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Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, MN |
After an 8th Circuit decision to affirm the district court's summary judgment against Szabla and to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the City of Brooklyn Park, the City of Brooklyn Park filed a petition requesting a hearing en blanc. The 8th Circuit granted the petition, but limited the en blanc hearing to the issues raised in the city’s petition. In all other respects, however, the Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Mn., 429 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 2005) panel opinion and judgment were reinstated. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Minnesota, 486 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2007).
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Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Mn. |
A homeless man was mistaken for the driver of a crashed car while sleeping in a public park and was bitten by a police dog. The homeless man brought claims under Section 1983 claiming his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the police department and city, but the Court of Appeals remanded the issue of excessive force.
Rehearing en Banc Granted in Part,
Opinion Vacated in Part by
Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, MN
, 429 F.3d 1289 (8th Cir., 2006).
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Taft v. Taft |
In this Georgia case, an adult son, who was business invitee, brought an action against his father to recover for injuries sustained when he was attacked by his father's bull while attempting to corral it for market. The lower court entered judgment for son, and father then appealed. The Court of Appeals, held that it for the jury to determine questions as to proximate cause, viciousness of bull, assumption of risk, superior or equal knowledge, contributory negligence, and negligence of the plaintiff. The failure of the trial court to charge adequately on proximate cause required a reversal, notwithstanding appellant's lack of a timely and proper request for a specific proximate cause charge. Judgment reversed.
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Take It to the Limit: The Illegal Regulation Prohibiting the Take of Any Threatened Species Under the Endangered Species Act |
Part II of this article will provide a brief background on the adoption of the Endangered Species Act. Part III will explain that the statute does not authorize the agencies to extend the take prohibition to all threatened species. Part IV will argue that returning to the statutory scheme would result in a fairer distribution of the costs of species protection by imposing the costs of prophylactic protection on agencies and the public generally. Burdening individuals would be a last resort, as Congress intended. Finally, Part V will identify how Congress' policy is a reasonable way to align private incentives with species protection. The statute's approach would encourage property owners to stop a threatened species' further slide, to avoid imposition of the take prohibition, and to recover endangered species to the point where they can be downlisted and the take prohibition lifted. This would make the statute more effective at accomplishing its primary goal - recovering species to the point that they no longer require protection. |
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Take Me Home Rescue v. Luri |
Defendant Luri appeals an injunction against her to return a foster dog that she failed to have spayed in accordance with an agreement between her and Take Me Home pet rescue organization. In finding that the trial court did not err in issuing the injunction, the court found that Take Me Home had a reasonable likelihood for success on the merits of its breach of contract claim because the original agreement was amended by a separate oral agreement that the dog would be spayed after recovering from a bout of mange. Further, in assessing the balance of harms, the court found that it favored Take Me Home. While Luri can either spay the dog or adopt a new one, the organization's "entire existence depends on its ability to place pets that it obtains from shelters in adoptive homes."
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Tarquinio v. City of Lakewood, Ohio (unpublished) |
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment from the court that Lakewood City Ordinance (“LCO”) 506.01, which bans pit bull dogs or those dogs with "appearance and characteristics of being predominantly of such breeds," unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution Home Rule provisions. In this motion, plaintiffs argue that LCO 506 conflicts with and impermissibly expands the provisions of Ohio Revised Code § 955.22. The court found that while § 955.22 outlines requirements that must be met by a person who houses vicious dogs, including all pit bulls, it does not explicitly permit pit bulls. The court found that the General Assembly intended to allow municipalities to regulate the possession of pit bulls.
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Taub v. State of Maryland |
Maryland Court of Appeals held that animal-cruelty statute did not apply to researchers because there are certain normal human activities to which the infliction of pain to an animal is purely incidental and unavoidable.
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Taylor v. Howren |
A family friend wanted to ride a horse and the horse owner told him it was rideable, despite knowing the horse was not fully trained yet. The family friend sued after being kicked in the eye, knocked unconscious and paralyzed by the horse. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment for the horse owner on the basis that there was still a genuine issue of material fact as to the horse owner's immunity under the Equine Activities Act.
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TEACHING POSTHUMANIST ETHICS IN LAW SCHOOL: THE RACE, CULTURE, AND GENDER DIMENSIONS OF STUDENT RESISTANCE |
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Ten Hopen v. Walker |
Defendant was convicted of wilfully and maliciously killing a dog. On appeal, the court found the instructions proper and held that a plaintiff could recover exemplary damages in addition to market value as compensation, not as punitive damages. The court also found that the killing of a dog is not justified by trespass because there are remedies for destruction of property by animals of another.
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