United States
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Summary |
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| Reid v. Kramer | In July of 2017, Alpena County Animal Control Officer Michelle Reid, filed a complaint against the respondents alleging that a black and tan German Shepherd named Bruiser had attacked or bit a person. The victim, Joshua Henderson, testified that as he was jogging past the respondents’ house, Bruiser ran toward him and bit his left bicep and left forearm. The Respondents stated that Bruiser had never attacked or bitten anyone before and was raised around children. The prosecutor clarified that euthanization was not being sought at the time, however, the district court found that Bruiser had caused serious injury to Henderson and noted the possibility of Bruiser injuring children in the future and ordered Bruiser to be destroyed. The Respondents appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the district court’s decision. The Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Respondents argued that the circuit court erred in determining that Bruiser was a dangerous animal and that the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser caused death or serious injury or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals concluded that Bruiser fit the definition of a dangerous animal under the statute, however, the Court agreed with the Respondents that the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that Bruiser caused serious injury or was likely to cause death or serious injury in the future. In order for an animal to be destroyed, it must be more than dangerous. Henderson’s injuries consisted of scrapes, puncture wounds, and three stitches. Those injuries did not rise to the level of a “serious injury” as defined under MCL 287.321(e) which defines serious injury as permanent, serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health, or serious impairment of bodily function. The district court did not properly interpret MCL 287.322 and based their decision solely on the fact that Bruiser had bitten someone once and concluded that because of that, the court knew that Bruiser was more likely to do so again. The circuit court erred by affirming the district court’s order because the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser had caused serious injury or death to a person or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the district court. |
| Renzo v. Idaho State Dept. of Agriculture |
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| Repin v. State |
In this case, Robert Repin sued Washington State University (WSU) and WSU veterinarian, Dr. Margaret Cohn-Urbach after his dog suffered complications while being euthanized. Repin argued that Cohn-Urbach was grossly negligent in performing the euthanasia which caused his dog pain and prolonged her death. Ultimately, Repin sued for breach of contract, reckless breach of contract, professional negligence, lack of informed consent, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and conversion. The trial court dismissed all of Repin’s claims and Repin appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and found that Repin was unable to provide sufficient evidence to establish that a reasonable jury may be able to find in his favor. As a result, the Court of Appeals dismissed Repins claims. |
| Reporting Animal Cruelty | |
| Republic v. Teischer |
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| Respecting Animals: A Balanced Approach to Our Relationship with Pets, Food, and Wildlife | |
| Responsibility in the "Sport of Kings": Imposing an Affirmative Duty of Care on the Primary Financial Beneficiaries of the Thoroughbred Horseracing Industry | |
| Reviewing The Marine Mammal Protection Act Through a Modern Lens | This paper will focus primarily on examining the Marine Mammal Protection Act and provide a review of its major provisions that were established to protect those species who heavily rely on oceanic and freshwater ecosystems. The first section will outline the original Marine Mammal Protection Act created in 1972 and what pertinent language set the foundation for what is still in play today. The second section will look at the 1994 amendments and revisions to the 1972 Act, looking at the added and clarified language in the face of growing concerns for the Act’s enforcement. The final section frames the current situation of the MMPA. This section will also consider two species, the polar bear and manatee, and relevant MMPA rules for both terrestrial marine mammals and aquatic marine mammals. Scientific studies have explained climate change impacts marine mammals in four tiers, intertwining broad effects with species-specific ones. Over the last 50 years, the MMPA has done wonderful things to protect marine mammals especially when it comes to working in tandem with the 1973 Endangered Species Act. The MMPA has protected population stocks of some of the most important marine mammals but may not be as effective in protecting those species when faced with the rapid development of climate change and subsequent effects on habitats. |
| Revision of the AWA and Removal of Zoos as an Exempt Category | |
| Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association | Homeowners brought action against thier condominium association and other homeowners, claiming that the association failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for homeowners' disability in the form of emotional support animals, and that the other homeowners interfered with the fair exercise of their fair housing rights, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The Court of Appeals held that: 1) Fair Housing Act claims survive the death of a party; 2) issue of fact as to whether association reviewed homeowners' paperwork for an emotional support animal precluded summary judgment on claims association failed to make a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act; 3) issue of fact as to whether association reviewed homeowners' paperwork for an emotional support animal precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims; 4) issue of fact as to whether neighbor's comments about homeowners were sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with homeowners' Fair Housing Act rights precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims; and 5) issue of fact as to whether neighbor's blog posts about homeowners were sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with homeowners' Fair Housing Act rights precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |