United States

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Titlesort descending Summary
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke In this case, the Center for Biological Diversity and Maricopa Audubon Society (collectively “CBD”) challenged the determination of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) that the Sonoran Desert Area bald eagle (“desert eagle”) is not a distinct population segment (“DPS”) eligible for listing under the Endangered Species Act. There are two requirements for DPS status: (1) the discreteness of the population segment in relation to the remainder of the species to which it belongs, and (2) the significance of the population segment to the species to which it belongs. Here, the parties agreed that the desert eagle population is discrete, but they disputed whether the population is significant. CBD argued that if FWS found that a population segment satisfies any of the four listed significance factors, it is required to conclude that the population segment is significant. The court held that FWS did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding that the desert eagle did not satisfy significance requirement for being a DPS, even though it found that the desert eagle satisfied the persistence requirement and one significance factors. The district court's grant of summary judgment to FWS was affirmed.
CULTURAL SOLIPSISM, CULTURAL LENSES, UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES, AND ANIMAL ADVOCACY This article explores the cultural similarities and differences relating to the relationship between humans and animals in a globalized world. The article acknowledges that cultural differences in a globalized world can have a profound impact on the efficacy of advocacy for the benefit of animals. Attempts in one nation to provide protection for animals can have unintended consequences in our globalized world. The problem that then presents itself is, given the potpourri of human cultures and the need to take a global view of animal rights advocacy, how can animal rights advocates most efficiently and successfully advocate for animals? This article addresses that issue.
Custer v. Coward


Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The plaintiffs' 5-year-old child was bitten by the defendants' dog while the plaintiffs were visiting the defendants, who were also their neighbors. While jumping on the defendants' trampoline, the plaintiffs' child fell onto the defendants' dog who bit the child on the leg and would not let go for a few minutes.  The plaintiffs contended at trial that the defendants' knowledge that the dog had "Wobbler's Syndrome," a cranial neck instability that causes leg problems, somehow put the defendants on notice of the dog's vicious propensity. However, the court discarded plaintiffs' argument, finding that is no evidence that Butkus had bitten or attempted to bite anyone before the incident. Further, there was no reason for the defendants to believe that the dog's leg condition would make it more apt to attack humans.

