HABITAT-BASED CONSERVATION LEGISLATION: A NEW DIRECTION FOR SEA TURTLE CONSERVATION |
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Haefele v. Commonwealth |
Defendant Haefele was convicted of two counts of maliciously maiming the livestock of another, in violation of Code § 18.2-144, and two counts of conspiring to maliciously maim the livestock of another. The killing occurred in 2020. Defendant's neighbor possessed two goats on her property in Spotsylvania County and received several complaints. Ultimately, the code enforcement officer instructed the neighbor to remove the goats and even offered assistance in relocating them. However, about a month after this order, Defendant and two other men entered the neighbor's goat pen with the neighbor's permission and killed the goats with “what looked like a two-by-four with spikes wrapped around it." After investigation and review of video footage taken of the attack, Defendant and the two others were charged and convicted by bench trial in 2021. Testimony by an expert in veterinary pathology revealed that the animals suffered before they died. On appeal here, Defendant contends that he could not be convicted under Code § 18.2-144 “because the defendant [Haefele] was acting with the permission of, and in concert with, the owner of the animals in question.” The court disagreed, finding no language in the statute that limits the statute only to acts that were against the will of the owner. Defendant also claims he did not act with requisite malice because the “the owner of the goats had given him permission to act against the goats." Again, the court recounted the brutal and repeated acts against the goats that occurred over a ten-minute span. Thus, the evidence showed that Defendant acted with sufficiently demonstrated malice. While livestock owners can ask others to euthanize or properly slaughter their livestock, the manner in which Defendant caused the goats' deaths clearly demonstrated malicious intent. Thus, the trial court did not err in convicting Defendant under Code § 18.2-144 and the matter was affirmed and remanded. |
HAGEN v. LAURSEN |
Two Irish setters knocked down a neighbor while playing outside.
Previously no one had seen them run into anyone while playing.
They were not shown to have been more boisterous than dogs usually are.
There was no evidence that these dogs were vicious. The court found that there was no foreseeable risk of harm and therefore no duty upon which to base a claim of negligence.
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Haggblom v. City of Dillingham |
This is an owner's appeal of the city order which ordered her dog be euthanized or banished from city limits because the dog bit a person without provocation. The order had been affirmed by the superior court and is now in front of the state Supreme Court. Haggblom argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it does not provide meaningful process, and is too vague because it does not explicitly offer the alternative of banishment from city limits. This court found that due process was satisfied and that the ordinance is constitutionally clear, and thus affirms the order. |
Haines v. Hampshire County Commission |
A dog was impounded and adopted after being picked up by animal control officers. The owners of the dog brought suit over the adoption of their dog. The trial court dismissed the suit and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the dog's owners failed to state a claim.
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Hairston v. Burger King Corp. |
Louisiana appeals court affirmed trial court's finding that plaintiff failed to adequately link her stomach ailment with a burger purchased from Burger King and thus could not sustain an action that sought recovery of alleged damages suffering due to food poisoning.
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Hament v. Baker |
The custody of an eleven year old German wirehaired pointer was the central issue in this Vermont divorce case. While both parties testified to their strong emotional ties to the dog and to the care that each spouse provided, the Superior Court awarded custody to the husband. The wife appealed the Superior Court’s decision arguing that the court erred in refusing a joint arrangement, that the court’s finding was not supported by the evidence, and that this finding provided an arbitrary basis for award. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the family court division could consider factors not set out in 15 V.S.A. § 751(b); specifically, the welfare of the animal and the emotional connection between the animal and each spouse. The court found that both parties were afforded an opportunity to put on evidence regarding both factors without restriction in the Superior Court. The Supreme Court of Vermont also held that the Superior Court was correct in its statement that the family division could not enforce a visitation or shared custody order for companion animals. Unlike child custody matters, the court said, there is no legislative authority for the court to play a continuing role in the supervision of the parties with respect to the care and sharing of a companion animal. The Superior Court’s decision of awarding custody to the husband was therefore affirmed. |
Hamilton v. State |
In this Florida case, the 82-year-old defendant was convicted of a third-degree felony animal cruelty violation (section 828.12(2)) and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. Defendant had his dog on leash and approached too close to a cat, whereupon the leashed dog began to attack the cat. In reversing the decision, the appellate court found that defendant's conduct did not rise to a criminal level, as it was "objectively unlikely" that a leashed dog walking with his owner would inflict such damage. Further, while the issue of sentencing was rendered moot by the reversal, the court found the consideration of a petition with approximately 3,000 signatures demanding the maximum sentence, "an affront to the very notion of due process of law . . ."
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Hamlin v. Sullivan |
Plaintiff was walking her dog in an area of state where dogs go off-leash. Plaintiff and defendant were back in the parking lot talking when defendant's dog, who was still off-leash, ran into her, causing her to fall and sustain injuries. The appellate court found that plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to meet the burden establishing that the dog had a proclivity to run into people and knock them over. While testimony showed that the dog (Quinn) routinely ran up to people and put his paws on their chest to "greet" them, this was different than a propensity to knock people down. The court found that the behavior of jumping on people "was not the behavior that resulted in plaintiff's injury, and plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that defendant had notice of a proclivity by Quinn to run into people and knock them over. . ." The court also noted that the dog's rambunctious behavior, occurring at a dog park where dogs freely run around, was insufficient to establish vicious propensities. Summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed.
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Hammer v. American Kennel Club |
Plaintiff Jon Hammer is the owner of a pure-bred Brittany Spaniel which has a natural, undocked tail approximately ten (10) inches long. He contends that tail docking is a form of animal cruelty, and that the practical effect of defendant American Kennel Club's tail standards for Brittany Spaniels is to effectively exclude his dog from meaningfully competing shows unless he complies with what he perceives as an unfair and discriminatory practice. Specifically, his amended complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the complained-of standard (1) unlawfully discriminates against plaintiff by effectively precluding him from entering his dog in breed competitions, (2) is arbitrary and capricious, (3) violates Agriculture and Markets Law § 353, and (4) is null and void as in derogation of law; he further seeks an injunction prohibiting defendants from applying, enforcing or utilizing the standard. The court held that plaintiff lacked standing to obtain any of the civil remedies he sought for the alleged violation of Agriculture and Markets Law Section 353. The Legislature's inclusion of a complete scheme for enforcement of its provisions precludes the possibility that it intended enforcement by private individuals as well. The dissent disagreed with the majority's standing analysis, finding that plaintiff's object is not to privately enforce § 353, insofar as seeking to have the defendants' prosecuted for cruelty. Rather, plaintiff was seeking a declaration that the AKC's standard for judging the Brittany Spaniel deprives him of a benefit of membership on the basis of his unwillingness to violate a state law and, thus, he wanted to enjoin defendants from enforcing that standard against him. The dissent found that whether tail docking for purely cosmetic reasons violates § 353 is solely a question of law and entirely appropriate for a declaratory judgment. Cosmetic docking of tails was wholly unjustifiable under the law in the dissent's eyes. While plaintiff pointed out that docking may serve some purposes for hunting dogs, it is not a justification for docking the tails of non-hunting dogs, such as plaintiff's, for purposes of AKC competitions.
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