Federal

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Titlesort descending Summary
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. U.S.


This case examines the requirements surrounding the issuance of an Incidental Take Statement (ITS), a statement that authorizes harm to an endangered species, but that must include a trigger for reviewing the decision (known as “re-consultation”) at the point when there is a risk of jeopardizing the species. The trigger must be a numerical trigger describing the “take” (e.g., the capturing or killing of members of an endangered species) in terms of specific population data unless it is impractical to do so.

 

Specifically, this case explores whether the Army Corps of Engineers and FTS were able to use an ecological surrogate in place of a numerical trigger in an ITS that was promulgated in the process of conservation work in the Everglades.

 

This conservation work involved manipulating water levels in the Everglades and impacted the viability of three species protected under the Endangered Species Act (the Cape Sable seaside sparrow, the Everglade snail kite, and the wood stork), as well as the well-being of the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians.

Midcoast Fishermen's Ass'n v. Gutierrez
Plaintiffs filed suit seeking review of the Department of Commerce’s (the “Agency”) decision to deny their petition for emergency action to address continued overfishing in the Northeastern multispecies fisheries by excluding midwater trawl vessels from groundfish closed areas.

 

After the administrative record was filed, and the Agency certified that it was the administrative record for the decision, Plaintiffs moved to compel completion of the administrative record.

 

The United States District Court, District of Columbia denied Plaintiffs’ motion, finding that Plaintiffs failed to show that the Agency blatantly ignored specific readily available information, the fact that the Agency based its decision on data from a two year chronological time span did not render the record incomplete, supplementing the record with bycatch data from an earlier time period would not provide any background information useful to the resolution of the case, and that the record contained sufficient information to allow the Court to determine what process the Agency followed in making its decision.
Milburn v. City of Lebanon

Plaintiff Milburn was acquitted of misdemeanor animal abuse on appeal, but a Lebanon police officer removed Milburns’ dog from her possession. While the appeal was pending, the Defendant, City of Lebanon, gave the dog to an animal shelter. The dog was later adopted by a new owner. The Linn County Circuit Court ordered the City to return the dog to Milburn after the acquittal but the Defendant City failed to comply. Milburn then brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against the City of Lebanon. The City moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim, and the United States District Court, for the District of Oregon, granted that motion while giving leave for Milburn to amend her complaint. In the Amended Complaint, Milburn contended that the City’s refusal to return her dog pursuant to the state court order deprived her of property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Milburn also asserted a violation of her procedural due process rights. The United States District Court, for the District of Oregon, reasoned that while Milburn alleged a state-law property interest in her dog, she failed to allege that the Defendant City deprived her of that interest without adequate process. Milburn also did not allege state remedies to be inadequate. Those two omissions in combination were fatal to Miburn's procedural due process claim. Also, Milburn's assertion that the court issued an order and that the City did not comply with, is an attack on the result of the procedure. The court reasoned that attacking the result instead of the process of a procedure does not state a procedural due process claim. Milburn’s procedural due process claim was then dismissed. The Court also held that it did not have jurisdiction over Milburn’s injunctive relief claim. Therefore, Milburn's request for injunctive relief was dismissed with prejudice. However, the court held that Milburn could seek monetary damages. While Defendant City’s second motion to dismiss was granted, Milburn was granted leave to amend her complaint within 90 days with regard to her claim for actual and compensatory damages.


 

