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New Hampshire General Laws 1878: Trespasses, Malicious Acts, etc. |
The New Hampshire session laws from 1878, chapter 281, covers the state's cruelty to animals laws. Specifically, the law covers cruelty to animals and the treatment of animals during transportation. |
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New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Farmer Boy AG, Inc. |
Lightning struck a hog breeding facility, which disabled the ventilation system and killed pregnant sows. Plaintiff Insurance Company sued defendant for damages. The Court held that evidence of damages relating to the lost litters and subsequent generations was excluded because damages for future unborn litters are not recoverable when damages are recovered for the injury to or destruction of the pregnant sows.
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New Hampshire Revised Statutes 1843: Offences Against Chastity, Decency and Morality |
Section 12 of Chapter 219 from New Hampshire Revised Statutes of 1843 covers cruelty to animals. Specifically, the statutes states what qualifies as cruelty to animals and the punishment for it. |
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New Jersey Revision of Statutes 1709-1877: Chapter XII Supplement: An act for the prevention of cruelty to animals. |
A supplement to the New Jersey Revision of Statutes for 1877. The supplement covered standing for officer's of New Jersey Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. In addition, the supplement addresses the question of jurisdiction for the enforcement the anti-cruelty laws. |
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New Jersey Revision of Statutes 1709-1877: Chapter XII: An act for the prevention of cruelty to animals. |
A compilation of the New Jersey anti-cruelty laws as of 1877. The laws covered include treatment of animals, penalties, and exceptions for scientific experiments. |
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New Jersey Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. New Jersey Dept. of Agriculture |
This New Jersey case concerns several challenges to the adoption of livestock regulations by the state Department of Agriculture.
Specifically, several animal welfare groups contended that several of the regulations were inhumane and in violation of the state’s legislative mandate to issue humane livestock standards. The Superior Court of New Jersey, appellate division, agreed with the Department, holding that
the challenged regulations are consistent with the agency's legislative mandate, and are neither arbitrary, nor unreasonable.
This Judgment was Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part by New Jersey Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. New Jersey Dept. of Agriculture, 196 N.J. 366,955 A.2d 886 (N.J., 2008).
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New Jersey Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. New Jersey Dept. of Agriculture |
The issue in the case was whether the regulations promulgated by the NJDA pursuant to this authority were invalid for failing to comply with the “humane” standards requirement. Although the court held that the regulations in their entirety were not invalid, the court found that NJDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in enacting its regulations by allowing all “routine husbandry practices,” as there was no evidence that those practices were “humane.” The court further rejected NJDA regulations allowing cattle tail docking, finding no evidence to support that the practices were “humane.” Finally, the court rejected the assertion of NJDA that certain controversial farm practices, such as castration, de-beaking, and toe-trimming, are “humane” if they are performed by a “knowledgeable individual” “in a way to minimize pain.”
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New Jersey Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Board of Education |
In this action, the New Jersey Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, sought recovery against the Board of Education of the City of East Orange of penalties of the rate of $100 per alleged violation arising out of cancer-inducing experiments conducted by a student in its high school upon live chickens. By permission of the court, defendants, New Jersey Science Teachers’ Association and National Society for Medical Research Inc. were permitted by the court to participate as amicus curiae. The court found that because the board did not obtain authorization from the health department, an authorization which the health department did not think was needed, it was not thereby barred from performing living animal experimentation. The court concluded that the experiment at issue was not per se needless or unnecessary, and that such experiment did not fall within the ban of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 4:22-26 against needless mutilation, killing, or the infliction of unnecessary cruelty.
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New Mexico Department of Game and Fish v. United States Department of the Interior |
Defendant, The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) released two Mexican gray wolf pups on federal land in New Mexico without a permit. Their goal was to increase the recovery of the wolf population more rapidly. The Plaintiff, New Mexico Department of Game and Fish ("Department") brought action against FWS and the United States Department of Interior. The Department requested declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit FWS from releasing more Mexican gray wolves within New Mexico’s borders. Other wildlife organizations and various states also intervened as Defendants. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, entered an order granting the Department a preliminary injunction. The Defendants appealed. The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, reversed and remanded. The Court held that: (1) the Department failed to establish a significant risk of irreparable injury to its wildlife management efforts, and (2) the Department failed to establish a significant risk of irreparable injury to New Mexico’s sovereignty. |
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New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau , et. al. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, et. al. |
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service") designated 764,207 acres in New Mexico and Arizona as critical habitat for the jaguar pursuant to the Endangered Species Act. The area was divided into six individual units. Units 5 and 6 were the ones at issue. Plaintiffs filed suit contending that the Service’s designation of Units 5 and 6 as critical habitat was arbitrary and capricious. The district court ruled in favor of the Service and this appeal followed. There was no concrete evidence that jaguars were present in Units 5 and 6 at any time before 1995. The Service’s reliance on sightings in 1995, 1996, and 2006 to support a conclusion of occupation in 1972 was not based on expert opinion. It was purely speculative. The Court agreed with the Plaintiffs that the Service’s designation of Units 5 and 6 as occupied critical habitat was arbitrary and capricious. The Court further found that in order for an unoccupied area to be designated as a critical habitat, the Service must first find that the designation of the occupied areas is inadequate to ensure conservation of the species. The Service addressed all units together, finding that to the extent they were occupied, they were essential for the conservation of the species. The Court ultimately found that the Service did not follow its own regulations or give a rational explanation for failing to do so and as a result, its designation of Units 5 an 6 as critical habitat was arbitrary and capricious. The decision of the district court was reversed and remanded.
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