United States
Displaying 1241 - 1250 of 4789
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| Eriksson v. Nunnink | In this case a deceased horse rider's parents (Erikssons) have brought wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress actions against the rider's coach after she fell from her horse in competition and died. Due to a release form signed by the parents, the coach (Nunnink) could only be held liable if he was found grossly negligent. The parents attempted to show that the coach was grossly negligent in allowing the rider to compete after injuries sustained by the horse. This court concluded that the Erikssons failed to establish that Nunnink was grossly negligent. The court affirmed the judgment. |
| Eshleman v. Key | A county police officer failed to securely fasten her police dog’s portable kennel; the dog escaped as a result and attacked an 11 year old boy. The father of the boy sued the county police officer, alleging that she failed to restrain the dog. The officer moved for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity. The trial court denied her motion and the appeals court affirmed that decision. On issuing a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. As a county police officer and dog handler, the Court stated the officer was responsible for the care and maintenance of the dog at all times, even when she was not working. For that reason, the allegation that she failed to secure the dog outside her home concerned her performance of an official function and was presumptively entitled to official immunity—with two exceptions to that presumption. Since the father had not contended that the officer acted with malice or with intent to injure anyone, the issue was whether the officer acted with negligence in the performance of a ministerial function. Since the county had not given the officer specific directions about the extent to which the dog should be restrained and since a generalized duty of care stated in a state statute and county ordinance was not enough to amount to a ministerial duty, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. |
| Eslin v. County of Suffolk |
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| Estis v. Mills | The Estis' sued the Mills for the wrongful killing and disposal of the Appellants’ German Shepherd. On appeal, the Appellants argue that the district court erred in permitting the Appellees to amend their original answer to now include an affirmative defense of immunity pursuant to La. R.S. 3:2654, which would relieve the Appellees of liability. Further, the Appellants contend that the district court erred in granting the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, asserting that there remain genuine issues of material fact, and notwithstanding liability for the death of the dog, the court erred in dismissing the Appellees’ claim for conversion. The parties were neighbors whose property was separated by an enclosed pasture where the Mills used to keep horses. Despite requests from Mills, the Estis' dogs would enter the pasture and harass the horses. In 2017, Mills discovered the dog yet again in the pasture with the horses, so Mr. Mills shot, killed, and disposed of the dog. Subsequently, the Estis family filed suit seeking damages for the intentional killing of the dog and disposing of the dog in a bayou approximately ten miles away. The lower court granted a motion in favor of the Mills agreeing that they had immunity from suit under La. R.S. 3:2654.1. On appeal to this court, the Estises argue that the Mills waived the immunity under the statute because they failed to affirmatively plead the defense in their answer to the pleadings. This court found that immunity had not been affirmative pled as required by statute. Consequently, the Mills received permission to amend their answer and plead the immunity provision. Following granting of the Mills' second motion for summary judgment based on the immunity statute, the Estises appeal that decision. As to Estis' argument that leave to amend the answer was erroneously granted, this court first noted that determination whether to allow pleadings to be amended is discretionary and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. The court found no evidence that there was bad faith in the decision to the amend the pleadings like delay. Further, there was no demonstration of prejudice from the granting of an amended answer. As to Estis' claim that summary judgment was erroneously granted, the court discussed a photograph that was submitted in evidence support showing a horse grazing with its back presented "indifferently" to the dog. The Mills countered with the evidence of an independent eyewitness to the incident who asserted that the dog harassed the horses. The court noted that issues of the credibility of evidence have no place in a summary judgment appeal. As a result, this court found that the lower court judge's statements that, in effect, weighed the credibility of the photograph versus the testimony of the witness were inappropriate. Thus, the lower court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. Finally, the court evaluated Estis' conversion claims for the disposal of the dog's dead body. This court said that, [i]f the court finds that the killing of the dog falls under La. R.S. 3:2654, then the claim for conversion of the dog's body does not survive. However, if there were personal items on the dog at the time of the killing, such as a tracking collar or items of other value, then a conversion claim can be made for those items. If the court determines that the immunity statute does not apply, then the claim for conversion and any other applicable damages may apply." Thus, the trial court's judgment to allow the motion to amend the pleadings was affirmed, the granting of the summary judgment was reversed, and the dismissal of Estis' claims for conversion was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. |
