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Mansour v. King County |
King County Animal Control issued an order requiring that Mansour to remove his dog from King County or give her up to be euthanized. On appeal, Mansour argued that the Board hearing violated his due process rights. The court of appeals agreed, finding that in order for Mansour, or any other pet owner, to effectively present his case and rebut the evidence against him, due process requires that he be able to subpoena witnesses and records.
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Manzke v. Jefferson County |
Joshua Pernat and Sara Manzke owned property that had four miniature goats and two geese on it. Sara (plaintiff) applied for a zoning variance and a conditional use permit to accommodate her emotional support animals. Jefferson County and the Town of Ixonia denied her applications. Sara then brought forth claims under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and Wisconsin’s Open Housing Act that she was discriminated against by Jefferson County and the Town of Ixonia. Joshua and Sara also sought a notice of removal of a small claims action brought forth by Jefferson County seeking monetary sanctions for the alleged violations of the zoning variance. Jefferson County argued that the plaintiff’s federal reasonable accommodation claim was not ripe because the County never made a final decision with respect to Sara’s applications for a variance and conditional use permit. When the Town of Ixonia voted to recommend that Jefferson County deny the plaintiff’s variance application, the plaintiff withdrew her applications from consideration. Sara argued that the town’s denial “foretold a denial by the County,” and any further appeal to the County would have been fruitless. The Court did not agree. The County had no obligation to follow the town’s recommendation. The Court dismissed plaintiff’s Fair Housing Amendments Act claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and accordingly dismissed plaintiff’s state law claim without prejudice. Since Sara was unable to state a federal claim, the Court also held that Sara and Joshua could not remove the small claim by Jefferson County to federal court. |
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Marek v. Burmester |
In this New York case, a bicyclist was injured after allegedly being chased and attacked by defendant's two dogs. The plaintiff-bicyclist sued to recover damages for his injuries. The Supreme Court , Putnam County, granted a defense motion for summary judgment, and the bicyclist appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that a genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether defendants had constructive notice of the dogs' proclivity to chase bicyclists on the roadway and as to whether those actions put others at risk of harm.
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Marine Mammal Conservancy, Inc. v. Department of Agr. |
A nonprofit organization petitioned for review of the order of administrative law judge (ALJ) which denied organization's motion to intervene in administrative proceedings under Animal Welfare Act. The Court of Appeals held that the organization's failure to appeal administrative denial to judicial officer precluded judicial review of ALJ's actions.
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Marine Wonderland & Animal Welfare Park, Ltd., v. Kreps |
The facts of this case deal with an Canadian amusement park that had dolphins in its possession en route to Canada when it was forced to land in the United States. In this case, the court found that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"), which is the agency charged with the administration of the MMPA, must be accorded first opportunity to interpret the meaning of "importation." The NOAA, as fact-finder and record-builder, is best suited to determine legal and factual determinations.
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Marino v. Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. |
Plaintiff animal welfare organizations sued the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and its parent agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, seeking to enforce conditions in permits held by SeaWorld. The permits authorize the capture and display of orcas and require display facilities to transmit medical and necropsy data to the NMFS following the death of an animal displayed under the terms of a permit. In 1994, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was amended such that it shifted authority to oversee conditions of marine mammals at exhibitors from NMFS to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). After three pre-1994 orcas died at SeaWorld, plaintiffs tried to convince NMFS that it still had the authority to enforce the pre-1994 rules related to release of records, but NMFS contended that its authority was extinguished in 1994. Plaintiffs brought suit, arguing that the NMFS's policy rests upon an arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the MMPA, and that its refusal to enforce the permit conditions was also arbitrary and capricious. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit for lack of standing. On appeal here, the court examined plaintiffs' standing under the three-part Lujan test. The court found a lack of redressability for the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts from which the court could infer the relief they seek would likely cause the NMFS to redress their alleged harms. In fact, because the MMPA language on permits is permissive, NMFS has discretion whether to enforce them. This is coupled with the fact that there is no evidence that third-party SeaWorld will turn over the reports even if NMFS were to direct them. Therefore, this court held that the district court did not err in determining that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue this case. Affirmed. |
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Marino v. University of Florida |
The petitioner in this Florida case sought records for 33 non-human primates whose captivity was documented by a USDA report. The University of Florida redacted certain portions of the records to obscure the physical housing location of the primates. The University contends that the information was confidential and exempt under Florida law as part of its "Security Plan." On appeal, this court first noted that under the Florida Public Records Act, all public documents are subject to public disclosure unless specifically legislatively exempted without considering public policy questions. The court reversed and remanded the case with instructions to release the records without redaction.
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Martin v. Columbia Greene Humane Society, Inc. |
A dog breeder was required to abstain from selling dogs for three years or else criminal charges would be reinstated for failing to file health certificates for the dogs they sold or report deaths due to contagious diseases. The breeder brought claims for malicious prosecution, tortious interference with a business relation, and section 1983 violations. The trial court denied defendants motion to dismiss and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part holding the complaint failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution and the humane society volunteer was entitled to statutory immunity as an unpaid officer of a not-for-profit corporation.
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Martinez v. Robledo |
These two consolidated California appeals address the measure of damages for the wrongful injury to a companion animal. Both respondents filed motions in limine concerning the issue of damages in the cases and, in both case, the trial court limited the measure of damages to the market value of the dogs. On appeal, the appellants argued that the measure of damages should go beyond market value to cover the reasonable costs of the pets' treatment. The appellate court found the recent case of Kimes v. Grosser (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1556 (decided after these appeals were filed) persuasive (where the court held that a plaintiff can recover reasonable and necessary costs where a pet is wrongfully injured). The court reasoned that otherwise, the injured animal's owner would bear the burden of all the costs of treatment, regardless of the wrongdoer's conduct. Moreover, this ruling reflects a basic principle of tort law - to make a plaintiff whole again - and accords with the different way animals, as property, are treated in the criminal arena. Thus, the court agreed with Kimes that allowing a pet owner to recover reasonable and necessary costs related to the treatment of an animal wrongfully injured is an appropriate measure of damages.
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Martinez v. State |
A jury may infer a culpable mental state ("intentionally and knowingly") from the circumstances surrounding the offense of cruelty to animals.
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