United States
Title |
Summary |
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| MI - Wolves - Control of gray wolves, § 324.95151 to 324.95167 | This chapter of Michigan laws deals with the removal, capture, or destruction of gray wolves. According to the laws, a landowner is able to use any means necessary to remove a gray wolf from its property, including lethal force, if the gray wolf is threatening the landowners livestock or dog(s). Once a landowner has removed, captured, or destroyed a gray wolf, the landowner must report it to a department official no later than 12 hours after the removal, capture, or destruction. According to Section 324.95167, the act is not operative until final appellate court issues a decision overruling the decision of The Humane Society of the United States v Dirk Kempthorne that allows removal of wolves from the federal ESA list, or the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service promulgates a final rule dated after March 12, 2007 that removes gray wolves located in this state from the list of endangered and threatened wildlife established under the federal endangered species act of 1973 and that final rule takes effect. |
| Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. U.S. |
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| Michigan Compiled Laws 1838: Chapter 8: Section 22 | The Michigan law concerning the treatment of animals from 1838. The law states the punishment for the crime, and factors for determining if the crime has occurred. |
| Michigan Compiled Laws 1929: Chapter 285: Section 1 | Chapter 285, entitled "An act for the more effectual prevention of cruelty to animals," concerns Michigan's Law about the treatment of animals from 1929. The act covers what qualifies as cruelty to animals and what is the punishment for crime of cruelty to animals. |
| Midcoast Fishermen's Ass'n v. Gutierrez |
Plaintiffs filed suit seeking review of the Department of Commerce’s (the “Agency”) decision to deny their petition for emergency action to address continued overfishing in the Northeastern multispecies fisheries by excluding midwater trawl vessels from groundfish closed areas. After the administrative record was filed, and the Agency certified that it was the administrative record for the decision, Plaintiffs moved to compel completion of the administrative record. The United States District Court, District of Columbia denied Plaintiffs’ motion, finding that Plaintiffs failed to show that the Agency blatantly ignored specific readily available information, the fact that the Agency based its decision on data from a two year chronological time span did not render the record incomplete, supplementing the record with bycatch data from an earlier time period would not provide any background information useful to the resolution of the case, and that the record contained sufficient information to allow the Court to determine what process the Agency followed in making its decision. |
| Milburn v. City of Lebanon |
Plaintiff Milburn was acquitted of misdemeanor animal abuse on appeal, but a Lebanon police officer removed Milburns’ dog from her possession. While the appeal was pending, the Defendant, City of Lebanon, gave the dog to an animal shelter. The dog was later adopted by a new owner. The Linn County Circuit Court ordered the City to return the dog to Milburn after the acquittal but the Defendant City failed to comply. Milburn then brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against the City of Lebanon. The City moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim, and the United States District Court, for the District of Oregon, granted that motion while giving leave for Milburn to amend her complaint. In the Amended Complaint, Milburn contended that the City’s refusal to return her dog pursuant to the state court order deprived her of property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Milburn also asserted a violation of her procedural due process rights. The United States District Court, for the District of Oregon, reasoned that while Milburn alleged a state-law property interest in her dog, she failed to allege that the Defendant City deprived her of that interest without adequate process. Milburn also did not allege state remedies to be inadequate. Those two omissions in combination were fatal to Miburn's procedural due process claim. Also, Milburn's assertion that the court issued an order and that the City did not comply with, is an attack on the result of the procedure. The court reasoned that attacking the result instead of the process of a procedure does not state a procedural due process claim. Milburn’s procedural due process claim was then dismissed. The Court also held that it did not have jurisdiction over Milburn’s injunctive relief claim. Therefore, Milburn's request for injunctive relief was dismissed with prejudice. However, the court held that Milburn could seek monetary damages. While Defendant City’s second motion to dismiss was granted, Milburn was granted leave to amend her complaint within 90 days with regard to her claim for actual and compensatory damages.
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| Miles ex rel. Miles v. Rich |
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| MILITARY WORKING DOGS: CLASSIFICATION AND TREATMENT IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES | |
| Milke v. Ratcliff Animal Hospital, Inc. | This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought against a veterinarian and veterinary clinic, as well as an action for improper delay and bad faith dealing against the insurer of the veterinary clinic. Plaintiff brought this case after their 6-month old puppy died in the post-operative period following neutering surgery. Defendant veterinarian and clinic could not provide an exact cause of death, and the malpractice insurer that plaintiff was referred to denied plaintiff's malpractice claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the court found that the veterinarian and clinic did not commit malpractice and the insurer did not act in bad faith, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court. |
| Miller v. Dep't of Agric. | The Plaintiff, Kim Miller, argued “a severe deprivation” of her rights when the Superior Court dismissed her appeal to prevent her dogs from being euthanized. Miller owned two Rottweiler dogs that attacked the victim Cynthia Reed, causing injuries to Reed's head, the back of her neck, and her back. An animal control officer issued two disposal orders to euthanize Miller’s dogs. The Defendant, Connecticut Department of Agriculture, then affirmed the orders and Miller appealed. The Superior Court also dismissed the appeal, and Miller appealed further to the Appellate Court of Connecticut. Here, Miller argues, among other things, that her Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses were violated when witnesses were not available for cross-examination. Plaintiff Miller also claims that there were procedural violations in the initial hearing because of lack of written rules that applied to dog disposal orders and claimed error when the hearing officer acted acted arbitrarily and capriciously by “interject[ing] his opinion” while questioning a witness. The Appellate Court held that: (1) the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) did not preclude the admission of statements from the victim and an eyewitness, even though the victim and witness did not testify at the hearing. The court reasoned that in administrative proceedings under the UAPA, evidence is not inadmissible solely because it constitutes hearsay, as long as the evidence is reliable and probative. Additionally, a party to an administrative proceeding under the UAPA is not required to call any particular witness. (2) A dog owner's appeal of disposal orders for a biting animal is not a criminal prosecution that invokes Sixth Amendment protections. The court reasoned that the issuance of a disposal order does not, by itself, trigger the imposition of a fine or prison term on the owner. Rather, by obviating the threat that dangerous animals pose to the public, the provision is remedial and civil in nature. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's appeal was affirmed. |