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Protect Our Communities Foundation v. Jewell |
The Protect our Communities Foundation challenged the Bureau of Land Management's Record of Decision authorizing development of a utility-scale wind energy facility on public lands in San Diego County, arguing that BLM's approval of a right-of-way violated the National Environmental Policy Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Bald and Golden Eagles Protection Act. The Court found that BLM did consider several alternatives to the proposed Project, took a "hard look" at the environmental consequences, and did not improperly defer specification and analysis of mitigation measures. The Court also held that Federal agencies are not required to obtain a permit before acting in a regulatory capacity to authorize activity, such as development of a wind-energy facility, that may incidentally harm protected birds. The Court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' cross motions for summary judgment. |
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Protect Our Communities Foundation v. Jewell |
In this case, various environmental groups filed suit against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Department of the Interior, arguing that the BLM should not have granted right-of-way on federal lands to a proposed energy project because the project would violate the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. The plaintiffs also argued that the BLM’s environmental impact statement (EIS) for the project was not sufficient according to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Ultimately, the court held in favor of the defendants and found that the EIS was sufficient under the NEPA and that by granting the right-of-way, BLM was not violation the MBTA or the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. The court found that the EIS was sufficient under the NEPA because it included all the necessary information and was broad enough as to not force the BLM into automatically accepting the proposal. Additionally, the court held that the BLM was not in violation of the MBTA or the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act because the BLM was acting in a “purely regulatory capacity” and the BLM’s action could directly or proximately cause a violation under the MBTA or the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. |
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Protect our Communities Foundation v. Salazar |
The Protect Our Communities Foundation filed a complaint challenging the United States Department of the Interior's approval of the Record of Decision approving a utility-scale wind power project arguing that it violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA). But the Court held that the Department discussed reasonable alternatives, that the Decision was not an arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that a permit was required under the MBTA for an unintentional killing of migratory birds. |
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Protect Our Eagles v. City of Lawrence |
The court held that no private right of action exists under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, where a group of concerned citizens brought a civil action under the BGEPA against a developer to prevent the demolition of a grove of trees where wintering eagles perch. For further discussion on the construction and application of the BGEPA, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act
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Protecting Equine Rescue From Being Put Out To Pasture: Whether Ranches Dedicated To Abused, Abandoned, And Aging Horses May Qua |
This law review argues that the use of property to board, train, and graze abused, abandoned and aging (rescue) horses should fall under the Florida Greenbelt Law’s “agricultural” tax classification. The authors of this law review contend that the use of property for rescue horse ranches is consistent with the purpose of the Greenbelt Law, and the rescue horse ranches provide other benefits to Florida's communities.
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Protection for the Powerless: Political Economy History Lessons for the Animal Welfare Movement |
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PROTECTION OF ANIMALS THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS |
This paper discusses the potential of a human rights framework to contribute to the growth and development of global animal law. Parts one and two of the essay take as their example the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and examine the major trends in the Court’s judgments and admissibility decisions that directly or indirectly concern the rights or welfare of animals. It is concluded that the Court is not indifferent to the welfare of animals, but that animal welfare is instrumentalised: it is understood not as a good in itself, but is instead valued for its implications for human welfare and rights. Part three of the essay then considers the obstacles that the anthropocentrism of the human rights idea and the instrumentalisation of animal concerns present to the use of human rights frameworks to further the development of global animal law, as well as the opportunities that exist in the meeting of these paradigms. It concludes that although the telos of human rights law is different from that of animal law, nevertheless there exist many overlapping concerns within which mutually beneficial interactions are possible. |
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Pruett v. Arizona |
A diabetic woman in Arizona attempted to keep a chimpanzee as an assistance animal in spite of the state’s ape ban. Despite the state’s ban, the diabetic woman imported a chimpanzee with the intention of keeping him as a service animal, claiming that she was entitled to do so under the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). In September of 2007, the chimpanzee’s owner sued the State of Arizona, the Game and Fish Commission, and the Director of the Game and Fish Department in federal court claiming that they had violated her rights under the federal disability laws. According to the plaintiff, the ADA requires the state to make “reasonable accommodations” for disabled individuals; and in her case this meant the state must waive its ban on possessing “restricted” apes so that she can keep a chimpanzee in her home as a service animal. The District Court found that the plaintiff’s chimpanzee is “unnecessary” and “inadequate” to meet her disability-related needs and the animal is not a “reasonable” accommodation under the ADA because he threatens the health and safety of the community.
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Puckett v. Miller |
In this Indiana case, a dog owner brought action against a farmer for the negligent destruction of his two "coon dogs." The lower court granted the farmer's motion for involuntary dismissal, and dog owner appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's two dogs, at time they were shot by defendant farmer, were “roaming unattended.” This meant that an attempt to find them had been abandoned, and they were, according to defendant's uncontradicted testimony, trying to get into defendant's chicken enclosure. Thus, defendant farmer was protected in his shooting of those dogs by state statutes that provided that any dog known to have worried any livestock or fowl or any dog found roaming over the country unattended may be lawfully killed.
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Pulaski v. Chrisman |
Residents of a mobile home park attempted to get injunction preventing the conversion of their mobile home park into a community campground. Plaintiffs claimed violation of the Endangered Species Act due to the possible removal of endangered species during the renovation. The court held it did not have jurisdiction to entertain part of plaintiffs Endangered Species claim because of a procedural violation and that plaintiffs failed to show violation of the Endangered Species Act was likely on the remainder of their claims.
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