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Titlesort descending Summary
RI - Spay/Neuter - Chapter 19. Animal Care. § 4-19-18. Penalties for violations This Rhode Island statute provides that violations of Sec. 4-19-16, relating to the mandatory spay/neuter agreement from a licensed releasing agency. Violations of the written agreement executed pursuant to § 4-19-16 by an adopting party are punishable by a fine of fifty dollars ($50.00) for the first offense, one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for the second offense and four hundred dollars ($400) for the third and subsequent offenses. Second and subsequent offenses may constitute grounds for seizure and forfeiture of the dog or cat.
RI - Transportation - § 4-1-7. Live poultry containers This Rhode Island statute requires poultry be shipped in sanitary, warm, and ventilated containers.
RI - Trusts - § 4-23-1. Trust for care of animals This law represents the state's pet trust law. The law provides that a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal, or if the trust was created to provided for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime upon the death of the last surviving animal. The statute lists a distribution schedule for any remaining trust property and also states that such trusts are to be liberally construed to carry out the transferor's intent.
RI - Vehicle - § 31-22-28. Transporting animals This Rhode Island law makes it unlawful for any person to transport any animal, whether for business or pleasure, in an open air motor vehicle unless certain requirements are met: (1) the animal is kept in an enclosed area of the vehicle; (2) the animal is under physical control of a person; or (3) the animal is safely restrained and harnessed by means other than a neck restraint. Violation results in a fine of $50 to $100, with an increase of up to $200 for each subsequent offense.
RI - Vehicle - § 31-26-3.1. Duty to stop in accidents resulting in death or injury to domesticated animals This Rhode Island statute states that the driver of any vehicle knowingly involved in an accident resulting in death or injury to a domesticated animal, shall immediately stop the vehicle and remain at the scene of the accident until the driver renders all possible assistance to the injured animal. The driver shall immediately and by the quickest means known, give notice of the accident to the owner of the animal or to a nearby office of local or state police. Any person failing to stop or comply with the requirements of this section shall upon be punished by a fine of not more than fifty dollars ($50.00).
RI - Veterinary - Chapter 25. Veterinary Practice These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners.
Riad v. Brandywine Valley SPCA, Inc. In 2019, Plaintiff was bitten by a dog while at a facility operated by Brandywine Valley SPCA (“BVSPCA”), a non-profit animal welfare organization that takes in stray or surrendered animals and offers some of those animals for adoption. The bite occurred at the BVSPCA facility where a large dog named "Ceelo" was housed. Ceelo had previously lunged at a veterinarian during intake and vaccination. Plaintiff Riad was bitten on the hand while waiting to adopt Ceelo, who was on a leash held by a BVSPCA employee. After the incident, Ceelo was eventually euthanized due to a "noticeable decline in behavior." In 2021, Riad filed a personal injury complaint in Superior Court based on: (1) 16 Del. C. § 3053F, the dog bite strict liability statute; and (2) negligence. The Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of the organization and the plaintiff appealed. The primary question on appeal is whether an animal welfare organization is exempt from strict liability under the statute. The lower court held that the statute does not apply to such organizations based on two previous Superior Court opinions that concluded the legislature's intent when enacting the statute was “to rein in irresponsible dog owners who were keeping vicious dogs as pets by eliminating the ‘one free bite rule.'" Here, the Delaware Supreme Court found that reliance misguided as the statutory text contains only limited exceptions and a clear definition of the word "owner." The Court found that it "inappropriate for the Superior Court to engage in a speculative inquiry into the General Assembly's intentions at the time of the dog bite statute's enactment." The Court was not persuaded by BVSPCA's suggestion that the separation of definitions for "animal shelter" and "owner" implied that the term owner does not include animal shelter. The plain language of the statute does not exempt an animal welfare organization from the definition for owner. In addition, BVSPCA's argument that this interpretation disfavors public policy was also rejected by the Court since the statute is unambiguous. Finally, the Court held that, contrary to BVSPCA's assertions, expert witness testimony was not required by law to establish the degree of care a reasonably prudent person must exercise in controlling an aggressive dog. The Superior Court's entry of summary judgment was reversed.
Richardson v. Fairbanks North Star Borough


This case concerns the proper measure of damages for the death of a pet dog caused by a municipality's negligence after the Fairbanks North Star Borough Animal Shelter violated a Borough ordinance and mistakenly killed the Richardsons' pet dog, Wizzard.  The court indicated it is willing to recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for the intentional or reckless killing of a pet animal in an appropriate case.  However, the court held that in this case, the Richardsons made an offer of proof regarding their emotional distress and the evidence in the record indicates that the trial judge properly made a threshold determination that the severity of the Richardsons' emotional distress did not warrant a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Rickrode v. Wistinghausen


In this Michigan case, a mother sued as next friend for injuries suffered by her daughter after the daughter was attacked by defendant's domestic cat. The lower court directed a verdict in favor of the cat's owner and the mother then appealed. The Court of Appeals held that evidence warranted submission to the jury on questions of strict liability and negligence. If an owner has knowledge that her cat has bitten children before and that it was suffering from a disease that makes the cat extra sensitive, then a prima facie case has been made that the cat was dangerous, posing more than the normal risk of harm from cats.
Ridley v. Sioux Empire Pit Bull Rescue, Inc. Plaintiff Ridley was walking at a campground where she was attacked and injured by a pit bull type dog belonging to Sioux Empire Pit Bull Rescue, Inc. (SEPR) and in the care of Susan Tribble-Zacher and Harry Podhradsky. At the time, the dog was tethered to a tree near the Zacher and Podhradsky campsite. SEPR functions as a pit bull fostering organization that takes pit bulls from situations of abuse and neglect and places them with foster providers until a permanent home can be found. The lower court granted both Zacher's and Podhradsky's motions for summary judgment, which Ridley appeals in this instant case. On appeal, Ridley claims the trial court erred by incorrectly weighing the evidence by viewing the facts in a light most favorable to SEPR instead of plaintiff. The appellate court disagreed, finding that the motion for summary judgment was granted on the basis that the injury to Ridley was not foreseeable. The court rejected Ridley's argument that pit bull type dogs have inherently dangerous breed tendencies and, as a result, the attack was foreseeable and the keepers should be held to a higher standard of care. The court noted that South Dakota law does not support any "breed-specific standard of care," and that every dog is presumed tame so that the burden is on a plaintiff to prove otherwise. The dog who attacked Ridley had no prior history of aggression toward humans to make the attack on Ridley foreseeable. In addition, the fact that Zacher and Podhradsky may have violated a policy by SEPR to keep the dog in a two-week "shutdown period," where the dog would not travel outside the home, did not make it foreseeable that the dog would attack Ridley. Thus, the defendants did not breach their duty of reasonable care toward Ridley. The motions for summary judgment were affirmed.

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