Federal

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Titlesort descending Summary
Knaust v. Digesualdo Appellant operated a USDA-licensed exotic animal business in Texas. In February 2010, a United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service agent visited the business on a routine inspection and cited Appellant for several USDA regulation violations. After several subsequent inspections, several other violations were discovered and Appellant was presented with a Notice of Intent to Confiscate Animals. The next day, the animals were confiscated. Using Bivens, Appellant argued the agents violated her Fifth Amendment Due Process rights by (1) seizing her property without providing a method for challenging the seizure and (2) not allowing sufficient time to cure the cited violations prior to seizing her property. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision because the Appellant failed to assert factual allegations showing how each defendant, by his or her own individual acts, violated her constitutional rights.
Kohola v. National Marine Fisheries Service


Environmental groups challenged the NMFS's use of data in its classification of the Hawaii longline fishery as a "category III" fishery.  Held:  the NMFS has discretion to consider reliability of only available scientific data in classifying fishery.
Kokechik Fishermen's Association v. Secretary of Commerce


The Secretary of Commerce issued a regulation authorizing appellant salmon federation to take a fixed number of porpoise in connection to commercial fishing for salmon.  Appellee commercial fishermen opposed the permit.  The federation sought review of a judgment which preliminarily enjoined the Secretary from issuing the permit.
Kollman Ramos v. U.S. Dept. Of Agr.



Petitioner sought to have the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, set aside a Default Decision and Order of a United States Department of Agriculture Judicial Officer concluding that Petitioner had willfully violated multiple provisions of the AWA, including knowingly operating as a dealer without a license by


delivering for transportation, or transporting, two lions for exhibition without a valid license to do so, causing injury to two lions that resulted in the death of one of the lions, and lying to investigators about Petitioner’s actions.

 

The Court affirmed the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order, finding, among other things, that the USDA did not err in concluding that Petitioner failed to admit or deny any material allegations in the complaint and was thus deemed to have admitted all allegations, the


Judicial Officer did not abuse his discretion by revoking Petitioner’s AWA license on a finding of willfulness, and that that the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order did not violate fundamental principles of fairness as embodied in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Administrative Procedures Act, the Animal Welfare Act, and the USDA’s rules.
Kollman v. Vilsack

The Animal Welfare Act (AWA) (7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159) regulates the housing, sale, transport, treatment, and exhibition of animals. Defendants, United States Secretary of Agriculture, licensed Plaintiff, Lancelot Kollman, as an exhibitor under the AWA. However, after the death of two lions and Kollman’s failure to contest charges, the Secretary revoked Kollman's license. Still, Hawthorn, a company that holds an exhibitor license, hired Kollman to train a “tiger act” for performance at circuses throughout the United States. Hawthorn then asked Kollman to travel with the tigers and perform the act. However, the USDA received complaints about Kollman's participation in the act, despite having his license revoked. The USDA investigated and determined that Kollman was prohibited from exhibiting animals as an employee of Hawthorn. Kollman, sued Thomas J. Vilsack, the United States Secretary of Agriculture, and Chester A. Gipson, a deputy administrator of animal care.  Kollman sued for a declaration that, at a circus maintained by his employer, Hawthorn Corporation, he could publicly perform the tiger act. The Defendants moved for summary judgment.  The United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division, held that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment was Granted. The court reasoned that Kollman was barred from presenting animals on behalf of Hawthorn because regardless of his status as a Hawthorn employee, Section 2.10(c) of the Animal Welfare Act clearly prohibited Kollman, as an individual with a revoked license, from exhibiting an animal. Secondly, Section 2.10(c) was unambiguous.
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman


In 1999, President Clinton ordered the Forest Service ("FS") to initiate a nationwide plan to protect inventoried and uninventoried roadless areas in national forests, which eventually became termed the "Roadless Rule" (after extensive study was conducted in the 1970's).  The Kootenai Tribe, several livestock and recreational groups, and other plaintiffs filed suit contending that the Roadless Rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), claiming the rule would prevent access to national forests for proper purposes (e.g., fighting wildfires and threats from insects or disease).  On appeal of the grant of preliminary injunction, the Court held the Forest Service complied with the APA and NEPA in implementing the roadless rule, the court noted the extensive public notification process as well as the impact statements, which considered a full range of reasonable alternatives.  The court held that the district court erred in finding a strong likelihood that the Forest Service violated NEPA, as there was only minimal showing of irreparable harm ("restrictions on human intervention are not usually irreparable in the sense required for injunctive relief"). 
Kromenhoek v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association In this case, a condominium owner, who suffered from an anxiety disorder and had been prescribed use of emotional support animal, brought action against condominium association, its board, and certain association members, alleging, inter alia, imposition of a fine for owner's violation of association's “no dogs” policy violated Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiff sent information about her emotional support dog and a letter from a licensed psychologist indicating that plaintiff was diagnosed with Anxiety Disorder to defendant Association's office manager. Plaintiff alleged that the President of the Association shared the content of her documents with some of the Association members, and approximately one year later plaintiff received an e-mail stating plaintiff had violated the "no dogs" policy contained in the Associations Rules and Regulations. The defendants moved for summary judgment, On each of the counts, the could held that: 1) owner's initial request to have emotional support dog was not specific; 2) association's alleged delay in processing condominium owner's request to have emotional support dog did not constitute refusal to grant reasonable accommodation; 3) association's notice of fine did not subject owner to adverse action; 4) there was no causal link between association's implementation of “no dogs” policy and owner's request to have emotional support dog; 5) there was no causal link between alleged disclosure of owner's confidential information and owner's request to have emotional support dog; 6) neighbor's blog posts regarding owner did not rise to level of interference with owner's FHA rights; and 7) condominium building was not public accommodation under ADA. With regard to the ADA claim, the court noted that a condominium can be a place of public accommodation if it operates as a place of lodging. Here, the bylaws specifically provided that Cowpet Bay West was a place of residence and not one of public accommodation. In addition, a single advertisement for a temporary rental on a webpage by one tenant was insufficient to show that owners were likely to rent to the public. On the issue of the blog posts constituting harassment under Section 3617, the court found that they did not rise to the level of interference with plaintiff's rights under the FHA. Instead, they reflected more of a "dispute between neighbors, not unlawful discrimination." The court found that the Board, the Association, and Talkington are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Counts One, Three, Five, and Six. The Court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over local counts, Seven through Eighteen, as against the Board, the Association, Talkington, Verdiramo, and Cockayne, as no federal counts remain as against any of said defendants; an appropriate Judgment was to follow this memorandum.
Kuba v. 1-A Agr. Ass'n


