United States
Displaying 2811 - 2820 of 4789
Title |
Summary |
|---|---|
| NM - Veterinary - Article 14. Veterinary Practice Act. | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. |
| NM - Veterinary reporting - 16.25.3.8 CONDUCT | This New Mexico regulation appears to allow permissive reporting of animal cruelty by veterinarians. Subsection (T) states: "The reporting of cruelty or illegal action is not a violation of confidentiality." |
| NM - Wild Horses - § 77-18-5. Wild horses; conformation, history and deoxyribonucleic acid testing | This New Mexico law states that a wild horse that is captured on public land shall have its conformation, history and deoxyribonucleic acid tested to determine if it is a Spanish colonial horse. If it is a Spanish colonial horse, the wild horse shall be relocated to a state or private wild horse preserve created and maintained for the purpose of protecting Spanish colonial horses. If it is not a Spanish colonial horse, it shall be returned to the public land, relocated to a public or private wild horse preserve or put up for adoption by the agency on whose land the wild horse was captured. |
| NM - Wildlife - Article 15. Predatory Wild Animals and Rodent Pests | The New Mexico County Predatory Control Act deals with predatory wild animals and rodent pests. On federal lands, the federal government pays for rodent pest repression. On public federal or state lands, the state and federal cooperative funds pay for rodent pest repression. On private land, rodent pest repression is based on voluntary cooperation of owners, but if the owner fails, after written notice, to destroy the prairie dogs, the state rodent inspector is authorized to enter the lands and destroy the prairie dogs at the expense of the owner. Any person who interferes with the rodent inspector is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of $100 to $500. |
| No Pets Allowed: Housing Issues and Companion Animals | |
| No Shelter from the Storm: How the Execution of Pets by Law Enforcement at Beauregard Middle School in St. Bernard Parish in the Aftermath of Katrina Violated the Constitutional Rights of Pet Owners |
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| NO WAY TO TREAT MAN’S BEST FRIENDS: THE UNCOUNTED INJURIES OF ANIMAL CRUELTY VICTIMS | |
| Non-Therapeutic Procedures for Companion Animals | |
| NONECONOMIC DAMAGE AWARDS IN VETERINARY MALPRACTICE: USING THE HUMAN MEDICAL EXPERIENCE AS A MODEL TO PREDICT THE EFFECT OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE AWARDS ON THE PRACTICE OF COMPANION ANIMAL VETERINARY MEDICINE | |
| Nonhuman Rights Project on behalf of Tommy and Kiko v. |
The petitioner, Nonhuman Rights Project brought this appeal on behalf of Tommy and Kiko, who are two captive chimpanzees. The chimpanzees had been confined by their owners in small cages within a warehouse and a cement storefront in a crowded residential area, respectively. Petitioner sought leave to appeal from an order of the Appellate Division, which affirmed two judgments of the Supreme Court declining to sign orders to show cause to grant the chimpanzees habeas relief. The lower courts based their denial of habeas corpus for the chimpanzees on the dictionary definition for "person." The term “person” tends to lean towards an entity that is recognized by law as having most of the rights and duties of a human. The Appellate Division also reasoned that chimpanzees are not considered people because they lack the capacity to bear legal duties or to be held legally accountable for their actions. As a counter, the Petitioner argued that the same can be said for human infants or comatose human adults, yet no one would say that it is improper to seek a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of one of them. The Appellate Division therefore based their denial on the fact that chimpanzees are not a member of the human species. In the instant action, Court of Appeals of New York denied the motion for leave to appeal. In the concurring opinion, Judge Fahey states that the better approach is not to ask whether a chimpanzee fits the definition of a person or whether it has the same rights and duties as a human being, but whether he or she has the right to liberty protected by habeas corpus. The concurring opinion also found that the Appellate Division erred by misreading the case it relied on and holding that a habeas corpus challenge cannot be used to seek transfer; a habeas corpus challenge can be used to seek a transfer to another facility. Although Judge Fahey recognizes that Chimpanzees share at least 96% of their DNA with humans and are autonomous, intelligent creatures, he concurred with the Appellate Division’s decision to deny leave to appeal. However, he ultimately questioned whether the Court was right to deny leave in the first instance. |