Results
| Title |
Author |
Citation | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| Introduction to Animal Rights | Joseph Lubinksi | Animal Legal and Historical Center |
This article explores the roots of the animal rights movement. It also looks at personhood, standing, and other barriers to animal rights in the legal world. |
| Brief Summary of Animal Rights | Joseph Lubinski | Animal Legal and Historical Center |
This summary provides a short overview of the animal rights, detailing the different positions of those involved as well as the history of the movement. |
| Introduction to Animal Rights (2nd Ed) | Joseph Lubinski | Animal Legal and Historical Center |
This article explores the evolution of animal rights, specifically examining the influence of the property status of animals in the U.S. |
| Overview of Animal Rights | Joseph Lubinski | Animal Legal and Historical Center |
This overview provides a summary of the evolution of the animal rights movement with particular focus on the property status of animals in the U.S. |
| FREE SPEECH, ANIMAL LAW, AND FOOD ACTIVISM | Howard F. Lyman | 5 Animal L. i (1999) | Howard Lyman discusses a case that provides an example of using the law to force activists to use their scarce resources in court to defend the right of free speech. |
| Pawing Open the Courthouse Door: Why Animals' Interests Should Matter | Lauren Magnotti | 80 St. John's L. Rev. 455 (Winter 2006) |
It is widely accepted that animals are viewed as property under the law. It is equally apparent, however, that animals are much more than the average inanimate piece of personal property. The law of standing should reflect that animals are creatures with interests worthy of legal protection in their own right. Thus, while the courts may inevitably continue to recognize animals as property, animals are qualitatively different and the courts can and must take this into consideration when deciding the issue of standing. |
| LIVE FREE OR DIE: ON THEIR OWN TERMS: BRINGING ANIMAL-RIGHTS PHILOSOPHY DOWN TO EARTH BY LEE HALL | Joel Marks | 17 Animal L. 243 (2010) |
This book review examines Lee Hall’s new book, which presents an innovative animal rights theory: wild animals, due to their autonomous nature, are endowed with rights, but domesticated animals lack rights because they are not autonomous. With that theory in mind, Hall outlines ideas about how humans are obligated to treat both wild and domestic animals. Hall first argues that the rights of wild animals require that humans let them alone. Yet, despite the fact that domestic animals lack rights under Hall’s theory, Hall argues that humans are required to care for them because it is humans who brought them into existence. While the reviewer believes that Hall’s theory is indeed innovative and appealing, he ultimately concludes that it cannot explain why domestic animals completely lack rights and that the implications of the theory for how they are to be treated are unsatisfactory. |
| The Animal Question: The Key to Coming to Terms with Nature | Jim Mason | 13 Animal Law 197 (2007) |
In this Introduction to Volume 13, Part 2 of Animal Law, the author considers the "Animal Question" - the shorthand term "for all of those difficult questions about our views of, and relations with,nonhuman animals." |
| Natural Behavior | Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson | 16 Animal L. 1 (2009) |
This introduction to Volume 16 is provided by Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, author of such book as When Elephants Weep, and The Pig Who Sang. to the Moon. |
| CAN NONHUMAN ANIMALS FIND TORT PROTECTION IN A HUMAN-CENTERED COMMON LAW? | Enger McCartney-Smith | 4 Animal L. 173 (1998) | The question of 'Rights allocation" typically hinges on society's distinction between legal and moral entitlement. Although many rights find support in both categories, not all rights grounded in societal morality are likewise accorded legal status. The animal rights movement, particularly in the last three decades, has advanced the recognition of nonhuman animals' moral entitlements, but corresponding legal rights have been slow to follow. This Comment explores this gap in nonhuman animals' rights allocation with an eye toward establishing a basis for a private right of intentional tort action. Through appeal to predominant tort jurisprudential theories, in conjunction with an examination of our scientifically and experientially grounded understanding of nonhuman animals, the Comment concludes that there is room in our current legal system for direct recognition of, and compensation for, intentional injurious behavior aimed at nonhuman animals |