United States
Title | Summary |
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Balen v. Peltier (NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED AS UNPUBLISHED AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY MINN. ST. SEC. 480A.08(3). |
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Ballas v Ballas |
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Banasczek v. Kowalski |
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Banks v. Adair |
In this Georgia dog bite case, plaintiffs appealed a directed verdict for the defendant. The Court of Appeals held that the verdict was properly directed for defendant where there was no evidence that established the defendant's knowledge of his dog's propensity to bite or injure humans. |
Barber v. Pennsylvania Dept. Agriculture |
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Bard v. Jahnke |
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Barger v. Jimerson |
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BARKING HOUND VILLAGE, LLC., et al. v. MONYAK, et al. | In 2012, Plaintiffs Robert and Elizabeth Monyaks took their dogs Lola and Callie, for ten days to a kennel owned by Defendants Barking Hound Village, LLC (“BHV”) and managed by William Furman. Callie, had been prescribed an anti-inflammatory drug for arthritis pain. However, three days after picking up their dogs from BHV, Lola was diagnosed with acute renal failure and died in March 2013.The Monyaks sued BHV and Furman for damages alleging that while at the kennel Lola was administered toxic doses of the arthritis medication prescribed for Callie. BHV and Furman moved for summary judgment on all the Monyaks' claims asserting that the measure of damages for the death of a dog was capped at the dog's fair market value and the Monyaks failed to prove that Lola had any market value. The Court of Appeals concluded that the proper measure of damages for the loss of a pet is the actual value of the dog to its owners rather than the dog’s fair market value. The court stated that the actual value of the animal could be demonstrated by reasonable veterinary and other expenses incurred by its owners in treating injuries, as well as by other economic factors. However, evidence of non-economic factors demonstrating the dog's intrinsic value to its owners would not be admissible. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed in part and held that the damages recoverable by the owners of an animal negligently killed by another includes both the animal's fair market value at the time of the loss plus interest, and, in addition, any medical and other expenses reasonably incurred in treating the animal. The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he value of [a] dog may be proved, as that of any other property, by evidence that he was of a particular breed, and had certain qualities, and by witnesses who knew the market value of such animal, if any market value be shown.” The Supreme Court also affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and found no error in the court's determination that Georgia precedent does not allow for the recovery of damages based on the sentimental value of personal property to its owner. |
Barnes v. City of Anderson |
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Barnes v. State | In this Florida case, Appellant challenges his judgment and sentence for two counts of misdemeanor animal cruelty, asserting that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. The conviction stems from an incident in 2023, where Appellant discovered two dogs that killed three of his chickens. Appellant found the offending dogs a short distance later, where he shot and killed both dogs. At trial, the state did not contest Appellant's evidence and Appellant pleaded no contest to two counts of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor animal cruelty, while specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The trial court withheld adjudication and sentenced Appellant to concurrent terms of 11 months and 29 days of probation. On appeal here, the court observed that the plain language of section 767.03, titled "Good defense for killing dog," provides Appellant with a defense and the trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss. The dogs killed chickens, defined under Florida law as "domestic animals," and section 767.03 constitutes a good defense to killing dogs who were found killing livestock or domestic animals. The court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions to vacate Appellant's judgment and sentences. |