Results
| Title |
Author |
Citation | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| Methods and Welfare Considerations for Behavioral Research | Adrian R. Morrison, D.V.M., Ph.D., Hugh L. Evans, Ph.D., Nancy A. Ator, Ph.D., Richard K. Nakamura, Ph.D., and the editorial assistance of Deborah Faryna | National Institute of Mental Health (2002). Methods and Welfare Considerations in Behavioral Research with Animals: Report of a National Institutes of Health Workshop. Morrison AR; Evans HL; Ator NA; Nakamura RK (eds). NIH Publication No. 02-5083. Washin | Behavioral research has made significant contributions to the understanding, treatment, and prevention of behavioral disorders. Experimental animals play an essential role in this work. The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), together with other institutes of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) that have relevant research programs, prepared this handbook. The handbook provides a description of and references for commonly used behavioral research methods and associated animal welfare considerations in accordance with Federal laws governing animal research. It is intended to assist Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs) in their reviews of protocols involving animal behavior and animal cognition, particularly when expertise is not available on the committee, and to assist investigators in planning their experiments. |
| Standing on New Ground: Underenforcement of Animal Protection Laws Causes Competitive Injury to Complying Entities | Samantha Mortlock | 32 Vt. L. Rev. 273 (2007) |
This Article explores competitive injury as a basis for challenging the USDA's failure to enforce the HMSA and AWA. Part I.A provides background on claims that the Acts are both underenforced. Part I.B then introduces the problem of standing in the context of animal welfare lawsuits. Part II.A analyzes Article III standing requirements as applied to a competitively injured plaintiff. Part II.B then analyzes what the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires for an injured competitor to bring suit against the USDA for failure to enforce the HMSA and AWA. This Article concludes by suggesting that the HMSA provides the best vehicle for a competitive injury suit against the USDA because Congress has made abundantly clear its desire to see the HMSA fully enforced. |
| What About Wilbur? Proposing a Federal Statute to Provide Minimum Humane Living Conditions for Farm Animals Raised for Food Pro | Amy Mosel | 27 UDTNLR 133 (2001) |
This article proposes federal legislation that would provide minimum standards for the daily living conditions of animals raised for food production. |
| Tilikum’s Splash: Lessons Learned From Animal Rights-Based Litigation Strategies | Brittany J. Mouzourakis | 10 J. Animal & Nat. Resource L. 223 | The animal advocacy movement is divided between those who believe in animal welfare and those who believe in animal rights. Although these two factions of the animal advocacy movement hold the overall goal of making the lives of animals better, practical differences do arise in the way in which these two factions litigate animal issues to achieve this goal. This Note explores Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entertainment, a case in which five orca whales "sued" Sea World for violating their Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from slavery and involuntary servitude. The case received widespread publicity as it was the first time a U.S. federal court had been asked to determine whether the Thirteenth Amendment to the United affords protection to non-humans. The Tilikum case departed from the traditional model of litigating animal issues by utilizing what this Article deems an animal rights-based litigation strategy. This Note first provides an overview of the traditional animal welfare-based model of litigating animal issues. This Note then analyzes the Tilikum litigation strategy to show how it departed from the traditional animal welfare-based model. Additionally, this Note weighs the advantages of both litigation strategies, ultimately recommending that animal advocacy organizations not depart from the animal-welfare based litigation strategies. Finally, this Note explores the theoretical possibility of expanding legal rights to animals based upon the expansion of legal rights to other non-human entities, such as corporations. |
| Our Dumb Animals Vol 20 No.3 | MSPCA | Vol 20, No 3 |
This is a magazine published by the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. It is a mixture of articles, humor, poems and information, not unlike the Reader's Digest format of today. It is reflective of a softer, gentler era. |
| ANIMAL VIOLENCE COURT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE-BASED PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT FOR THE ADJUDICATION OF ANIMAL CRUELTY CASES INVOLVING JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND ANIMAL HOARDERS | Debra L. Muller-Harris | 17 Animal L. 273 (2011) |
Cases involving cruelty to animals are currently handled by the traditional criminal courts. These courts, however, are not effective at punishing animal abusers or protecting animal victims. Although all states have laws criminalizing various forms of animal cruelty, the reality is that most cruelty cases are not prosecuted; even when cruelty cases are successfully prosecuted, punishments are weak. This Comment proposes the creation of an Animal Violence Court, using juvenile animal abusers and adult hoarders as ideal candidates for a pilot animal cruelty justice system. The Animal Violence Court will provide for the ongoing safety and care of animal victims, will work to rehabilitate offenders, and will require long-term monitoring of offenders by the court. Modeled after similar problemsolving courts, the Animal Violence Court will improve upon the current criminal justice system, rehabilitate offenders, and protect innocent animals, sending a clear message that animal abuse will not be tolerated. |
| A Show of Humanity to Slow Hugh, the Manatee: A Property Rights Proposal for the Sea Cow (with a Brief Consideration for his Friend, the Brown Pelican) | Mark A. Mullins | Animal Legal & Historical Center |
This paper explores the background of the manatee and the issues the species faces. It then sets forth some of the applicable laws that are currently in place, followed by a consideration of the benefits and shortcomings of those laws. Finally, it reflects on some changes that have been suggested, and, ultimately, introduces a new approach—providing property rights to the West Indian Manatee—with a response to potential criticism in mind. |
| Federal Wildlife Law of the 20th Century | Ruth Musgrave |
This Chapter provides a review of the political, legislative and judicial trends which have shaped the formation of the "tangle" of federal wildlife and related environmental laws, from the early 1900s to the present. |
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| State Wildlife Laws Handbook: Chapter 2 Overview of Wildlife Law | Ruth S. Musgrave | Musgrave, Ruth S. & Mary Anne Stein, State Wildlife Laws Handbook 6-13 (1993). |
This chapter gives an overview of the history of wildlife laws and the development of modern state wildlife laws. Moreover, it discusses the relationship between state wildlife laws and federal wildlife laws. |
| The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly | John Copeland Nagle | 97 Mich. L. Rev. 174 (1998) |
The Delhi Sands Flower Loving Fly obtained endangered species status on the day a county planned to construct a hospital on the fly's dwindling habitat. Since the Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits the taking of any endangered species and courts have interpreted "taking" to include “significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures” a member of the species, the county made concessions to comply with the ESA. However, when the county learned that the fly stood in the way of its plans to redesign an intersection, the county filed suit challenging the application of the ESA to the fly's habitat; many others who also wished to build on the fly's habitat joined in the suit as well. Using United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), these groups hoped the district court would find that the ESA, under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, could not constitutionally protect the fly's habitat. The district court, however, upheld the act's application. In the appeal of the district case, known as the National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the appellate court upheld the lower court's decision, but offered three different explanations why the ESA could or could not constitutionally require protection of the fly. In this article, John Copeland Nagle investigates these three strikingly diverse explanations. In doing so, Nagle also investigates whether Congress has the power to protect something that is very rare, very valuable, and seemingly entirely uninvolved with commerce between the states. |