.S.). Many animal advocates argue that abolishing animals’ property status is essential to establishing effective protections; nonetheless, it will take time for our society to accept the concept of legal personhood for animals. Therefore, this Note suggests that for the time being, great ape protection should be framed in a human context, to protect animals within the existing, property-based animal law system. In general, this Note provides background on the property status of animals in the U.S., specifically analyzes the legal status of great apes domestically and abroad, and suggests how advocates may most efficiently work toward great ape protection today. |
LEGISLACIÓN INGLESA Y NORTEAMERICANA: DERECHO ANIMAL | BELEN LAO RODRÍGUEZ | Animal Legal & Historical Center |
El presente trabajo analiza la legislación de Estados Unidos en materia de derecho bienestar animal relacionándola con la de Reino Unido con el objetivo de delimitar hasta qué punto su regulación puede ser considerada modélica y / o si resultaría mejorable. Para ello, se analiza, si la Declaración Universal de Derechos del Animal, la observancia de la cual debería servir como punto de partida, en tanto Código de Conducta, es observada por tales legislaciones. A su vez, en el marco de tal regulación, se examina si existe una relación directa entre el grado de concienciación social y el grado de protección de su regulación respecto los animales. Finalmente, se apunta desde una perspectiva crítica cual es el mérito que suponen tales legislaciones para el derecho de bienestar animal, a la vez que pretende examinar sus posibles carencias. |
Think or be Damned: The Problematic Case of Higher Cognition in Animals and Legislation for Animal Welfare | Lesley J. Rogers and Gisela Kaplan | 12 Animal L. 151 (2005) |
Recent discoveries of higher cognitive abilities in some species of birds and mammals are bringing about radical changes in our attitudes to animals and will lead to changes in legislation for the protection of animals. We fully support these developments, but at the same time we recognize that the scientific study of higher cognition in animals has touched on only a small number of vertebrate species. Accordingly, we warn that calls to extend rights, or to at least better welfare protection, for the handful of species that have revealed their intelligence to us may be counterproductive. While this would improve the treatment of the selected few, be they birds or mammals, a vast majority of species, even closely related ones, will be left out. This may not be a particular problem if being left out is only a temporary state that can be changed as new information becomes available. But, in practice, those protected and not protected are separated by a barrier that can be more difficult to remove than it was to erect in the first place. We summarize the recent research on higher cognition from the position of active researchers in animal behavior and neuroscience. |
Animal Ethics and the Law | Bernard Rollin | 106 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 143 (2008). | Concerned with the lack of legal protection for farm animals in the United States, Bernard Rollin argues for the enfranchisment of farm animals. In this article, Rollin also identifies five factors that have called forth new ethics and new laws regarding animals. |
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE AND THE EXPANSION OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE: IS IT POSSIBLE FOR THE LAW PROTECTING ANIMALS TO SIMULTANEOUSLY FAIL AND SUCCEED? | Peter Sankoff | 18 Animal L. 281 (2012) |
This Article uses the theory of deliberative democracy, as developed by Jürgen Habermas and others, to suggest that public discourse is essential to encouraging democratic change in animal welfare law. The author examines the legal regimes of Canada and New Zealand to determine which country better facilitates a public dialogue about the treatment of animals. The Article concludes that, while Canada has a number of laws that ostensibly protect animals, New Zealand’s regime is much better at creating the public discourse required to meaningfully advance animal protection. The author does not suggest that New Zealand’s regime is perfect; rather, New Zealand’s model is preferable to Canada’s because it allows the public to meaningfully engage in laws affecting animals at regular intervals. In Canada, generating discussion in government about animal welfare is too often left to the whim of legislators. Due to New Zealand’s model of encouraging and requiring public discourse, its protection laws have begun to surpass those of Canada, and there is reason to believe this will continue. Encouraging public discourse about our assumptions about animals fosters hope for meaningful progress in their lives. |
Five Years of the New Animal Welfare Regime: Lessons Learned from New Zealand's Decision to Modernize Its Animal Welfare Legislation | Peter Sankoff | 11 Animal L. 7 (2005) |
In 1999, New Zealand took an ambitious step to update its animal welfare legislation. The new law included a limited provision to protect Great Apes from scientific experimentation that was heralded internationally as a huge step forward for animals. The Author suggests, however, that New Zealand’s other animals have not fared nearly as well under the new law, and that the notion of New Zealand as the “animal friendly” nation implied by its treatment of primates is more about perception than reality. This article explores the New Zealand experience, and suggests lessons that can be drawn from the modernization of its animal welfare legislation. |
Animals as Vulnerable Subjects: Beyond Interest-Convergence, Hierarchy, and Property | Ani B. Satz | 16 Animal L. 65 (2009) |
This Article presents a new paradigm, premised on the equal protection principle, for the legal regulation of human interactions with domestic animals: Equal Protection of Animals (EPA). EPA combines the insights of vulnerability theorists with the equal protection principle and capability theory to create a mechanism for recognizing the equal claims of human and nonhuman animals to protections against suffering. Under such an approach, domestic animals—like humans—have claims to food, hydration, shelter, bodily integrity (including avoiding pain), companionship, and the ability to exercise and to engage in natural behaviors of movement. Existing animal welfare and anti-cruelty laws, despite their stated purposes, fail to protect animals adequately. This Article identifies the ontology of the problem as interest-convergence, famously described by Derrick Bell in the desegregation context. |
Animal Welfare: Its Place in Legislation | Congressman Christopher Shays | 12 Animal L. 1 (2005) |
Comments by Congressman Christopher Shays: Animal welfare will continue to be a challenge. By advocating animal welfare legislation at the federal level, states, the private sector, and individuals can follow clearer, more humane guideline regarding the safety of all animals. As co-chairs of the Congressional Friends of Animals Caucus, Congressman Lantos and I will continue to educate lawmakers about the importance of animal welfare initiatives at all levels. |
Non-Violence and the Animal Rights Movement | Jerry Simonelli | Animal Legal & Historical Center |
The article explores the history of the non-violent protest movement starting with Gandhi and Dr. King and brings the issue into the present animal rights movement. |
PROTECTION OF ANIMALS THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS | Tom Sparks | MPIL RESEARCH PAPER SERIES No. 2018-21 | This paper discusses the potential of a human rights framework to contribute to the growth and development of global animal law. Parts one and two of the essay take as their example the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and examine the major trends in the Court’s judgments and admissibility decisions that directly or indirectly concern the rights or welfare of animals. It is concluded that the Court is not indifferent to the welfare of animals, but that animal welfare is instrumentalised: it is understood not as a good in itself, but is instead valued for its implications for human welfare and rights. Part three of the essay then considers the obstacles that the anthropocentrism of the human rights idea and the instrumentalisation of animal concerns present to the use of human rights frameworks to further the development of global animal law, as well as the opportunities that exist in the meeting of these paradigms. It concludes that although the telos of human rights law is different from that of animal law, nevertheless there exist many overlapping concerns within which mutually beneficial interactions are possible. |