Miller v. Nye Cty. In this case, Plaintiff Gary Miller sued Nye County and one of its deputies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various Nevada state laws for the fatal shooting of his dog, Blu. Blu was shot four times at the plaintiff's residence after officers responded when Mr. Miller accidentally set off a silent alarm at his own residence. The County and deputy moved to dismiss three of the plaintiff's claims and his request for punitive damages against the County. The court granted the motion to dismiss those claims because it found that the County is statutorily immune from Plaintiff's negligent-training claim and because he lacks the necessary relationship with Blu to establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. With regard to the punitive damages claim in a § 1983 action, the court granted the County's motion to dismiss that request for relief. Finally, the court granted the County's motion to dismiss Miller's § 1983 claim against it because the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief under a theory of single-incident liability. However, the court granted leave to amend this claim if the plaintiff can plausibly allege that the County has engaged in a pattern of similar conduct, or that the scenario in this case is likely to recur and that an officer who is ill-equipped to handle the scenario will likely commit a constitutional violation.
Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris After California passed Proposition 2 to mandate more humane housing standards for egg laying hens, the state then passed Assembly Bill 1437 to extend the applicability of Proposition 2’s standards to out of state egg producers. In response, six states, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Alabama, Kentucky, and Iowa, filed suit against the Attorney General of California seeking to block enforcement of the regulations before they went into effect. The states asserted parens patriae standing on behalf of the egg producers within their borders that would face increasing production costs as a result of compliance with the requirements of Proposition 2 and Assembly Bill 1437. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing. On appeal, the court found that plaintiffs failed to establish an interest apart from those of private egg producers within their borders, and acknowledged that those private egg producers could file a claim themselves. The allegations about the potential economic impact of the regulations were also found to be speculative, since the regulations had not yet gone into effect. Lastly, the court held that the regulations themselves are nondiscriminatory, since they apply to in state egg producers as well. However, because plaintiffs could file an amended complaint after the regulations go into effect that may be sufficient to establish standing, the case was dismissed without prejudice.
Missouri Pet Breeders Association v. County of Cook Cook County passed an ordinance that required a “pet shop operator” to only sell animals obtained from a breeder that (among other requirements) held a USDA class “A” license and owned or possessed no more than 5 female dogs, cats, or rabbits capable of reproduction in any 12-month period. Plaintiffs, a professional pet organization and three Cook County pet shops and their owners, sued Cook County government officials, alleging that the ordinance violated the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Defendants moved to dismiss the action. After concluding that plaintiffs had standing to pursue all of their claims, with the exception of the Foreign Commerce Claim, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all claims, but gave Plaintiffs a chance to cure their complaint's defects by amendment.
Missouri Primate Foundation v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. This matter is a motion of counterclaim by defendants Missouri Primate Foundation to dismiss PETA's (the counterclaim plaintiff) assertion that two chimpanzees were being held in conditions that deprived the chimpanzees of adequate social groups, space, and psychological stimulation, putting them at risk of and causing physical and psychological injury, such as deteriorated cardiovascular and musculoskeletal health, stress, anxiety and depression. PETA also alleges that the chimpanzees were denied a sanitary environment, proper ventilation, a healthy diet, and adequate veterinary care. PETA claimed that the Missouri Primate Foundation (MPF) (the counterclaim defendants) were holding the two chimpanzees in conditions that “harm” and “harass” the chimpanzees, thus violating the “take” prohibition of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). MPF's motion contends that PETA’s counterclaim is based on allegations that they failed to comply with the Animal Welfare Act, not the ESA. MPF further contends that because the chimpanzees at its facility were lawfully in captivity and under the auspices of the AWA as administered by the USDA–APHIS, so the chimpanzees cannot be subject to a “take” under the ESA. They further argued that PETA lacked standing as the AWA preempts or supersedes the ESA as to animals held at USDA licensed facilities. Because the AWA does not allow citizen suits, MPF argued, the case must be dismissed. After examining similar cases, this court concluded that claims under the AWA and ESA are complementary and do not conflict, and that the ESA protects captive animals regardless of whether the alleged violator is an AWA licensed entity. The court found that the allegations by PETA are sufficient at this stage of the case and issues of proof are reserved for trial. As such, the court denied the motions of the counterclaim defendants.
Missouri v. Holland


This was a bill in equity brought by the State of Missouri to prevent a game warden of the United States from attempting to enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918, c. 128, 40 Stat. 755, and the regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture in pursuance of the same. The ground of the bill is that the statute is an unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.  While the court recognized the states' province to act in traditional matters of fish and game, the migratory nature of wild birds makes them the proper subject of treaty.  As noted by the Court, "[t]he subject matter is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein."  The Court found the treaty was a proper exercise of constitutional authority where a national interest was implicated (i.e., "the protectors of our forests and our crops") and could only be protected by national action in concert with another power.

Mitchell v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.


In

Mitchell v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.

, 188 F.Supp. 869 (S.D. Cal. 1960), an expert was allowed to testify about a dog’s income-potential based on evidence that the dog could perform special tricks and made numerous appearances at charitable events. A jury verdict amounting to $5,000 was upheld where the court determined that the amount was not excessive and evidence of the dog’s income potential was not improper.

Moden v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife


Plaintiffs filed claim against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) alleging arbitrary and capricious agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and failure to perform a nondiscretionary act under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).

 

The United States District Court, D. Oregon, granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend, and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, finding

 

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ APA and ESA claims, and that it remains without jurisdiction to mandate action by the agency if rulemaking has not been initiated by the FWS at its discretion, regardless of whether a determination resulting from a five year review suggests a listing status should be changed or should remain the same.

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