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Journal of Animal and Natural Resource Law, Vol. 11
Journal of Animal and Natural Resource Law, Vol. 12
Journal of Animal and Natural Resource Law, Vol. 14
Journal of Animal and Natural Resource Law, Vol. 15
Joy Road Area Forest and Watershed Association v. California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection


The California Department of Forestry approved a developer's Timber Harvest Plan of cutting trees down to build a housing development. The court found that The California Department of Forestry abused its discretion by approving the Timber Harvest Plan because it had not given the public sufficient information about the plan, including the impact on the Northern Spotted Owl before approving it, and because the Timber Harvest Plan did not adequately address the issue of how the plan would affect water quality in the area.

Juelfs v. Gough

In this case, the husband and wife had agreed to shared ownership of their dog, which the lower court incorporated into its order.Based on danger the dog faced by other dogs in the wife’s home and increased contention between the parties, the lower court next gave the husband custody with an order for the wife’s visitation, and finally awarded sole custody to the husband.


The state’s Supreme Court affirmed the modified order.

Jurewicz v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture


Using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the United States Humane Society requested that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) disclose a certain Animal Welfare Act form. Arguing that two FOIA exemptions prevented the USDA from releasing certain information on this form (the number of dogs that they buy and sell each year and their annual revenue from dog sales), three Missouri dog breeders and dealers sought to prevent this information’s disclosure. After finding that the public interests in disclosing the information outweighed the privacy concerns for the breeders, the district court granted the USDA's and the U.S. Humane Society's motion for summary judgment.    


Just Puppies, Inc. v. Brown The plaintiffs, including retail pet stores and a USDA-licensed breeder, challenged Maryland's 2021 Pet Store Statute, which prohibits retail pet stores from selling or transferring dogs and cats, alleging it conflicts with the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and violates the Commerce Clause. The Pet Store Statute aims to curb the sale of dogs from "puppy mills" by banning retail pet stores and brokers from selling dogs, while exempting breeders who sell animals born at their establishments. Plaintiffs argued that the statute effectively shifts dog sales from regulated retail pet stores sourcing from out-of-state breeders to unregulated internet sales and local breeders, undermining the AWA's regulatory framework. The AWA establishes federal standards for the humane treatment of animals, including licensing requirements for breeders and brokers, but explicitly allows states to enact additional animal welfare regulations. The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the AWA preempts the Pet Store Statute, finding no conflict because the AWA does not occupy the field of animal welfare regulation and permits concurrent state laws. Plaintiffs also argued that the statute obstructs the AWA's objectives by eliminating USDA-licensed brokers from the Maryland market, but the court found no evidence that the statute impedes federal licensing or inspection processes. The court dismissed plaintiffs' Commerce Clause claims, finding no discriminatory purpose or effect against out-of-state breeders, as the statute applies equally to in-state and out-of-state entities and does not prohibit interstate sales. The statute allows out-of-state breeders to sell directly to Maryland consumers, either in person or online, and does not regulate sales occurring wholly outside Maryland. The court upheld the statute's legitimacy, recognizing Maryland's interest in addressing puppy mills, protecting consumers from unhealthy animals, and reducing shelter populations, which are valid state police powers. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, concluding that the Pet Store Statute is not preempted by the AWA and does not violate the Commerce Clause, as it regulates animal welfare within Maryland's traditional authority. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
Just Puppies, Inc. v. Frosh The State of Maryland passed a “No More Puppy-Mill Pups Act” which went into effect January 1, 2020. The Act prohibits retail pet stores in Maryland from offering for sale or otherwise transferring or disposing of cats or dogs. Four pet stores, a dog breeder, and a dog broker filed suit against Brian Frosh, the Attorney General of Maryland, the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Maryland Attorney General (CPD), the Maryland House Economic Matters Committee, and the Maryland State Senate Finance Committee seeking an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Act as well as a declaration that it is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Defendants were all entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, unless an exception were to apply. Under the Ex parte Young exception “private citizens may sue state officials in their official capacities in federal court to obtain prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal law.” The CPD and Committee Defendants were not State officials and, therefore, they did not fall within the Ex parte Young exception. The Ex parte Young exception, however, applied to Mr. Frosh as he was the Attorney General of Maryland since he had some connection with the enforcement of the Act. In Counts I, II, and III, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause. The Court found that the Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the Act discriminated against out-of-state breeders and brokers in its text, in its effect, or in its purpose. Count IV alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act was preempted by the AWA. The Court found that prohibiting Maryland pet stores from selling dogs or cats had no effect on the operation of the AWA. The Puppy-Mill Act's impact on pet stores did not clash with the AWA, because pet stores were explicitly exempt from the AWA. Count V alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to the equal protection of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court found no merit in this argument. Count VI asserted that the Act created a monopoly prohibited by Article 41 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court found that the Puppy-Mill Act did not constitute an exclusive right to sell cats and dog in Maryland. Although the Act prohibited brick and mortar stores from participating in the sale of cats and dogs, consumers still had a plethora of choices when seeking to obtain a pet, including rescue shelters, animal control units, USDA licensed breeders and brokers, and unregulated hobby breeders. The Court ultimately dismissed all claims against the CPD and the Committee Defendants and allowed the claims against Brian Frosh to proceed.
Justice by and through Mosiman v. Vercher The Oregon Court of Appeals, as a matter of first impression, considers whether a horse has the legal capacity to sue in an Oregon court. The Executive Director of Sound Equine Options (SEO), Kim Mosiman, filed a complaint naming a horse (“Justice”)as plaintiff with the Mosiman acting as his guardian, and claiming negligence against his former owner. In the instant appeal, Mosiman challenges the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss. In 2017, defendant's neighbor persuaded defendant to seek veterinary care for her horse. The veterinarian found the horse to be about 300 pounds underweight with significant walking difficulties and other maladies. The horse was voluntarily surrendered to Mosiman who eventually nursed the animal back to good health. In 2018, Mosiman filed a complaint on Justice's behalf for a single claim of negligence per se, alleging that defendant violated the Oregon anti-cruelty statute ORS 167.330(1) by failing to provide minimum care. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that a horse lacks the legal capacity to sue and the court granted dismissal. Specifically, the trial court expressed concern over the "profound implications" of allowing a non-human animal to sue and stated that an appellate court could come to a different conclusion by "wad[ing] into the public policy debate involving the evolution of animal rights." Here, the appellate court first found no statutory authority for a court to appoint a guardian for an animal because "a horse inherently lacks self-determination and the ability to express its wishes in a manner the legal system would recognize." The animal has a "distinctive incapacity" that sets it apart from humans with legal disabilities that require appointment of a legal guardian. The court reaffirmed the law's treatment of animals as personal property and found no support in the precedent for permitting an animal to vindicate its own legal rights. While Oregon's animal welfare laws recognize animals as beings capable of feeling pain, this makes them a special type of property and imposes duties on the human owners rather than rights to the animal victims. The court held that only human beings and legislatively-created legal entities are persons with the capacity to sue under Oregon common law. The court emphasized that this holding does not prevent Oregon laws from ever recognizing an animal as a legal person, but the courts are not the appropriate vehicle to do that. Accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

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