United States

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Titlesort descending Summary
Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v. Cheyenne Mountain Zoological Soc'y This Colorado case involves the appeal of the dismissal of a habeas corpus proceeding. The appeal asked the Colorado Supreme Court to decide whether the liberty interests protected by the "great writ of habeas corpus" extend to nonhuman animals. Petitioner Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (“NRP”) contends that the district court erred in dismissing its habeas petition because the five elephants that are the subject of the petition, Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo (“the elephants”), lacked standing to seek relief via the great writ. These elderly elephants live at the Cheyenne Mountain Zoo (“CMZ”) and where NRP asserts they were unlawfully confined. In support of this contention, NRP submitted affidavits from several animal biologists who stated that these intelligent and complex creatures are suffering from psychological disorders and stress from being in captivity. The Zoo countered with a motion to dismiss, arguing the elephants received extraordinary care and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because the elephants do not have standing to seek habeas relief. After the district court granted the motion to dismiss, this court sought to determine whether habeas corpus relief extends to nonhuman animals. The court first looked at Colorado's statutory grant of authority for habeas relief. In doing so, the court found that the statute grants "any person" the ability to seek habeas relief from illegal confinement or restraint of liberty. While "person" is not defined in the law, the court found other statutory definitions that limit "person" to mean "human being." This definition is bolstered by the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "person." Since Colorado's law explicitly limits habeas corpus relief to "persons," the court was unpersuaded by NRP to expand the writ to animals based on common law interpretations. Further, the court noted that even if the statute did not say "person," it would still not be persuaded to expand the writ because no other jurisdiction has recognized "personhood" for nonhuman species, expansion would have "unintended consequences" for interactions between humans and animals, and there is no evidence the Colorado legislature ever intended to recognize animals as legal persons in the statute. This court affirmed the district court's finding that Colorado's writ of habeas corpus does not apply to nonhuman animals.
North American Meat Institute v. Becerra The North American Meat Institute (NAMI) brought suit in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 12 brought suit in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 12 (which forbids the sale of pork meat and eggs in California from producers that do not comply with its animal housing standards). NAMI alleged that Proposition 12 violated the dormant commerce clause by improperly regulating economic activity outside of California’s boundaries and substantially burdening interstate commerce. Plaintiffs acknowledged that Proposition 12 was not facially discriminatory, and that Proposition 12 did not have a discriminatory purpose, because there was a lack of evidence that the state had protectionist intent when enacting Proposition 12. The district court dismissed the case, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
North Carolina v. Nance


The appellate court held that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence seized by animal control officers without a warrant. Several days passed between when the officers first came upon the horses and when they were seized. The officers could have obtained a warrant in those days; thus, no exigent circumstances were present.
Northern Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel


After the Secretary of the Interior promulgated regulations establishing a game code regulating hunting on the reservation, the Arapahoe Tribe of Wyoming sued the Secretary and other federal officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the regulations.  At issue, was  a concern over the declining big game populations on the reservation and surrounding areas due to an unusually harsh winter and over-hunting.  The Court of Appeals held that the government had the right to enact the game code because the rights of two tribes overlapped with regard to a limited resource, and the "[g]overnment's right extends to preventing overuse by the Arapahoe of their shared right when that overuse endangers the resource and threatens to divest the Shoshone of their right."  Where there exists a risk of extinction, the government may enact interim game code measures to prevent the threat when the tribes fail to enact their own game codes. 
Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service


The Endangered Species Act protects not just species, but also "distinct population segments" of species. The Fish and Wildlife Service refused to list the Western Gray Squirrel as endangered in Washington State, even though its numbers are low there, because it determined that the squirrels in Washington are not significant to the species as a whole. The court upheld this decision.
Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital


This court found that there was no common law liability where a tortfeasor's conduct caused a child to lose parental support and care. The court declined to create a new common law cause of action for parental consortium, and suggested that it was up to the legislature to create such a cause of action. However, dicta in the case refers to an invasion of the animal/animal owner relationship as actionable misconduct.
Nuijens v. Novy Plaintiff brought this action in Small Claims Court for the recovery of $254.63 after purchasing a dog from the Defendant. At the time of purchase, the Defendant gave a five day guarantee to the Plaintiff that if a veterinarian found anything wrong with the dog, the dog could be returned and the Plaintiff would receive a refund. The Plaintiff took the dog to a vet within five days and although she was told that the dog had a urinary infection, the Plaintiff kept the dog. Within 14 days of the sale, the Plaintiff learned that the infection was serious, and she contacted the Defendant requesting a refund under article 35-B of the General Business Law. The Court stated that Plaintiff's cause of action under the General Business Law failed: because it did not give the Plaintiff the right to recover damages, since the statute only covered "pet dealers" or "breeders" who sold more than one litter of animals per year. There was no evidence to indicate that the Defendant sold more than one litter of puppies. Also, because the Plaintiff chose not to return the dog for a refund within five days after learning about the infection, she could not seek recovery for breach of an express warranty (UCC 2-313). Lastly, because the Defendant was not a “merchant" the Plaintiff could not recover for the breach of an implied warranty (UCC 2-314).
Nuijens v. Novy


Plaintiff brought a New York Small Claims Court action seeking recovery of the sum of $254.63, after a licensed veterinarian determined that plaintiff's newly purchased dog was unfit according to Article 35-B of the General Business Law.  Specifically, plaintiff sought damages under two alternate theories: violation of the sale contract's five-day express warranty and violation of the implied warranty of merchantability.  Due to the vet's initial diagnosis, plaintiff did not return the dog.  The court held that plaintiff elected to forgo the express warranty by retaining the dog.  With regard to the implied warranty of merchantability, the court found defendant is not a "person who deals in goods of the kind" to fall within the definition of merchant under the statute.
Nutt v. Florio


This Massachusetts case involves an appeal of a summary judgment in favor of the landlord-defendant concerning an unprovoked dog attack. The dog, described as a pit bull terrier, was kept by a tenant of Florio's. The court found that, while the defendants cannot be held strictly liable by virtue the dog's breed, "knowledge of that breed and its propensities may properly be a factor to be considered in determining whether the defendants were negligent under common-law principles." Reviewing the record de novo, the court held that this question and the defendant's knowledge of the dog's propensities, created a genuine issue of material fact. The order of summary judgment for defendant was reversed and the case was remanded.
Nuzzaci v. Nuzzaci
The court refused to sign a stipulation and order (prepared by the parties and signed by each of them and their attorneys) concerning visitation of the divorcing couple’s dog.  The court held that a court can only award dog in its entirety to one party or the other.  The court advised the couple to come to their own private agreement instead, reasoning that the court has no jurisdiction in this matter and further no way to side with one party or the other in the event of a future dispute.

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