Results
| Title |
Author |
Citation | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| MILITARY WORKING DOGS: CLASSIFICATION AND TREATMENT IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES | Sarah D. Cruse | 21 Animal L. 249 (2015) | This Article explores and evaluates the use of canines by the United States (U.S.) Armed Forces as military working dogs, and examines the reasons why the current administrative classification of these dogs is inappropriate. The author examines the historical use of, and increasing reliance on, military working dogs by the U.S. Armed Forces from World War II to present day. This historical exploration traces the development of the federal statutes and military regulations that govern the Military Working Dog Program. Federal law currently categorizes military working dogs as 'equipment,' which grossly underestimates their role within the U.S. military and deprives these dogs of the opportunity to transition to a peaceful civilian life once they are deemed 'excess equipment' and retired from service. Categorization as equipment creates significant obstacles for service members, their families, and civilian parties who wish to adopt these dogs. This categorization also deprives military working dogs of ongoing medical care upon retirement, eligibility for recognition and commendation, and burial in national military cemeteries. Despite some of the recent improvements made in the military's treatment of these dogs, more work is needed. This Article urges Congress to recategorize military working dogs as canine members of the armed forces in order to properly honor their service to this country, and to protect the dignity of these dogs upon retirement. |
| The Mute Swan Case, the Fund for Animals, et al. v. Norton, et al: National, Regional, and Local Environmental Policy Rendered I | Paul J. Cucuzzella | 11 U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. 101 (Spring, 2004) |
This article suggests that an obstruction of sound environmental policy occurred in 2003 when The Fund for Animals used the National Environmental Policy Act to prevent the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Maryland Department of Natural Resources from implementing a plan to cull the population of mute swans in the Chesapeake Bay. The author suggests that there is no question that feral mute swans (cyngus olor) are harmful to the native habitats of the Chesapeake Bay. The research and scientific record into the effects of non-native mute swans on native environs is both extensive and comprehensive. |
| The Case Against Dog Breed Discrimination by Homeowners' Insurance Companies | Larry Cunningham | 11 Conn. Ins. L.J. 1 (2004) |
Part I of this article gives an overview of the problem: dog breed discrimination by insurers, as well as a related problem of breed-specific legislation by some states. Part II analyzes the major scientific studies on dog bites, showing that no one has adequately proven that some breeds are more inherently dangerous than others. Part III shows that breed discrimination and breed-specific legislation are opposed by most veterinary and animal groups. Part IV demonstrates that insurers have been ignoring the unique and special role that pets play in millions of American homes. Part V shows how the insurance industry is a highly regulated industry which subjects itself to legislative control where, as here, the public is being harmed by underwriting decisions not driven by actuarial justification. |
| A Dubious Grail: Seeking Tort Law Expansion and Limited Personhood as Stepping Stones Toward Abolishing Animals' Property Status | Richard L. Jr. Cupp | 60 SMU L. Rev. 3 (2007) |
Many animal rights legal advocates are seeking more manageable steps that may someday lead to the elimination or modification of property status. This Article critiques such efforts, specifically focusing on two potential stepping stones that may be perceived as particularly desirable for animal rights activists: seeking limited personhood for intelligent species of animals, such as chimpanzees; and the possible expansion of tort law to provide animals standing as plaintiffs whose interests are represented by court-appointed humans. This Article will analyze Steven Wise's work in Rattling the Cage and Drawing the Line, advocating limited personhood for some animal species, and David Favre's proposals in A New Tort, as illustrative of efforts at incremental movement toward animal rights and the abolition or modification of property status for animals. |
| Animals as More Than 'Mere Things,' but Still Property: A Call for Continuing Evolution of the Animal Welfare Paradigm | Richard L. Cupp, Jr. | University of Cincinnati Law Review, Forthcoming; Pepperdine University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2788309 | Abstract: Survival of the animal welfare paradigm (as contrasted with a rights-based paradigm creating legal standing for at least some animals) depends on keeping pace with appropriate societal evolution favoring stronger protections for animals. Although evolution of animal welfare protection will take many forms, this Article specifically addresses models for evolving conceptualizations of animals’ property status within the context of animal welfare. For example, in 2015 France amended its Civil Code to change its description of companion animals and some other animals from movable property to “living beings gifted with sensitivity,” while maintaining their status as property. This Article will evaluate various possible approaches courts and legislatures might adopt to highlight the distinctiveness of animals’ property status as compared to inanimate property. Although risks are inherent, finding thoughtful ways to improve or elaborate on some of our courts’ and legislatures’ animals-as-property characterizations may encourage more appropriate protections where needed under the welfare paradigm, and may help blunt arguments that animals are “mere things” under the welfare paradigm. Animals capable of pain or distress are significantly different than ordinary personal property, and more vigorously emphasizing their distinctiveness as a subset of personal property would further both animal welfare and human interests. |
| DOG MEAT TRADE IN SOUTH KOREA: A REPORT ON THE CURRENT STATE OF THE TRADE AND EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE IT | Claire Czajkowski | 21 Animal L. 29 (2014) | Within South Korea, the dog meat trade occupies a liminal legal space— neither explicitly condoned, nor technically prohibited. As a result of existing in this legal gray area, all facets of the dog meat trade within South Korea—from dog farms, to transport, to slaughter, to consumption—are poorly regulated and often obfuscated from review. In the South Korean context, the dog meat trade itself not only terminally impacts millions of canine lives each year, but resonates in a larger national context: raising environmental concerns, and standing as a proxy for cultural and political change. Part II of this Article describes the nature of the dog meat trade as it operates within South Korea; Part III examines how South Korean law relates to the dog meat trade; Part IV explores potentially fruitful challenges to the dog meat trade under South Korean law; similarly, Part V discusses growing social pressure being deployed against the dog meat trade. |
| An Introduction to Pet in Wills and Pet Euthanasia | Suzette Daniels | Michigan State University - Detroit College of Law |
This paper examines several issues related to estate planning and companion animals. Included in the discussion are pet trusts, new provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, and will-stipulated euthanasia of pets. |
| LEGAL PROTECTION FOR HORSES: CARE AND STEWARDSHIP OR HYPOCRISY AND NEGLECT? | Lafcadio H. Darling | 6 Animal L. 105 (2000) | Horses have a strong connection to America and Americans. They have played a pivotal role in our history, they have been a part of our work and our play, and we cherish them as companion animals. The legal system has made significant steps to protect horses in a number of ways. However, quite ironically, horse protection laws are often ineffective, unenforced, and sometimes non-existent. This article will explore America's relationship with the horse, horse protection laws-their strengths and their failures. |
| United States v. Friday and the Future of Native American Religious Challenges to the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act | Michael Davidson | 86 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1133 (2009) |
This Comment examines the Tenth Circuit's United States v. Friday opinion along with its underlying implications. Part I provides a brief historical analysis of the BGEPA and introduces relevant statutory provisions, including the exception that allows Native Americans to apply for eagle take permits. Part II analyzes the development of RFRA to provide a better understanding of how RFRA affects Native American religious challenges to the BGEPA. Part III surveys relevant precedent in hopes of better understanding the opinion in Friday, and the avenues left open for future litigation. Part IV reviews the Friday opinion and discusses its relevant procedural history. Part V analyzes the Friday opinion in context with relevant precedent, discusses the implications of the Friday decision, and discusses the avenues left open for Native American religious challenges to the BGEPA after Friday. |
| Rebuilding the Wall | Bill Davis | 7 Animal L. 221 (2001) | The debate about whether nonhuman animals deserve legal rights encompasses an ever broadening range of theories and strategies. Most thinkers pushing for nonhuman animal rights reject speciesism, which they view as an often tacit foundation for their adversaries’ arguments. Yet almost every current contributor to the debate—whether they favor or disfavor the extension of rights beyond the human sphere—engages in some form of intelligenceism by focusing disproportionate attention on humanlike animals. This essay submits that nonhuman animal advocates must recognize this pervasive intelligenceist bias and be wary of the detrimental effects its substitution for speciesism could have on their long-term objectives. There is a suspicion that some crucial perspective has been omitted from consideration, that the conclusion is as much a product of myopia as of logic. |