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Titlesort descending Summary
ME - Transport - § 2087. Transporting dogs in open vehicle regulated This Maine law regulates the transporting of dogs in open vehicles (like pick-up trucks or convertibles). Under the law, a person driving an open vehicle may not transport a dog in the open portion of that vehicle on a public way unless the dog is protected in a manner that prevents the dog from falling or jumping or being thrown from the vehicle. The law excludes transportation of a dog by a farmer engaged in agricultural activities involving the dog or a hunting dog that is between transported between hunting sites by a licensed hunter.
ME - Veterinary - Title 32. Professions and Occupations. These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners.
ME - Wildlife possession - Chapter 6. Educational & Scientific Collection Permit Rule This section establishes the rules in Maine for educational and scientific collection permits. A scientific collection permit is required by any person who wishes to take, transport or possess wild birds or animals and their parts or products for scientific research or educational purposes at any time of the year; and/or before any person may lawfully salvage, otherwise acquire, transport or possess wild birds and animals for any purpose not specifically covered under any other permit or license.
MEAT LABELING THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
Medical Research Animals
Medlen v. Strickland


[Reversed by Texas Supreme Court: 397 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2013)]. The Medlens sued Strickland for Avery's “sentimental or intrinsic value” because the dog had little or no market value and was irreplaceable. The trial court found that Texas law barred such damages, and dismissed the suit with prejudice. On appeal, the court stated that several opinions have supported damages based on sentimental or intrinsic value for personal property where the property has little or no market value. Because dogs are personal property that hold a special value to their owners, the court found that it was consistent to extend sentimental damages for the loss of a pet. The action was remanded for further proceedings.
Mejia v. State


Rooster fighting case. Testimony from the defendant's witness, a sociologist that argued cockfighting is not generally thought of as an illegal activity, was irrelevant in cruelty to animals conviction. Statute is not unconstitutionally vague.
Mellin v. Northern Security Insurance Company, Inc. This is an appeal brought by Mr. Mellin because his insurer, Northern, would not cover damages to Mellin's condominium caused by the odor of cat urine emanating from another tenant's condominium. This court reverses the lower court by deciding that the policy included pollution exclusion, but was ambiguous in whether that encompassed cat urine odor, so Mellin's claim is not precluded. The case was remanded for further proceedings. Two of the five judges dissent, concluding that the word 'pollutant' was defined and excluded cat urine odor.
Mercado v. Ovalle


In this New York case, plaintiff appealed the lower court's order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment in a dog bite case. Defendants, a grocery store and its owner, asserted that they did not own the two pit bulls that attacked plaintiff. The only evidence plaintiff presented showing defendants' ownership and control over the dogs were hearsay statements from the mechanic who operated the lot that the dogs guarded. The court found this evidence that defendants occasionally walked and fed the dogs insufficient to show that they "harbored" the dogs. Affirmed.
Merced v. Kasson


Plaintiff José Merced, a Santeria Oba Oriate, or priest, brought action against the City of Euless alleging that city ordinances prohibiting the keeping of animals for slaughter and the slaughtering of animals prevented him from performing animal sacrifices essential to Santeria religious practice. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled in favor of the city, but denied its request for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision in favor of the city and affirmed the denial of attorney fees. The court found that the city did not prove that the burden it placed on the plaintiff advanced a compelling interest and was the least restrictive means of doing so. In fact, the Court noted that prior to the ban, Merced had performed these sacrifices for sixteen years without creating health hazards or unduly harming any animals. The City's purported interest was further undermined by the fact that hunters are allowed to butcher dead animals at their homes. Thus, Euless failed to assert a compelling governmental interest in support of its ordinances that burden Merced's religious conduct. 

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