Federal
Displaying 491 - 500 of 1083
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| Mostek v. Genesee County Animal Control |
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| Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel |
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| N.Y. Pet Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. City of N.Y. |
In 2015, New York City enacted a group of laws aimed at dealing with problems associated with the companion animal business in the city by regulating the sale of dogs and cats in pet shops. On the day the laws were to go into effect, the New York Pet Welfare Association (NYPWA) filed suit challenging two of the laws. The first law, the “Sourcing Law,” required that pet shops sell only animals acquired from breeders holding a Class A license issued under the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The second law law, the “Spay/Neuter Law,” required that pet shops sterilize each animal before releasing it to a consumer. NYPWA argued that the Sourcing Law violated the “dormant” Commerce Clause and is preempted by the AWA, and that the Spay/Neuter Law is preempted by New York law. The district court dismissed NYPWA’s complaint and the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. First, the 2nd Circuit determined that the Sourcing Law did not violate the Commerce Clause because it did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The 2nd Circuit found that the Sourcing Law may make it difficult for certain out of state breeders to sell to city shops, but so long as breeders from other states are allowed to sell in the city, then it is not considered to be discriminatory. Also, the 2nd Circuit found that NYPWA was unable to show that any incidental burden that the Sourcing Law placed on out of state breeders was excessive and therefore the law passed under the Pike Balancing test. Lastly, the 2nd Circuit determined that the Spay/Neuter Law was not preempted by New York Law because NYPWA failed to identify a single New York statute or case that suggests that the new law would be preempted in any way. As a result, the 2nd Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. |
| Nantucket Residents Against Turbines v. U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt. | In this case, the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) approved the construction of Vineyard Wind, a wind power project off the coast of Massachusetts after consulting with the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”). A group of Nantucket residents, organized as "Nantucket Residents Against Turbines" (“Residents”), allege that the federal agencies violated the Endangered Species Act by concluding that the project's construction likely would not jeopardize the critically endangered North Atlantic right whale. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment for BOEM and NMFS. On appeal of summary judgment, the Residents further allege that BOEM violated the National Environmental Policy Act by relying on NMFS's flawed analysis. The court rejected the Residents' argument, finding that NMFS's biological opinion properly analyzed the current status and environmental baseline of the right whale. Further, the biological opinion properly analyzed the effects of the project (e.g., noise) on the right whale, along with mitigation measures, and did not ignore the project's additive effects on the right whale's long-term recovery prospects. Finally, BOEM's reliance on the biological opinion did not violate NEPA. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. |
| Naruto v. Slater |
A seven-year-old monkey named Naruto that lived in a reserve on the island of Sulawesi, Indonesia got ahold of a wildlife photographer’s unattended camera in 2011 and took several photos of himself. David Slater, the owner of the camera, and Wildlife Personalities, Ltd., (“Wildlife”) published the photos in a book that identifies Slater and Wildlife as the copyright owners of the photographs. In 2015 PETA and Dr. Engelhardt filed a complaint against Slater, Wildlife, and Blurb (the website that helped create the book) for copyright infringement on behalf of Naruto. The defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to establish standing under Article III or statutory standing under the Copyright Act. The district court granted the motions to dismiss. PETA and Dr. Engelhardt appealed on Naruto’s behalf. Dr. Engelhardt ended up withdrawing from the litigation, so PETA remained as the next friend of Naruto. The Court of Appeals held that PETA cannot validly assert a “next friend” status to represent Naruto because they failed to allege any facts to establish the required significant relationship between a next friend and a real party in interest and secondly an animal cannot be represented by a “next friend” under the laws of the United States. The Court pointed out, however, that lack of a next friend does not destroy an incompetent party’s standing entirely. “Article III standing does not compel a conclusion that a statutorily authorized suit in the name of an animal is not a case or controversy.” Based on precedent, the Court concluded that Naruto did not have standing to sue under the Copyright Act because the statute did not expressly state that animals have standing. The Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that held that Naruto and animals in general lack statutory standing to sue under the Copyright Act. The Court also awarded the defendants attorneys’ fees. Circuit Court Judge N.R. Smith wrote a concurring opinion agreeing that the case must be dismissed but disagreeing with the Majority’s conclusion that next friend standing is non-jurisdictional. Judge Smith stated that “the Majority ignores its own conclusion by determining that 1) next-friend standing is non-jurisdictional; and 2) even if the elements of next-friend standing are not met, any third party may still bring suit on behalf of anyone or anything – without the real party in interest’s permission – as long as the real party in interest has an Article III injury; and the real party in interest is adequately protected by the purported next friend’s (or self-appointed lawyer’s) representation. In his opinion, this fails to follow both Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. Judge Smith further concludes that Supreme Court precedent bars next friend standing for animals because the scope of next friend standing is limited by historical practice and there is no historical evidence that animals have ever been granted authority to sue by next friend, absent an act of Congress. There is also no textual support in the habeas corpus statute or Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is because only a natural person can have a habeas corpus petition filed on their behalf. Rule 17 only authorizes next friend suits on behalf of “a minor or an incompetent person.” The Majority’s conclusion that next friend standing is non-jurisdictional and, therefore, allowed the case to go forward is incorrect and is legally unsupportable by precedent. In his opinion, the case must be dismissed if there is no next friend standing and the Majority should have never reached the merits of the Copyright Act question. The question before the court was whether a third-party had next friend standing allowing it to invoke the authority of the court and stand in Naruto’s shoes to advance his claims. The question was not whether Naruto was properly protected or was brought into the litigation as a defendant. |
| Naruto v. Slater (PETA) | |
| Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. Ross | This case concerns a challenge to Proposition 12, a measure passed by California voters in 2018 that bans the sale of whole pork meat (no matter where produced) from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards. Proposition 12 amended sections 25990–25993 of the California Health and Safety Code to “prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm animal confinement." The National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (collectively referred to as “the Council”) filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause. The court noted that under its precedent, a state law violates the dormant Commerce Clause only in narrow circumstances. Here, the Council argues that Proposition 12 places an undue burden on interstate commerce and that Proposition 12 has an impermissible extraterritorial effect. The court disagreed, finding that Proposition 12 does not function as a price-control nor price-affirmation statute, as it neither dictates the price of for pork products nor does it tie the price of pork products sold in California to out-of-state prices. The Council also suggests that the law effectively violates the dormant Commerce Clause because of the interconnected nature of the pork industry. Pork producers would either have to produce all pork according to California standards or segregate California pork production to comply with the enhanced welfare standards. Again, the court found the argument unpersuasive based on precedent because a a state law is not impermissibly extraterritorial unless it directly regulates conduct that is wholly out of state. The "upstream" effects of Proposition 12 apply to both California and out-of-state entities equally, and a state is entitled to regulate commerce within its state. Finally, the court dismissed the argument that the dormant commerce clause is violated because it create inconsistent regulations where there is a need for "national uniformity in regulation." The court was unpersuaded that pork production rises to the level of need like taxation or interstate travel. The court held that the complaint here does not plausibly allege that such narrow circumstances apply to Proposition 12; thus, the court ruled that the district court did not err in dismissing the Council's complaint for failure to state a claim. |
| Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. Ross | Following the adoption of California’s Proposition 12, two organizations – the National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (Petitioners) – filed this lawsuit on behalf of the members of these organizations that are in the business of raising and processing pigs for the sale of pork meat. Petitioners allege that Proposition 12, which forbids the sale of whole pork meat in California that is made from breeding pigs (or their immediate offspring) that are confined in a cruel manner, violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by placing an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Under Proposition 12, confinement of pigs is cruel if it prevents a pig from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely. Petitioners allege that the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will increase production costs, but concede that those costs will fall on both California and out-of-state pork producers. Petitioners also allege that, because California imports most of the pork it consumes, the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will be dealt to mostly out-of-state producers. The district court concluded that petitioners’ complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law and dismissed the case, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, rejecting petitioners’ arguments that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court found no violation of the dormant Commerce Clause because: (1) petitioners concede that Proposition 12 did not implicate the antidiscrimination principle, because it imposes the same burdens on in-state pork producers that it imposes on out-of-state pork producers, and (2) petitioners’ reliance on the Pike line of cases to prevent a state from regulating the sale of a consumer good within its borders on nondiscriminatory terms was rejected, as that line of cases had never yielded such a result. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was affirmed. |
| Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior | This case centers on the Trump Administration's new interpretation of incidental takings under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA). In December 2017, the Principal Deputy Solicitor of the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) issued a memorandum that countered almost 50 years of the agency’s interpretation of “takings” and “killings” under the MBTA (the "Jorjani Opinion"). According to the DOI in that opinion, the MBTA does not prohibit incidental takes or kills because the statute applies only to activities specifically aimed at birds. Environmental interest groups and various states brought three now-consolidated actions to vacate the memorandum and subsequent guidance issued in reliance on the memorandum. Both parties moved for summary judgment. In essence, the question before the court is whether DOI’s interpretation of the MBTA must be set aside as contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or upheld as a valid exercise of agency authority. The court first observed that, from the early 1970s until 2017, the DOI interpreted the MBTA to prohibit incidental takes and kills, imposing liability for activities and hazards that led to the deaths of protected birds, irrespective of whether the activities targeted birds or were intended to take or kill birds. To conserve migratory birds and ensure compliance with the MBTA’s prohibition on “incidental take,” the DOI's Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) used a range of strategies: sending companies notice of the risks their facilities and equipment posed to migratory birds; issuing industry guidance; informally negotiating remediation efforts; and issuing permits authorizing takes. In fact, the court noted that the agency prioritized a cooperative approach with industry over enforcement actions. In 2015, the DOI formalized this approach by undergoing a rulemaking process regulating incidental take. In early 2017, the DOI's Solicitor then issued a memorandum that reaffirmed the long-standing interpretation that the MBTA prohibited incidental take that became known as the "Tomkins Opinion." Once presidential administrations changed and Tomkins departed, the new Principal Deputy Solicitor issued a new memorandum that stated any agency comments, recommendations, or actions not be based on the principle that the MBTA prohibited incidental take (the Jorjani Opinion). This triggered the instant lawsuits by conservation organizations and several states. On July 31, 2019, the lower court found that the plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated standing and denied the DOI's motion to dismiss. On appeal here, this court first noted that both parties agree with longstanding precedent that the MBTA's misdemeanor provision creates strict liability. In contrast, the Jorjani Opinion contends that the criminal penalty provisions under the MBTA is limited to only acts directed at birds and those activities whose purpose is to "render an animal subject to human control" like hunting or capturing. In reviewing the Jorjani Opinion under the lessened deference standard afforded by administrative law, this court found the DOI overstated the any conflicts in interpretation of the MBTA among circuit courts (a "dramatized representation"). In addition, the court found the Jorjani Opinion "is a recent and sudden departure from long-held agency positions backed by over forty years of consistent enforcement practices." The court found the Jorjani Opinion was an unpersuasive interpretation of the MBTA's unambiguous prohibition on the killing of birds and is contrary to the plain language of the law itself. Such an interpretation runs contrary to legislative history, decades of enforcement practices by the DOI, and caselaw. Because the agency's action was held unlawful under the APA, the court found the only appropriate remedy was vacatur. Thus, Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment were granted, and Interior’s motion was denied. |
| National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Davis |
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