United States
Title | Summary |
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ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT LISTINGS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: AVOIDING THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM | |
Endangered Species Act Split-Listing Chart for Chimpanzees | |
Engquist v. Loyas |
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ENVIRONMENTALLY FRIENDLY RANCHING? AN INTERVIEW ON THE HIGH DESERT | |
Equine Activity Liability | |
EQUITY AS A PARADIGM FOR SUSTAINABILITY: EVOLVING THE PROCESS TOWARD INTERSPECIES EQUITY | |
Erie County Society ex rel. Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Hoskins |
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Eriksson v. Nunnink | In this case a deceased horse rider's parents (Erikssons) have brought wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress actions against the rider's coach after she fell from her horse in competition and died. Due to a release form signed by the parents, the coach (Nunnink) could only be held liable if he was found grossly negligent. The parents attempted to show that the coach was grossly negligent in allowing the rider to compete after injuries sustained by the horse. This court concluded that the Erikssons failed to establish that Nunnink was grossly negligent. The court affirmed the judgment. |
Eshleman v. Key | A county police officer failed to securely fasten her police dog’s portable kennel; the dog escaped as a result and attacked an 11 year old boy. The father of the boy sued the county police officer, alleging that she failed to restrain the dog. The officer moved for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity. The trial court denied her motion and the appeals court affirmed that decision. On issuing a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. As a county police officer and dog handler, the Court stated the officer was responsible for the care and maintenance of the dog at all times, even when she was not working. For that reason, the allegation that she failed to secure the dog outside her home concerned her performance of an official function and was presumptively entitled to official immunity—with two exceptions to that presumption. Since the father had not contended that the officer acted with malice or with intent to injure anyone, the issue was whether the officer acted with negligence in the performance of a ministerial function. Since the county had not given the officer specific directions about the extent to which the dog should be restrained and since a generalized duty of care stated in a state statute and county ordinance was not enough to amount to a ministerial duty, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. |
Eslin v. County of Suffolk |
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