In this case, the Justice Tribunal in Paraná, Brazil, unanimously overturned the lower court decision and ruled that two dogs, Rambo and Spike (appellants), had the legal capacity to be legal persons and, therefore, had standing to sue their owners, Pedro Rafael de Barros Escher and Elizabeth Merida Devai (Appellees) in a damages claim.
On appeal, an ONG acting on behalf of Spike and Rambo asserted that:
- Animals are subject of rights and have legal capacity to be active parties in a legal proceeding
- Legal personality and procedural capacity are not requirements to have the capacity to be a party, since it is sufficient to hold at least one positive subjective right
- Rambo and Spike are two dogs who were victims of mistreatment and abandonment and should be parties in the lawsuit seeking reparation for the damages suffered due to the actions and omissions of the defendants
- The Federal Constitution recognizes animals as sentient beings, guaranteeing them the right to access justice, and recent legislation places greater emphasis on the dignity of animals;
- High Courts' jurisprudence has established the duty to protect animals, even if this means limiting fundamental "human" rights
- Recognizing animals as subjects of rights changes the interpretation of other legal norms treating them as "property," and the legal regime regarding "persons" is no longer limited to humans
- Non-human animals, as subjects of rights by virtue of the constitutional text, must be admitted as parties to the proceedings in defense of their rights
- There are local laws and judicial precedents recognizing animals as subjects of fundamental rights
- Decree 24.654/1934, having the force of ordinary law, remains in force and is compatible with current civil and procedural rules so that the NGO "Sou Amigo" has legitimacy to assist the dogs, Spike and Rambo, at trial
- The absence of the aforementioned dogs in the active part of the lawsuit will result in irreparable harm since "any decision or agreement will not cover their individual legal sphere"
Upon thorough examination of the validity of Decree-Law 24,645/1934, granting the Public Prosecutor's Office and animal protection entities the authority to act as legal representatives for animals, the court determined that the decree is an ordinary law (higher hierarchy than other laws), and is still in full force. As a result, animals in Brazil are explicitly endowed with the legal capacity to participate as parties in judicial proceedings by law.
The judge referenced the 2005 case Suíça v. Gavazza, a groundbreaking decision where the chimpanzee, the subject of a Habeas Corpus, had passed away before the final judgment. Despite the unique circumstances, the judge acknowledged the possibility of extending legal personhood to other chimpanzees. Additionally, the judge mentioned the 2020 case Diego and Others v. Barcino, a more recent lawsuit where the guardian of twenty-three cats sought specific performance and emotional damages against a construction company on behalf of the feline plaintiffs.
The judge concluded that there is a discernible judicial trend towards accepting animals as legal persons with the ability to be a party in legal proceedings. Emphasizing that in Brazil, legal standing comprises a three-fold concept involving 1) the capacity to be a party, 2) the capacity to be at trial, and 3) the capacity to act on behalf of a party.
To further show the evolution of societal views on the topic regarding animals, the court also referred to comparative law from Argentina, more specifically, the cases of the orangutan Sandra against the Buenos Aires Zoo and the chimpanzee Cecilia against the Mendoza Zoo and the case of Chucho, the Andean Bear against the Barranquilla Zoo. Furthermore,
The court stated that the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 established the principle of unobstructed access to justice, which means that every holder of substantive rights can be a party in a judicial proceeding; without this ability, such principle is ineffective and pointless.
Consequently, relying on the aforementioned arguments and in compliance with the constitutional provisions in Articles 5, XXXV, and 225, § 1, VII, along with Articles 2, § 3, of Decree-Law No. 24,645/1934, the judge held that non-human animals are entitled to full access to justice, even as plaintiffs in a lawsuit, provided that they are duly represented.
The appeal was granted, and the court ordered that Rambo and Spike maintain their role as the focal points of the lawsuit, acting as plaintiffs represented by the NGO.