Results
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Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
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In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health | 543 F.Supp.2d 70 (D.C.C., 2008) |
This FOIA case was brought against the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") by In Defense of Animals (“IDA”) seeking information related to approximately 260 chimpanzees located as the Alamogordo Primate Facility (“APF”) in New Mexico. Before the court now is NIH's Motion for Partial Reconsideration as to the release of records. This Court rejected NIH’s arguments that the records are not “agency records” because they belong to NIH's contractor, Charles River Laboratories, Inc. (“CRL”), a publicly held animal research company. Also, the Court was equally unconvinced that the information requested here is “essentially a blueprint of the APF facility,” and that release of such information presents a security risk to the facility. |
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In Defense of Animals v. Oregon Health Sciences University | 112 P.3d 336 (Or. 2005) | 199 Or.App. 160 (2005) |
A nonprofit corporation petitioned the trial court for injunctive and declaratory relief regarding fees charged by a state university primate research center for document inspection. The circuit court dismissed the action with prejudice, reasoning it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the fee issue and, assuming jurisdiction existed, the fees were in compliance with law. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding the circuit court had jurisdiction to review the basis, reasonableness and amount of fees charged by the university. |
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Missouri Primate Foundation v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. | Slip Copy, 2018 WL 1420239 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 22, 2018) | This matter is a motion of counterclaim by defendants Missouri Primate Foundation to dismiss PETA's (the counterclaim plaintiff) assertion that two chimpanzees were being held in conditions that deprived the chimpanzees of adequate social groups, space, and psychological stimulation, putting them at risk of and causing physical and psychological injury, such as deteriorated cardiovascular and musculoskeletal health, stress, anxiety and depression. PETA also alleges that the chimpanzees were denied a sanitary environment, proper ventilation, a healthy diet, and adequate veterinary care. PETA claimed that the Missouri Primate Foundation (MPF) (the counterclaim defendants) were holding the two chimpanzees in conditions that “harm” and “harass” the chimpanzees, thus violating the “take” prohibition of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). MPF's motion contends that PETA’s counterclaim is based on allegations that they failed to comply with the Animal Welfare Act, not the ESA. MPF further contends that because the chimpanzees at its facility were lawfully in captivity and under the auspices of the AWA as administered by the USDA–APHIS, so the chimpanzees cannot be subject to a “take” under the ESA. They further argued that PETA lacked standing as the AWA preempts or supersedes the ESA as to animals held at USDA licensed facilities. Because the AWA does not allow citizen suits, MPF argued, the case must be dismissed. After examining similar cases, this court concluded that claims under the AWA and ESA are complementary and do not conflict, and that the ESA protects captive animals regardless of whether the alleged violator is an AWA licensed entity. The court found that the allegations by PETA are sufficient at this stage of the case and issues of proof are reserved for trial. As such, the court denied the motions of the counterclaim defendants. | Case | |
New England Anti-Vivisection Society v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service and Yerkes National Primate Research Center | 208 F. Supp. 3d 142 (D.D.C. 2016) | 2016 WL 4919871 (D.D.C., 2016) | New England Anti-Vivisection Society (NEAVS), a non-profit organization that dedicates itself to animal-welfare, brought suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for issuing an export permit to Yerkes National Primate Research Center (Yerkes). NEAVS filed suit against FWS arguing that FWS had violated the Endangered Species Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. NEAVS argued that FWS had violated the acts by allowing Yerkes to export chimpanzees in exchange for making a financial donation that would be put towards a program to help with “habitat destruction and disease, which face wild chimpanzees in East Africa.” The court reviewed the case and determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to address the claims made by NEAVS. The court found that NEAVS was not able to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution because NEAVS had not “suffered an injury in fact.” Ultimately, the court held that NEAVS was unable to show that it had a “concrete and particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent” and that is “traceable” to FWS’ actions. As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of FWS. | Case |
Nonhuman Rights Project on behalf of Tommy and Kiko v. | 31 N.Y.3d 1054, 100 N.E.3d 846 (2018) | 2018 WL 2107087 (Mem), 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 03309 | The petitioner, Nonhuman Rights Project brought this appeal on behalf of Tommy and Kiko, who are two captive chimpanzees. The chimpanzees had been confined by their owners in small cages within a warehouse and a cement storefront in a crowded residential area, respectively. Petitioner sought leave to appeal from an order of the Appellate Division, which affirmed two judgments of the Supreme Court declining to sign orders to show cause to grant the chimpanzees habeas relief. The lower courts based their denial of habeas corpus for the chimpanzees on the dictionary definition for "person." The term “person” tends to lean towards an entity that is recognized by law as having most of the rights and duties of a human. The Appellate Division also reasoned that chimpanzees are not considered people because they lack the capacity to bear legal duties or to be held legally accountable for their actions. As a counter, the Petitioner argued that the same can be said for human infants or comatose human adults, yet no one would say that it is improper to seek a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of one of them. The Appellate Division therefore based their denial on the fact that chimpanzees are not a member of the human species. In the instant action, Court of Appeals of New York denied the motion for leave to appeal. In the concurring opinion, Judge Fahey states that the better approach is not to ask whether a chimpanzee fits the definition of a person or whether it has the same rights and duties as a human being, but whether he or she has the right to liberty protected by habeas corpus. The concurring opinion also found that the Appellate Division erred by misreading the case it relied on and holding that a habeas corpus challenge cannot be used to seek transfer; a habeas corpus challenge can be used to seek a transfer to another facility. Although Judge Fahey recognizes that Chimpanzees share at least 96% of their DNA with humans and are autonomous, intelligent creatures, he concurred with the Appellate Division’s decision to deny leave to appeal. However, he ultimately questioned whether the Court was right to deny leave in the first instance. | Case |
