|
Indiana Dept. of Natural Resources v. Whitetail Bluff, LLC |
Appellee established a business that allowed for "high fence" hunting, which refers to hunting wild animals on property that is enclosed by a fence, of privately-owned whitetail deer. The pivotal question in this appeals case was whether the Indiana Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) was correct in asserting that the current statutory scheme prohibited this practice, and therefore allowed the agency to promulgate rules effectuating that prohibition. The Indiana Court of Appeals held that IDNR did not have the power to regulate fish and wildlife that were legally owned or held in captivity under a license. The IDNR therefore went beyond its express powers conferred upon it by the General Assembly when it promulgated rules that prohibited "high fence" hunting. The lower court's grant of summary judgment to the appellee was affirmed. |
|
Indiana v. Massachusetts |
A coalition of multiple states filed a lawsuit against Massachusetts in the U.S. Supreme Court. Thirteen states, Indiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, filed suit against the state of Massachusetts in response to the animal welfare laws created by Massachusetts Question 3. The states claimed to have direct standing to challenge the Massachusetts law because state agencies and instrumentalities own and operate farms that are subject to the Massachusetts law and wish to continue to sell products to other states, including Massachusetts. The states also claimed parens patriae standing on behalf of farmers and consumers within their borders that would be affected by the Massachusetts law. The plaintiff states filed suit in the U.S. Supreme Court requesting that the Court declare the Massachusetts law unconstitutional. The Court denied the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint because hearing the case would not be an appropriate use of the Court’s original jurisdiction. The Court stated that, in order to resolve plaintiff’s challenge and address the issues of standing and the merits of the case, the Court would need to resolve complex factual disputes. The Court reasoned that such disputes are better suited to resolution in federal district court, not the U.S. Supreme Court.
|
|
Ing v. American Airlines |
A man shipped his dog on an American Airlines airplane, and the dog died shortly after landing. The court found that the contract signed prior to take-off limited the liability of the airline. However, the airline could be liable because after landing, the man had asked for his dog back, to give it veterinary care, but the airline took more than four hours to give it back. Also, the airline could be liable if the plane temperature had been higher than for which the contract called.
|
|
Initiative and Referendum Institute v. Herbert |
Motion of Western Wildlife Conservancy, et al., for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.
|
|
Initiative and Referendum Institute v. Walker |
Several plaintiffs - including six wildlife and animal advocacy groups, several state legislators and politicians, and more than a dozen individuals - bring a facial First Amendment challenge to the Utah constitution supermajority requirement for initiatives related to wildlife management. District court held the plaintiffs had standing, but dismissed the claims on their merit. On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court's decision.
|
|
Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc'y |
After the International Court of Justice ruled against Japan in the Whaling in the Antarctic case, Sea Shepherd moved to dismiss the Ninth Circuit’s earlier ruling regarding Sea Shepherd’s own actions in the Antarctic. Sea Shepherd claimed that because the Institute had announced that it would not engage in whaling in the 2014-15 season, its claim was moot. This argument, though, ignored the fact the Institute also stated that it plans to resume whaling in the future, leading the Court to dismiss the motion. |
|
Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc. |
The Institute of Cetacean Research, a Japanese whaling group, sued the direct action environmental protection organization Sea Shepherd, claiming that Sea Shepherd’s actions taken against the whaling group’s vessels in the Antarctic are violent and dangerous. The Institute claimed that Sea Shepherd had rammed whaling ships, thrown dangerous objects on to the ships, attempted to prevent them from moving forward, and navigated its vessels in such a way as to endanger the Japanese ships and their crews. The Institute’s request for an injunction was denied when the Court held that the Institute did not establish the necessary factors. The Court did state, however, that though Sea Shepherd’s acts did not constitute piracy, it did not approve of the organization’s methods or mission. |
|
Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc. |
After the Institute was denied an injunction in the trial court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an injunction preventing Sea Shepherd from attacking any of the Institute’s vessels in any way and from coming within 500 yards of any Institute vessel operating in the open sea. |
|
Institute of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc. |
Several whalers brought suit against Paul Watson and the Sea Shepard Society—of Animal Planet fame—under the Alien Tort Statute for acts that amounted to piracy and that violated international agreements regulating conduct on the high seas. Though the district court denied the whalers a preliminary injunction and dismissed the whalers' piracy claim, the Ninth Circuit found in favor for the whalers. The case was reversed and instructed to be transferred to another district judge; Circuit Judge Smith dissented on the instruction to transfer.
|
|
Institute of Marine Mammal Studies v. National Marine Fisheries Service |
The Institute of Marine Mammal Studies (IMMS) brought action against the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and others, alleging that NMFS regulations did not properly implement the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and that the NMFS was improperly administering placement list for rehabilitated sea lions that could not be reintroduced into the wild. Parties cross-moved for summary judgment. After considering the parties' arguments, the administrative record, and the relevant law, the District Court found that the IMMS lacked standing to bring its claim that NMFS regulations did not properly implement the Marine Mammal Protect Act ("MMPA"). Further, the Court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction of IMMS' claims that the NMFS was improperly administering a placement list for non-releasable sea lions. However, the Court found it may review the claims concerning the permit allowing IMMS to "take" sea lions. The Court found that a term included in IMMS' permit improperly delegated federal authority to third parties. The permit was therefore remanded to the agency for reconsideration. Each summary judgment motion was granted in part and denied in part. |
