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Pedersen v. Benson |
In the matter of
Pedersen v. Benson
, an importer had a permit to import five giraffes from Kenya, three of which were sold and released to public zoos after the requisite quarantine period. The other two were bought by ‘Africa USA,’ but not released. One of them had a heart attack and died. Plaintiff’s filed suit to have the other one they purchased released. The permits, issued by APHIS, were issued under the further understanding that all the giraffes would be consigned to an approved zoological park (Africa USA is a privately-owned zoo). The Court found no basis to uphold the government’s claim that a government officer may impose an ad hoc system of licensure upon any citizen, or upon any one group, i.e. private zoos, as opposed to another. Here, the importation was specifically permitted for all five animals, and any one animal was just as much a potential carrier of hoof and mouth disease as this particular giraffe. Therefore, this matter was dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim.
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Peklun v. Tierra Del Mar Condominium Association, Inc. |
On cross-motions, Defendant Tierra Del Mar Condominium Association, Inc.'s (“TDM") and Plaintiffs, (Personal Representatives of the Estate of Sergey Peklun) seek Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs assert that denial of Sergey Peklun's request for a reasonable accommodation for his dog Julia "resulted in Peklun's increasingly despondent attitude, ultimately culminating in his decision to end his life." As such, plaintiffs’ claim Defendants are liable under theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the Florida and Federal Fair Housing Acts. This conflict over Julia first emerged in 2011 and lasted until Peklun's death in 2015. In 2011, Peklun first acquired Julia the dog, who he claimed was being trained as a cardiac service dog. While the training as a service dog was never substantiated, the Board did approve the dog as an emotional support animal for Peklun in 2011. The composition of the Board changed in coming years and the issue arose after another tenant, Frank Speciale, demanded the dog's removal due to stated allergies. TDM warned Peklun if he did not remove Julia within the period provided, it would initiate arbitration against him in accord. Julia was never removed and, on July 16, 2013, TDM commenced arbitration against Peklun with the Florida Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes. Speciale also moved for an injunction barring Peklun from keeping Julia on the premises, which was granted on March 11, 2014. During this time, the Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners Office of Equal Opportunity organized an extensive investigation into TDM's purported discrimination and found "reasonable grounds to believe that [TDM] discriminated against [Peklun] on the basis of his disability.” Following this, on August 11, 2014, TDM approved Peklun's request for a reasonable accommodation as an emotional support animal. Despite this, Speciale continued to seek Julia's eviction, filing a motion in state court, seeking contempt and sanctions. Plaintiffs contended that this behavior reflected "a campaign of harassment." As to TDM instant motion for summary judgment, it claims the decision was reasonable because Peklun failed to provide TDM with the requested information necessary to verify his disability and that Julia was not a trained service animal. Also, TDM asserts Peklun was not a “qualified individual” under the FHA. The District Court found that while Peklun's various cardiac and organ problems did not constitute a "handicap" under the FHA, the submissions of Peklun's treating physicians are sufficient to establish that Peklun's sleep apnea interfered with a major life activity. As a result, there was sufficient evidence that Peklun was handicapped within the meaning of the FHA. Further, the absence of any certification or training did not permit TDM to immediately deny the request for Peklun's assistance animal. In fact, the court observed that Peklun was previously granted an accommodation for Julia on the basis that she was an “emotional support animal” in 2011; that knowledge of the 2011 accommodation was imputed to TDM's current board. The court did note that Section 3604(9) states there is no obligation to honor a request that would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other tenants. However, the court noted that determining this threat is a question of fact, not a question of law. The issue of Speciale's allergies "is contentious and the Court declines to grant judgment based on a hotly debated factual dispute." As a result, the cross motions for summary judgment by each party were denied. |
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Peloquin v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury |
The finders of a stray cat were able to maintain a conversion suit against their neighbors who trapped the cat and brought it to a shelter where it was euthanized.
