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Anderson v. Christopherson |
This appeal asks two questions: whether defendant-dog owners (Christophersons) were strictly liable under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 for plaintiff Anderson's injuries suffered when he attempted to break up a fight between defendants' and plaintiff's dogs; and (2) whether one of the defendants was an "owner" for purposes of this law. In the case at hand, the court found that the events leading to Anderson's injury could produce three reasonable alternative inferences such that summary judgment was inappropriate. The court found there was an issue whether the father Dennis Christopherson was "harboring" the dog at the home for purposes of the animal owner liability statute.
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Anderson v. State Department of Natural Resources |
A paper manufacturing company sprayed pesticides on their tree grove, but accidentally over sprayed killing some of plaintiff's commercial bees. The commercial beekeeper sued the paper manufacturing company and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the paper company. The Supreme Court of Minnesota ultimately reversed the grants of summary judgment on the commercial beekeeper's negligence claims and affirmed dismissal of the nuisance claims.
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Balen v. Peltier (NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED AS UNPUBLISHED AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY MINN. ST. SEC. 480A.08(3). |
Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries she received after being thrown from defendant’s horse. Specifically, plaintiff argued that defendant knew or should have known of the horse’s “hazardous propensities” and therefore had a duty to protect plaintiff. In finding that there existed no special relationship between the parties to impart a duty to defendant, defendant’s motion for summary judgment was affirmed.
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Berres v. Anderson |
This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought by the purchasers of cattle that tested positive for Johne's disease. The veterinarian diagnosed the disease in the seller's herd and treated the buyer's herd for the disease. The trial court granted summary judgment for the veterinarian on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired for the malpractice claim. On appeal, the court reversed the district court's granting of summary judgment, as it determined that the record indicated a genuine issue for trial as to the causation of the spread of the disease among the herd of cattle and whether adequate hygiene would have reduced the spread of the disease. |
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Berrier v. Minnesota State Patrol |
This Minnesota Supreme Court case considers whether sovereign immunity shields the State Patrol from liability after a police canine injured a person in an unprovoked attack. This case stems from an incident that occurred in 2019, where a state trooper brought his patrol vehicle in for service at a car dealership accompanied by his State Patrol canine. During the visit, the canine committed an unprovoked attack on Berrier, who suffered serious and permanent injuries. Berrier sued the State Patrol, claiming her injuries were "a direct and proximate result" of the State Patrol's negligence. After some procedural issues, the district court denied the State Patrol's motion to dismiss, finding that Berrier sufficiently pleaded her claim under the state's strict liability dog-bite statute. In doing so, the court observed that the law imposes strict liability on "the owner" of a dog with a "clear intent to include governmental entities . . ." The court of appeals reversed the district court's order and remanded the case. Berrier then petitioned this court for review. On appeal here, the State Patrol questions whether Berrier adequately pleaded her dog-bite claim and whether the State Patrol has sovereign immunity even not when expressly referenced. The Supreme Court first noted there is a rigorous standard in Minnesota for waiving sovereign immunity where the statute as a whole must be read and interpreted. Previous caselaw held that the dog-bite statute applies to municipal owners of police dogs but did not touch on State actors. However, the court noted that the legislature could have amended the dog-bite law to exclude police dogs after that 2005 case, but did not do so. Further, the language of the dog-bite statute is broadly inclusive and has previously been interpreted broadly to effect the goals of the law (e.g., ensuring a claimant's full recovery). The Court was not swayed by the State's concerns of exposure to wide-ranging liability since only three agencies have active canine programs with few canines actually trained in apprehension or tracking of suspects. The court of appeals decision was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. |
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Detailed Discussion of Minnesota Great Ape Laws |
The following article discusses Great Apes law in Minnesota. While there is no direct law governing who may own a great ape in Minnesota, there are, however, laws in various parts of the Minnesota code that have some limited application to great apes. On the upside, the state's anti-cruelty law applies to all animals, and there is a law specifically protecting companion animals which applies to apes kept for that purpose. On the other hand, the structure of the state's endangered species law - that it neither references apes nor the federal endangered list - makes it a particularly lacklustre protection. Moreover, the state's affirmative decision to address the ownership and possession of Great Apes as a "regulated" animal, along with a number of exceptions and exemptions to the general ban against possessing such animals, is a window into how the state views these animals. |
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Engquist v. Loyas |
After a 9-year old child was bitten by defendant's dog while at a sleepover at defendant's house, the child's mother sued the dog’s owners on child's behalf. The jury found that the plaintiff provoked the dog and the court entered a judgment in favor of defendants. The appellate court reversed on the ground that the jury instruction given by the district court misstated the meaning of provocation under the statute, and remanded for a new trial. In the instant action, the Supreme Court affirms this decision. Specifically, the jury here could have found provocation without any consideration of the victim's knowledge of the danger, and this misstatement prejudiced the defendant.
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Eureka Township v. Petter |
In this case, the Township brought action against property owners to enjoin the owners from possessing exotic animals on the property, operating an animal exhibition on the property, and operating a business pelting exotic animals on the property. The District Court invalidated the township's exotic animal ordinance as conflicting with state statute, determined that an animal exhibition was not a permissible use under the township's zoning ordinance, and permanently enjoined the owners from operating an animal exhibition and conducting any retail sales, except for horticultural products produced on the property. This court held that the exotic animals ordinance did not conflict with state statute nor was it preempted. Further, this court held that the property owners' grandfathered possession and exhibition of exotic animals was limited to one wolf; animal control officer exception to exotic animal possession was limited to temporary possession of exotic animals in conjunction with owner's work as an animal control officer; township was not estopped from enforcing its exotic animal ordinance; and interpreting zoning ordinance's language to require sale of horticultural products from the land itself was not inherently unreasonable. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion dismissed. |
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Gurtek v. Chisago County |
Appellants sought review of a denial of a special-use permit to build a large campground adjacent to a bald eagle nesting site. They contended that the denial by the county board was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the denial was reasonable where the county proffered two legally valid reasons for denying the permit: the danger to the sensitive nesting eagle population and the detrimental effect the increased human activity would have on the unspoiled nature of the property.
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Hannan v. City of Minneapolis |
This case held that a state statute permitting the control and ultimate destruction of dangerous animals does not preclude municipal controls that add to the breadth of public powers without regulating conditions expressly prohibited by statute. In the case, a dog owner sought review of municipal animal control division's order for destruction of his dog. The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance providing for destruction of dangerous dog did not conflict with statute and thus was not preempted by statute. The court stated that, after comparing the ordinance with the state statute, it was evident that the local provision is merely additional and complementary to the statute, permitting local action that the state statute does not prohibit. In fact,
state law expressly provides for local regulation, giving municipalities full authority to regulate "potentially dangerous dogs," as long as the regulations are not breed-specific.
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