Activist sued a state-created agricultural association under 42 USC § 1983 to challenge a rule that limited demonstrations to “free expression zones” outside a state-owned performance facility. The Court of Appeals held that the association was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. It held that the parking lots and walkways were public fora, and thus time, place and manner restrictions on speech had to be content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest. The Court held that the state did not have a significant interest in restricting protestors to these zones. The rule was not narrowly tailored enough to promote the association's interest in preventing traffic congestion, and restricted more speech than was necessary. Therefore, the rule unduly infringed free speech on its face.
Kuehl v. Sellner Five Plaintiffs Tracey K. Kuehl, Lisa K. Kuehl, Kris A. Bell, Nancy A. Harvey, John T. Braumann, and the Animal Legal Defense Fund filed a complaint against Defendants Pamela Sellner, Tom Sellner, and Cricket Hollow Zoo, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), by holding captive endangered species specifically the lemurs and tigers housed at Cricket Hollow Zoo. The United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division ordered the Defendants, to transfer the lemurs and tigers in their possession “to an appropriate facility which is licensed by the USDA and is capable of meeting the needs of the endangered species.” The Defendants proposed transporting the lemurs to Special Memories Zoo in Hortonville, Wisconsin, and transporting the tigers to the Exotic Feline Rescue Center in Centerpoint, Indiana. The Plaintiffs claimed that the proposed placements did not comply with the Court's Order and proposed that the lemurs be placed with the Prosimian Sanctuary in Jacksonville, Florida, and the tigers be transported to the Wild Animal Sanctuary in Keenesburg, Colorado. The Court held that the Special Memories Zoo was capable of meeting the lemurs' needs and should be transported there as the Defendant’s proposed. The court reasoned that even if the Court found Special Memories incapable of meeting the lemurs' needs, the Prosimian Sanctuary as proposed by the Plaintiff's was not licensed by the USDA. The Court also held that the endangered tigers should be transferred to the Exotic Feline Rescue Center as the Defendant’s proposed. The court reasoned that the center was capable of meeting of the needs of the tigers. Therefore the Court approved the Defendants' proposed placement of the lemurs and tigers.
Kuehl v. Sellner Plaintiffs, including advocacy organization Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF), brought suit against defendants the Sellners and the Cricket Hollow Zoo to enjoin defendants' mistreatment of their animals in violation of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. Defendants ran a zoo with over 300 animals, including lemurs, tigers, cougars, monkeys and birds, among others. Several of the plaintiffs visited defendants' zoo and witnessed care that raised concerns about the animals' mental and physical well-being, including lemurs kept in isolation with insufficient climbing structures, and tigers kept in feces-filled cages with inadequate care/enrichment. The district court denied plaintiffs' requests for attorney fees and costs and also transferred the animals to a facility that was not proposed by plaintiffs. On appeal, defendants argued that plaintiffs lack standing, and, even if they had standing, defendants contend that they did not violate the ESA. Plaintiffs also appealed, challenging the district court's placement decision for the animals, as well as the court's denial of their request for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals disagreed with defendants that plaintiffs lacked standing because "[they] visited the Cricket Hollow Zoo for the purpose of looking for claimed violations." The court noted that "it is the violation itself" and not the search for it that has caused injury to the plaintiffs. As to defendants' argument that they could not have violated the ESA because the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) provides a "safe harbor" for licensed facilities, the court found that the AWA does not provide a blanket immunity to the ESA. Here, the defendants harassed the lemurs under the ESA by keeping them socially isolated with insufficient enrichment. The defendants also harassed the tigers under the ESA by failing to provide appropriate veterinary care and keeping them in unsanitary conditions. With regard to the placement of the animals at a facility chosen by defendants, this court found no clear error by the district court and, thus, there was no abuse of discretion in the placement decision. Finally, as to denial of plaintiffs' request for attorney fees and costs, the court found that plaintiffs were seeking fees to serve "as a vehicle to close Cricket Hollow." The court was concerned that the use of the ESA as a "weapon" to close small, privately-owned zoos was not envisioned by the Act. Hence, those circumstances justified the district court's decision to deny the motion for attorney fees. The lower court's decision was affirmed.

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