Custody of Pets in Divorce
Dallas Safari Club v. Bernhardt Individual elephant sport hunters and their hunting organizations (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”) seeking to import their sport-hunted elephant trophies from Africa into the United States. The Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the Service to process pending and subsequently filed permit applications. The African Elephant is listed as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and is also a species that is regulated by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”). All African elephant trophy imports require the Service to make an enhancement finding, meaning that the killing of the trophy animal will enhance the survival of the species, and issue an ESA permit. Additionally, certain African elephant trophy imports require a non-detriment finding and a CITES import permit. Historically, the Service made periodic countrywide enhancement and non-detriment findings, however, this came to a halt due to a Presidential tweet surrounding media criticism over the Service’s decision to lift the suspension on Zimbabwe’s ESA enhancement finding. The Court found that injunctive relief was not warranted because the Plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm as to any Plaintiff. The individual Plaintiffs argued that they had suffered both emotional harm and economic harm. However, the Plaintiffs were on notice that their applications could take a significant amount of time to process. Additionally, the emotional distress claimed by the Plaintiffs would be alleviated when the Service issues a decision either granting or denying their permit applications, therefore, the harm that the Plaintiffs were claiming was not irreparable. The Court found that the individual hunter Plaintiffs’ alleged emotional and economic injuries were insufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction. The organizational Plaintiffs argued that they each were suffering irreparable harm derivatively because the Service’s delay in processing permit applications would decrease the popularity of sport hunting in Africa and cause a decrease in funding for conservation efforts. The problem was that the organizational Plaintiffs offered no proof to substantiate this argument. The Court ultimately held that in light of the disruptions caused by COVID-19 and the diminished capacity of the Service to process permit applications during this unprecedented time, it would be unwise and not in the public interest to order the expeditious processing of sport trophy permit applications. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
Dancy v. State The Justice Court of Union County found Michael Dancy guilty of three counts of animal cruelty and ordered the permanent forfeiture of Dancy’s six horses, four cats, and three dogs. Dancy appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court ordered that the animals be permanently forfeited and found Dancy guilty. The circuit court also ordered Dancy to pay $39,225 for care and boarding costs for the horses. Dancy subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. Essentially, Dancy failed to provide adequate shelter, food, and water for the animals. The Court found that the circuit court properly released the animals to an animal protection organization. The Court also found that the reimbursement order was permissible. Two of Dancy’s three convictions were for violations of the same statute regarding simple cruelty, one for his four cats and one for his three dogs. The Court held that, according to the statute's plain language, Dancy’s cruelty to a combination of dogs and cats occurring at the same time "shall constitute a single offense." Thus, the State cannot punish Dancy twice for the same offense without violating his right against double jeopardy. For that reason, the court vacated Dancy’s second conviction of simple cruelty. The court affirmed the permanent forfeiture and reimbursement order and his other cruelty conviction.
Daniels v. Drake Plaintiff Damon Daniels appeals from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Drakes. The incident stems from an unprovoked dog bite at defendants' home. The Drakes live on a large, rural property in Indiana with no neighbors. The Drakes own five dogs including "Max," a large Great Dane. Max would roam the property unrestrained. Daniels is a FedEx driver. In September of 2020, Daniels entered the property to deliver a package. Upon approaching the residence, Daniels honked his horn a couple times to get the attention of Lisa Drake. Daniels, who was still inside the vehicle, asked Lisa if Max was "okay," to which Lisa indicated a "thumbs up." However, after walking toward Lisa with the package, Max barked once and then bit Daniels in the abdomen. Daniels sustained puncture wounds, a one-centimeter laceration, swelling and a hematoma from the bite. Approximately two months later, Daniels filed the instant complaint seeking damages related to the dog bite. The Drakes filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that they did not have actual knowledge of Max's vicious propensities prior to the bite. In response, Daniels contended that Great Danes have a "natural propensity" to be territorial, which is exacerbated by isolation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal here, the court explained that Indiana law states that knowledge of a dog's dangerous or vicious tendencies may not be inferred from a first-time, unprovoked bite, but that knowledge may be inferred where evidence shows that the particular breed to which the owner's dog belongs is known to exhibit such tendencies." While the court observed that the Drakes presented evidence of a lack of actual knowledge of Max's vicious propensities, the expert who testified on Great Dane behavior presented evidence that Great Danes might behave with "territorial aggressive tendencies" in a given situation. The Drakes argued on appeal (for the first time) that this evidence by a canine behavioral expert was "immaterial" and cannot be used to show what lay people would know about Great Danes. The court was unpersuaded by the Drakes' novel argument, and this created a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, this court reversed the order granting summary judgment for the Drakes and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Danielson v. Cnty. of Humboldt Appellant Candis Danielson was seriously injured by dogs owned by Donald Mehrtens on his property. The injuries were so severe that she lost the lower half of her right leg and sustained damage to her other leg and hand. After Danielson was injured, Mehrtens surrendered both dogs to Humboldt County, which resulted in them being declared vicious and euthanized. Mehrtens was also barred from owning dogs for three years. She filed this action for damages against numerous parties, including Mehrtens and the County of Humboldt (Humboldt County or County). The County demurred. This appeal concerns solely the cause of action against the County for its alleged failure to perform a mandatory duty. This court first noted the record demonstrated Mehrtens had at least five different incidents over more than ten years that involved either an attack by his dogs or a report to animal control (including reports on biting, failure to license, and failure to vaccinate). When Dainelson was attacked by Mehrtens dogs in 2021, she argued that the County was liable for her injuries because it failed to perform mandatory duties imposed by the Humboldt County Code like impoundment and euthanasia of dogs that are unvaccinated, unlicensed, and dangerous. The County contended that there is no mandatory duty under the county code, to which the lower court agreed.This court found that the Government Claims Act provides immunity to public entities and employees for legislative action or discretionary law enforcement activity as opposed to mandatory duties. Here, the county ordinance did not impose a mandatory duty for the officer to petition for a hearing after one of Mehrtens' dogs had bitten a neighbor months earlier. In addition, the officer did not have a mandatory duty to impound the dogs due for licensing and rabies vaccination concerns. Finally, the dangerous dog ordinances also did not mandate seizing or impounding the dogs. Within the compulsory rabies vaccination code, the county did not impose a mandatory duty to impound unvaccinated dogs that had bitten someone. The use of the term "shall" in section 547-8 only applied after officer exercised his or her discretion in conducting an investigation. Similarly, the use of the term "shall" in two instances of the chapter on rabies vaccination did not create a mandatory duty because the decision of whether to impound a dog at all was discretionary. While the court "sympathize[d] with her desire to be compensated for her injuries," the failure to identify a law that created "a mandatory duty which was breached by the County" does not exist here. The lower court was affirmed.
Daskalea v. Washington Humane Soc.


In relevant part, the District of Columbia’s Freedom from Cruelty to Animal Protection Act allows any humane officer to take possession of any animal to protect the animal(s) from neglect or cruelty. Plaintiffs, all of whom had their dogs seized under the Act, brought a Motion for Partial Summary Disposition for a count alleging that the Act is unconstitutional on its face and as customarily enforced. The United States District Court, District of Columbia, denied Plaintiffs’ motion without prejudice, finding the parties’ briefs in connection to the motion insufficient to determine whether an issue exists as to the Act‘s constitutionality.

Daskalea v. Washington Humane Soc.


Pet owners sued after their pets were seized, detained, injured, or destroyed by the Humane Society. Pet owners’ attempts to certify a class failed because the claims were not typical. The members of the proposed class allegedly suffered a wide range of deprivations, were provided with different kinds of notice, and claimed distinct injuries. The class certification motion was also denied because the proposed members sought individualized monetary relief.

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