United States
Title | Summary |
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Loman v. Freeman | This case concerns surgical procedures performed on a racehorse that rendered the horse unfit for future racing. The horse's owners brought this action against the veterinarians who performed the surgical procedure, alleging negligence and conversion. The circuit court dismissed and the court of appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. At the state supreme court, the court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The court found that defendant was permanently deprived of the use of the horse due to its lameness from the surgery, which sustained the claim of conversion. |
Long v. Noah's Lost Ark, Inc. |
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Long v. The State of Texas |
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Longhi v. APHIS |
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Looking for a Good Home: Balancing Interests in the Disposition of Impounded Animals to Owners and Rescues | This Article explores the scope of governmental authority to interfere with or terminate the property rights of pet owners in the interest of efficiency and effectiveness. Part I sets out the regulatory framework for local animal control programs, describing the process for handling and disposing of stray animals and the provisions designed to help reunite owners with their pets. Part II then turns to the issue of post-redemption ownership, discussing the recognized reach of the law and its limitations as well as the cases that have contemplated termination of an owner’s rights to a pet. Part III explores the policy reasons that support a clear demarcation of when ownership of an unclaimed, impounded animal should be established in the government, making possible a clear transfer of title from a public shelter to an adopter or transferee, and Part IV suggests means by which a local government might increase the possibility of reuniting an owner with a pet within the appropriate timeframe to avoid the conflicts created by late-redeeming owners. |
Lopez v. State |
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Los Altos Boots v. Bonta | This unpublished California case considers the application of the recently amended statute (Penal Code section 653o), which makes it "unlawful to import into this state for commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of an iguana, skink, caiman, hippopotamus, or a Teju, Ring, or Nile lizard" beginning January 1, 2022. The instant case concerns the importation of some caiman products. The businesses bringing the suit seek the enjoin the caiman prohibition while the lawsuit is pending. While the state contends that the plaintiffs lack standing because the claim is unripe, the court found the three-part standing test was satisfied. The court also found that the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction was justified where plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits, the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable economic harm if section 653o goes into effect on January 1st that cannot not be mitigated by damages, and the balance of harms favors plaintiffs. Specifically, the court found that section 653o will create a "clear conflict between that section and the Endangered Species Act" and plaintiffs have demonstrated a serious harm to their businesses. The court declined to "wade into a policy dispute "whether California's or the United States’ wildlife protections are superior." The motion for a preliminary injunction was granted. The defendants, their employees, agents, and successors in office are enjoined from enforcing California Penal Code sections 653o(c) and 653r in connection with the importation, possession, or sale of caiman bodies, parts, or products until the final disposition of this case. |
Lost Dogs | |
Louisiana v. Caillet, Jr. |
Twenty- six people where charged with dog fighting in violation of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:102.5 for paying a fee to be spectators at a dog fight. They filed a motion to quash, urging that the indictments failed to charge a punishable offense; they were denied the motion. Thereafter, 11 defendants applied for supervisory writs, the appellate court granted the motion to quash, holding that § 14:102.5 did not proscribe paying a fee to be a spectator at a dog fight. |
LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. WATSON |
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