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In the MATTER OF the TITLE, BALLOT TITLE AND SUBMISSION CLAUSE FOR 2021-2022 #16 |
Opponents of an initiative in Colorado petitioned for a review of the Ballot Title Setting Board's decisions regarding the initiative's title, ballot title, and submission clause. The initiative proposed to amend the state's criminal animal cruelty statutes by ending certain exemptions for livestock, creating a safe harbor for their slaughter with certain conditions, and expanding the definition of "sexual act with an animal." The opponents alleged that the initiative violated the single subject requirement by covering multiple subjects. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the central focus of the initiative was to extend animal cruelty statutes to cover livestock. The initiative's safe harbor provision for the slaughter of livestock did not violate the single subject rule. The initiative's expansion of the definition of "sexual act with an animal" violated the single subject rule. The Court reversed the lower court's decision. |
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In the Matter of: Akiko Kawahara, Respondent |
The principle issue in this case is whether the planned stopover of a few hours in Kennedy Airport in New York constitutes an "importation" within the meaning of the MMPA. The respondent in this case was employed by a business dealing in the international trade of animals and was attempting to bring four dolphins captured off the coast of Argentina back to Japan. The respondent only landed the dolphins in New York as a stopover on their way to Tokyo, but the court found that there was no requirement of knowledge or specific intent under the MMPA to constitute civil violations.
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In the Matter of: Darcy Lynn Shawyer |
This case is a civil penalty proceeding under the MMPA for the unlawful importation of eight bottlenose porpoises into the United States. In this case, the court found that specific intent is not required for importation under the MMPA. The court found that the route taken over the United States, the requirement to land for customs clearance purposes, or weather conditions was known or should have been foreseeable to all parties.
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In the Matter of: Richard O'Barry |
In 1999, civil penalties in the amount of $59,500 were assessed for the release of two dolphins from captivity. The dolphins were not prepared to survive in the wild and sustained life-threatening injuries as a result of their release. An administrative law judge found that the release of two dolphins without providing them with the necessary skills for survival resulted in harassment and injury to them, and therefore, constituted a violation of the MMPA.
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In the Matter of: Thomas E. Rainelli |
This case involves violations of the MMPA by taking, in the form of harassment by feeding or attempting to feed wild dolphins. The respondents, a captain of a vessel used in a dolphin-feeding encounter, and the sole shareholder of a boat renal company, were both found guilty and assessed civil penalties in the amount of $4500. Though the shareholder was not on the vessel when it committed the feeding violations, he was found guilty of violating the MMPA, by providing a platform from which feeding is conducted or supported.
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In the Matters of: Kyle C. Mueller, et al |
The question in this case was whether respondents, members of a marine mammal conservation group, violated the MMPA by interfering with the authorized capture of six dolphins. As result of this case, which was a civil penalty proceeding, only one of the respondents was found guilty of taking under the MMPA. The court found that the respondent's actions, although taken with noble intentions, endangered the lives of the dolphins, was improper, and dangerous. He was assessed a fine in the amount of $2,000.
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INCORPORATING ANIMAL LAW INTO PRIVATE PRACTICE |
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Index for Animal Law Volume 7 |
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Indiana Dept. of Natural Resources v. Whitetail Bluff, LLC |
Appellee established a business that allowed for "high fence" hunting, which refers to hunting wild animals on property that is enclosed by a fence, of privately-owned whitetail deer. The pivotal question in this appeals case was whether the Indiana Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) was correct in asserting that the current statutory scheme prohibited this practice, and therefore allowed the agency to promulgate rules effectuating that prohibition. The Indiana Court of Appeals held that IDNR did not have the power to regulate fish and wildlife that were legally owned or held in captivity under a license. The IDNR therefore went beyond its express powers conferred upon it by the General Assembly when it promulgated rules that prohibited "high fence" hunting. The lower court's grant of summary judgment to the appellee was affirmed. |
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Indiana v. Massachusetts |
A coalition of multiple states filed a lawsuit against Massachusetts in the U.S. Supreme Court. Thirteen states, Indiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, filed suit against the state of Massachusetts in response to the animal welfare laws created by Massachusetts Question 3. The states claimed to have direct standing to challenge the Massachusetts law because state agencies and instrumentalities own and operate farms that are subject to the Massachusetts law and wish to continue to sell products to other states, including Massachusetts. The states also claimed parens patriae standing on behalf of farmers and consumers within their borders that would be affected by the Massachusetts law. The plaintiff states filed suit in the U.S. Supreme Court requesting that the Court declare the Massachusetts law unconstitutional. The Court denied the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint because hearing the case would not be an appropriate use of the Court’s original jurisdiction. The Court stated that, in order to resolve plaintiff’s challenge and address the issues of standing and the merits of the case, the Court would need to resolve complex factual disputes. The Court reasoned that such disputes are better suited to resolution in federal district court, not the U.S. Supreme Court.
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