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Pennsylvania Law of Session of 1860: Cruelty to Animals |
Section 46 of Pennsylvania Session Law from 1860 covers cruelty to animals. The section describes what is cruelty to animal and the punishment for it. |
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Pennsylvania Statute Law 1920: Article 14: Criminal Law |
Pennsylvania laws concerning the criminal punishment for cruelty to animals from 1921. The laws cover such topics as transportation of an animal to the powers of an agent from any anti-Cruelty society. |
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Pennsylvania Statute Laws 1920: Article 16: Agriculture Laws |
Pennsylvania laws concerning the treatment of animals in agriculture. The laws cover such topics as maiming and disfiguring animals to the transportation of an animal. |
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People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery |
This case is an appeal from a Supreme Court judgment denying petitioner's application for an order to show cause to commence a CPLR article 70 proceeding. At issue is the legal status of a chimpanzee named Tommy who is being kept on respondents' property. Petitioners filed a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 on the ground that Tommy was being unlawfully detained by respondents. They offered support via affidavits of experts that chimpanzee have the requisite characteristics sufficient for a court to consider them "persons" to obtain personal autonomy and freedom from unlawful detention. The Court of Appeals here is presented with the novel question on whether a chimpanzee is a legal person entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus. In rejecting this designation, the Court relied on the fact that chimpanzees cannot bear any legal responsibilities or social duties. As such, the Court found it "inappropriate to confer upon chimpanzees the legal rights . . . that have been afforded to human beings." |
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People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ. |
Plaintiff-appellee, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), began this case by issuing eight public records requests to defendant-appellant Louisiana State University (LSU). PETA made these records seeking veterinary care and disposition records for birds used in LSU’s laboratories. For the first seven of these requests, LSU did not produce the records, so PETA filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief pursuant to the Public Records Law. LSU denied PETA’s allegations and did not produce the records, so PETA made an eighth records request, which LSU responded to with an assertion that the requested records were exempt from disclosure. After a hearing, the trial court issued an oral ruling in favor of PETA and granted some of the records that PETA requested. LSU appealed. On appeal, the court considered whether the records sought by PETA were covered under the Public Records Law. The court first found that LSU qualifies as a research facility under the Animal Welfare Act, and needs to comply with federal law and maintain and produce records relating to research animals, so long as the records being sought would not be unduly burdensome to produce. The court held that the portions of the judgment ordering LSU to produce veterinary daily observation reports, veterinary daily health check records, and other veterinary records were affirmed. However, some of the information sought, including private communications between LSU employees, trapping records, and some videographic records, were considered unduly burdensome to compel LSU to produce. The court also amended a portion of one of the requests to make it more specific and narrow the documentation that LSU would need to produce. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, amended in part, and reversed in part. |
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People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd. |
In this Nevada case, respondent Berosini claimed that two animal rights organizations, PETA and Performing Animal Welfare Society (PAWS), and three individuals defamed him and invaded his privacy. The trial court entered judgment on jury verdicts on the libel and invasion of privacy claims in the aggregate amount of $4.2 million. On appeal, this Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict and reversed the judgment. The court found that the videotapes of Berosini beating his animal performers before the show was not libelous because they were not false or defamatory. The videotape was not “false” because it was an accurate portrayal of the manner in which Berosini disciplined his animals backstage before performances and it was not not defamatory because Berosini took the position that the shaking, punching, and beating that appear on the tape were necessary, appropriate and “justified” for the training, discipline, and control of show animals. With regard to his invasion of privacy claims, the videotaping did not invade the scope of Berosini's expectation of privacy because his asserted expectation was "freedom from distracting intrusion and interference with his animals and his pre-act disciplinary procedures." Thus, the filming did not intrude upon Berosini's
expected
seclusion.
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People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium |
PETA, an animal rights organization, brought this action in July 2015 to enjoin the Miami Seaquarium. The injunction would force the marine park to relinquish possession of a killer whale, Lolita, by releasing her to a sea pen. The grounds for this injunction is an alleged violation of section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act by the marine park when they confined the killer whale in such conditions that the confinement amounted to a taking of the endangered species of animal. PETA specifically alleged that the marine park took Lolita by harming and harassing her, citing thirteen different injuries that were directly caused by her confinement quarters. When Lolita’s species was recognized as an endangered species by the Act, it specifically excluded captive members of the species. Just two months prior to filing suit, PETA had successfully lobbied to have that exclusion removed from the listing, enabling the suit itself. The district court held for summary judgment in favor of the marine park, saying that to have taken an animal would require a grave threat or potential for a grave threat to the animal’s survival, and PETA did not provide evidence of conduct that met that standard. In this appeal, the court affirms the district court’s summary judgment, but disagrees with their standard for a taking of an animal. After lengthy analysis of the statutory language, this court lowers the standard to posing a threat of serious harm to the animal, rather than death of the animal. However, this court also holds that PETA did not prove that the Seaquarium’s confinement of Lolita met this standard either. Affirmed. |