| Estis v. Mills | On September 11, 2017, Plaintiffs, Catherine Estis, Samuel Estis, and Thuy Estis brought this action against the Defendants, Clifton and Kimberly Mills, seeking damages for the shooting of the Plaintiff’s ten-month-old German Shepherd puppy, Bella. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants shot Bella, did not disclose to them that Bella had been shot, and dumped her body over ten miles away. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Defendants argued that they fell within the immunity afforded by a Louisiana statute that gives immunity to anyone who kills a dog that is not on the property of the owner and is harassing, wounding, or killing livestock. The Defendants alleged that Bella, the puppy, was harassing their horses. The Plaintiffs argued that the immunity afforded by the statute needed to be affirmatively pled by the Defendants and that the Defendants waived such immunity by failing to assert the affirmative defense in their original answer or any subsequent pleading. The Plaintiffs further argued that the motion for summary judgment would not have been granted if it were not for the immunity protections. The Court ultimately held that the Defendants failed to affirmatively plead the immunity statute and, therefore, it reversed and remanded the case to the lower court. |
| Ethical Management of Invasive Species The Burmese Python | |
| Eureka Township v. Petter | In this case, the Township brought action against property owners to enjoin the owners from possessing exotic animals on the property, operating an animal exhibition on the property, and operating a business pelting exotic animals on the property. The District Court invalidated the township's exotic animal ordinance as conflicting with state statute, determined that an animal exhibition was not a permissible use under the township's zoning ordinance, and permanently enjoined the owners from operating an animal exhibition and conducting any retail sales, except for horticultural products produced on the property. This court held that the exotic animals ordinance did not conflict with state statute nor was it preempted. Further, this court held that the property owners' grandfathered possession and exhibition of exotic animals was limited to one wolf; animal control officer exception to exotic animal possession was limited to temporary possession of exotic animals in conjunction with owner's work as an animal control officer; township was not estopped from enforcing its exotic animal ordinance; and interpreting zoning ordinance's language to require sale of horticultural products from the land itself was not inherently unreasonable. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion dismissed. |
| Evans v. Craig |
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| Evelyn Alexander Wildlife Rescue Ctr. Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation | Petitioners, licensed wildlife rehabilitators with New York Wildlife Rehabilitation Licenses (WRL), challenged two statewide modifications to the WRL pertaining to white-tailed deer, which became effective in 2016. Petitioners contend these actions violated the state Administrative Procedures Act (SAPA). Additionally, they argue the modifications were irrational, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and WRLs were improperly modified without a prior State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). The first modification limits the time white-tailed fawns can be held for rehabilitation to a period of only April 15 to September 15 (absent prior written approval). The second modification limits the maximum holding period for an adult white-tailed deer (before release or euthanization) to 48-hours. This court did not find either modification was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In response to the challenges, the state, through a wildlife biologist, contends they are intended to prevent habituation and the spread of chronic wasting disease (CWD). The explanatory statements provided for the modifications support reasonable and rational interpretations of rehabilitation and do not violate the SAPA. The September 15th cut-off day for fawns was based on scientific research conducted by the state's "Big Game Team" that sought to address issues of disease as well as "a documented pattern of licensed wildlife rehabilitators in New York who have been reluctant to either euthanize or release white-tailed deer." As to the modification for adult deer, there was a rational basis since that time period allows the care of a temporarily stunned deer in need of a short rehabilitation period balanced against disease and habituation concerns. The court also found that the issuance of WRL is a ministerial action exemption from environmental review under SEQRA. The petitions in this consolidated action were denied in their entirety and the proceeding dismissed. |
| Evolving Functions of Service and Therapy Animals and the Implications for Public Accommodation Access Rules |
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