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery | 152 A.D.3d 73, 54 N.Y.S.3d 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) | 2017 WL 2471600 (N.Y. App. Div. June 8, 2017) | The Petitioners, including the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc . filed two petitions for habeas corpus relief on behalf of Tommy and Kiko, two adult male chimpanzees. The petitions stated that chimpanzees are intelligent, have the ability to be trained by humans to be obedient to rules, and to fulfill certain duties and responsibilities. Therefore, chimpanzees should be afforded some of the same fundamental rights as humans which include entitlement to habeas relief. The Respondents, included Tommy’s owners, Circle L Trailer Sales, Inc. and its officers, as well as Kiko’s owners, the Primate Sanctuary, Inc. and its officers and directors. The Supreme Court, New York County, declined to extend habeas corpus relief to the chimpanzees. The Petitioners appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division affirmed and held that:(1) the petitions were successive habeas proceedings which were not warranted or supported by any changed circumstances; (2) human-like characteristics of chimpanzees did not render them “persons” for purposes of habeas corpus relief; and (3) even if habeas relief was potentially available to chimpanzees, writ of habeas corpus did not lie on behalf of two chimpanzees at issue. | Case |
Orangutana, Sandra s/ Habeas Corpus | Orangutana, Sandra s/ Habeas Corpus | This decision was decided on an appeal of the writ of habeas corpus brought on behalf of an orangutan named Sandra after it was denied in its first instance. Pablo Buompadre, President of the Association of Officials and Attorneys for the Rights of Animals (AFADA) brought a writ of habeas corpus against the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and the City Zoological Garden of Buenos Aires on behalf of the hybrid of two different orangutan species, Sandra. AFADA sought the immediate release and relocation of Sandra to the primate sanctuary of Sorocaba, in the State of Sao Paulo in Brazil. AFADA argued that Sandra had been deprived illegitimately and arbitrarily of her freedom by the authorities of the zoo, and that her mental and physical health was at the time deeply deteriorated, with imminent risk of death. For the first time, basic legal rights were granted to an animal. In this case, Argentina’s Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation ruled that animals are holders of basic rights. The Court stated that “from a dynamic and non-static legal interpretation, it is necessary to recognize [Sandra] an orangutan as a subject of rights, as non-human subjects (animals) are holders of rights, so it imposes her protection." | Case | |
People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery | 2014 WL 6802767 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 4, 2014) | 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 08531 | This case is an appeal from a Supreme Court judgment denying petitioner's application for an order to show cause to commence a CPLR article 70 proceeding. At issue is the legal status of a chimpanzee named Tommy who is being kept on respondents' property. Petitioners filed a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 on the ground that Tommy was being unlawfully detained by respondents. They offered support via affidavits of experts that chimpanzee have the requisite characteristics sufficient for a court to consider them "persons" to obtain personal autonomy and freedom from unlawful detention. The Court of Appeals here is presented with the novel question on whether a chimpanzee is a legal person entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus. In rejecting this designation, the Court relied on the fact that chimpanzees cannot bear any legal responsibilities or social duties. As such, the Court found it "inappropriate to confer upon chimpanzees the legal rights . . . that have been afforded to human beings." | Case |
Pometti, Hugo c/ Provincia de Mendoza s/ acción de amparo | Id SAIJ: FA17190000 | This is an action of protection or "accion de amparo” filed by Hugo Edgardo Pometti against the Province of Mendoza in The Court of Associated Judicial Management No. 2 of Mendoza. The Petitioner sought to stop the transfer of the chimpanzee Cecilia to the sanctuary located in Brazil and to keep her in the Zoo of Mendoza in order to preserve the natural and cultural heritage and the biological diversity. The petitioner also requested a precautionary action to not transfer the chimpanzee until decision on the the action of amparo was issued. | Case | |
Pruett v. Arizona | 606 F.Supp.2d 1065 (D.Ariz.,2009) | 21 A.D. Cases 1520 |
A diabetic woman in Arizona attempted to keep a chimpanzee as an assistance animal in spite of the state’s ape ban. Despite the state’s ban, the diabetic woman imported a chimpanzee with the intention of keeping him as a service animal, claiming that she was entitled to do so under the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). In September of 2007, the chimpanzee’s owner sued the State of Arizona, the Game and Fish Commission, and the Director of the Game and Fish Department in federal court claiming that they had violated her rights under the federal disability laws. According to the plaintiff, the ADA requires the state to make “reasonable accommodations” for disabled individuals; and in her case this meant the state must waive its ban on possessing “restricted” apes so that she can keep a chimpanzee in her home as a service animal. The District Court found that the plaintiff’s chimpanzee is “unnecessary” and “inadequate” to meet her disability-related needs and the animal is not a “reasonable” accommodation under the ADA because he threatens the health and safety of the community. |
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