Federal
Displaying 251 - 260 of 1083
Title |
Summary |
|---|---|
| FAQ: Can I sell an old fur made from an endangered animal? | |
| Farm Sanctuary v. United States Dep't of Agric. |
Several non-profit organizations, including Farm Sanctuary and Animal Legal Defense Fund, filed a lawsuit against the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) challenging their actions related to the slaughtering of pigs under the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs alleged three causes of action related to the humane treatment, handling, and disposition of downed pigs, violation of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, and arbitrary and capricious denial of a Petition for Rulemaking. The plaintiffs in this case filed two causes of action against the defendants. The first cause of action claimed a violation of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for failing to investigate and report on downed pigs to Congress. Specifically, the plaintiffs submitted a petition to ban the slaughter of non-ambulatory pigs, which was denied by the defendants who claimed that their existing regulations and inspection procedures are sufficient in ensuring humane treatment and preventing diseased animals from entering the food supply. The plaintiffs requested the court to issue a declaration finding the violation and to compel the defendants to conduct an investigation and report to Congress. The second cause of action alleged a violation of the HMSA and APA for failing to assess the need for regulations regarding the humane treatment of downed pigs and to promulgate such regulations. The plaintiffs requested similar relief as in the first cause of action. The Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Complete the Administrative Record, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice, granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. On appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated standing at the summary judgment stage, despite a previous ruling during the motion to dismiss stage. Article III standing requires plaintiffs to show (1) an injury-in-fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's actions, and (3) the likelihood that the injury can be remedied. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue both causes of action because they had not been injured by the defendants' alleged failures, and any relief ordered by the court would not redress their injuries. Regarding the informational injury, the court found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that it was sufficiently concrete to meet the requirements of Article III. The court also stated that seeking to ensure compliance with regulatory law was not sufficient grounds for standing. The potential availability of a report through the Freedom of Information Act was considered too attenuated to establish a concrete informational injury. Regarding the organizational injury, the court referred to a recent Second Circuit decision that rejected an expansive concept of organizational injury for standing purposes. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been forced to spend resources investigating and reporting on downed pigs, which they argue was the responsibility of the USDA. However, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had voluntarily chosen to engage in these activities and had not been required to do so by the USDA. The court explained that an organization must show an involuntary material burden on its established core activities, and the challenged law or regulation must impose a cost that adversely affects the organization's regular activities pursued in its organizational mission. Expenditures or activities undertaken by the organization's own initiative, without being reasonably necessary to continue established core activities, were insufficient to establish injury for standing purposes. The court found that the plaintiffs had not shown a perceptible impairment to their activities caused by the defendants' actions, and the expenditures incurred by the plaintiffs were not reasonably necessary to continue their established core activities. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not establish an injury in fact for standing purposes based on organizational injury. Even assuming the plaintiffs had standing, they failed to establish that defendants violated the HMSA and the APA by failing to investigate and report to Congress on downed pigs. The defendants argue that they complied with Congress's mandates and that some obligations are not judicially reviewable, to which the court agreed. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that the defendants violated the FMSA by failing to investigate and report on downed pigs as required by Section 1907(a). However, the court found that Section 1907 does not mandate that the Secretary investigate each and every species of livestock, and the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence supporting that reading of the statute. The court also found that the plaintiffs' challenge to the sufficiency of the reports was not enough to succeed on an APA claim because they did not establish that the defendants failed to take a discrete agency action that they were required to take. As a result, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the first cause of action. Additionally, defendants argued that they are entitled to summary judgment because the relevant statute does not require them to regulate the slaughter of downed pigs, and therefore, the decision is discretionary. The plaintiffs did not provide a response to this argument, and their failure to advocate for their second cause of action is likely due to the absence of any statutory requirement that Defendants ban the slaughter of downed pigs. The court examined the relevant statute, which provides that the Secretary shall promulgate regulations to provide for the humane treatment of non-ambulatory livestock if necessary. The court concluded that the statute grants discretion to the Secretary to determine whether to promulgate such regulations and that agency decisions not to take enforcement action are unreviewable. Thus, the court concluded that the defendants' actions were not arbitrary or capricious. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Complete the Administrative Record was granted; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judicial Notice and their Motion for Summary Judgment were denied; and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was granted. |
| Farm Sanctuary v. United States Department of Agriculture | This case was brought by plaintiffs, several nonprofit animal rights organizations, to challenge a Final Rule implementing a new swine inspection system at pig farms and slaughterhouses across the United States against defendants, the United States Department of Agriculture and the Food Safety Inspection Service. The new system requires that employees of the slaughterhouses perform ante-mortem and post-mortem sorting activities before the federal inspection is to take place, which plaintiffs challenge under the argument that this shifting of the sorting activities to slaughterhouse employees is in violation of the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA). Plaintiffs argue that this delegation is improper, would negatively impact the safety of pork being produced by slaughterhouses, and would lead to inhumane slaughter of pigs. Plaintiffs and defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the delegation of the sorting process was improper. |
| Farm Sanctuary v. United States Department of Agriculture | Plaintiffs (nonprofit organizations working to protect animals, people, and environments from industrial animal agriculture) filed suit against the USDA and FSIS challenging the implementation of the Modernization of Swine Slaughter Inspection rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,300 (Oct. 11, 2019) ("Slaughter Rule”). Plaintiffs contend that the rule allows nearly all pigs in the U.S. to be slaughtered as "unlimited speeds," thereby posing risks to animal welfare and consumer safety. Plaintiffs' lawsuit was later amended to add a claim that challenges Defendants' failure to ban the slaughter of non-ambulatory or "downed" pigs in the rule. Defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs have no standing to sue. Plaintiffs contend that they have been injured by Defendants' implementation of the Slaughter Rule. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the authorization of the high-speed slaughter rule directly conflicts with their organizational missions and redirects resources to counteracting the Slaughter Rule instead of other activities like rescue of animals and advocacy. Some of the plaintiff organizations further allege that their members include consumers who eat pork products and are concerned about the increased health risks they face from consuming products from pigs who have not been adequately inspected as well as impacts to the environment from increased slaughter. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the FSIS is not consistent in its treatment of downed pigs versus downed cattle, and that downed pigs are inhumanely forced to rise/stand for slaughter resulting in potential exposure to the public of disease and other public health risks. The court first took up Defendants argument that Plaintiffs lack both organizational and associational standing. The Court has reviewed the amended complaint in light of this Second Circuit precedent and finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they have been forced to divert resources from mission-critical activities to oppose the Slaughter Rule. In other words, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ unlawful practices have impaired and frustrated their ability to engage in mission-related activities and caused a consequent drain on their limited resources, which “constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social interests" sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Taking Plaintiffs allegations in their pleadings as true, the Court finds that the amended complaint contains allegations sufficient to support organizational standing. Having found that Plaintiffs have organization standing, the Court need not reach the issue of associational standing. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. Finally, as to the 2020 Action concerning the downed pigs, the Court found that The Court reaches the same conclusion it did in the 2019 Action: that at this stage of the case, Plaintiffs have alleged organizational standing. The Court notes that several other Plaintiffs have submitted declarations from their members, which further explain how those organizations have sustained an injury-in-fact. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they provide additional services beyond mere issue advocacy, that these services have been impaired by Defendants’ actions, and that they have been forced to shift their resources away from those services to oppose the slaughter of downed pigs. Defendants' motions to dismiss were denied. |
| Farm Sanctuary v. USDA | Seven organizations dedicated to protecting the animals, people, and environments that suffer due to industrial animal agriculture filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) challenging its decision to reduce oversight at pig slaughterhouses and eliminate limits on the slaughter speeds. |
| Farm Sanctuary, Inc. v. Veneman |
|
| Faulkner v. Watt |
|
| Federation of Japan Salmon Fisheries Cooperative Association v. Baldridge |
|
| Feld Entertainment, Inc. v. A.S.P.C.A. |
|
| Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen Task Force v. Montana | This case was brought by several environmental organizations against the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission to challenge the approval or regulations that authorize the trapping and snaring of wolves within grizzly bear habitat in Montana. The grizzly bear is listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Montana trapping regulations allow wolf hunters to use foothold traps large enough to capture grizzly bears. Grizzly bears rely heavily on their front and back paws to hunt for food, so crippling their limbs with these traps will lead to the incidental killing of grizzly bears from starvation. Plaintiffs contend that allowing the trapping of wolves in grizzly bear territory is in violation of § 9 of the ESA, as it will lead to the incidental unlawful taking of grizzly bears. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the start of the wolf trapping season, raised questions on the merits, and established a reasonable threat of harm to grizzly bears if the trapping and snaring of wolves is allowed in their habitat. On the merits of the claim, although defendants could prove that no grizzly bears had been killed with such traps in Montana for several years, the court found that plaintiffs succeeded on the merits as there was evidence of grizzly bears being killed by such traps in adjacent states. Plaintiffs also showed that there was a likelihood of harm to grizzly bears, with evidence that these traps will lead to the death of grizzly bears. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in part and denied in part, and enjoined the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission from authorizing wolf trapping and snaring. |