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Long v. The State of Texas |
Appellant, who was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, raised 35 points of error in a direct appeal in which he challenged the trial court's voir dire rulings and its evidentiary rulings. The court held that the admission into evidence of photographs was within the discretion of the lower court, which properly determined that the photographs served a proper purpose in enlightening the jury.
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Lopez v. State |
The court convicted the defendant of cruelty to animals where the defendant left his dog in the car on a hot, sunny, dry day with the windows only cracked an inch and a half. Such action was deemed "transporting or confining animal in a cruel manner."
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Lost and Found: Humane Societies' Rights and Obligations Regarding Companion Animal Ownership |
This article discusses when ownership of a dog that is lost or relinquished by its owner transfers to an animal shelter. The shelter's property rights in a found animal vary depending on whether the animal is licensed or unlicensed, stray or abandoned. Each state has its own rules regarding how long a shelter must keep an animal before transferring ownership to a third party.
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LUKUMI AT TWENTY: A LEGACY OF UNCERTAINTY FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND ANIMAL WELFARE LAWS |
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MA - Cambridge - Title 6: Animals (Chapter 6.12: Care and Use of Laboratory Animals) |
In Cambridge, Massachusetts, research institutions that perform experiments on animals must do so in conformity with all federal, state and local statutes, ordinances and regulations, as well as maintain or establish an autonomous animal care and use committee with the power to disapprove or restrict research, experiments or regarding the care and use of laboratory animals. This ordinance also establishes a Commissioner of Laboratory Animals (CLA) for the purpose of overseeing research institutions and their committees. Penalties for violating these provisions are also provided.
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MA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes |
These Massachusetts laws contain the state's anti-cruelty provisions. Sec. 77 is the operative anti-cruelty statute and provides that whoever overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, cruelly beats, mutilates or kills an animal, and whoever uses in a cruel or inhuman manner in a race, game, or contest, or in training, as lure or bait a live animal (except as bait in fishing), or knowingly and willfully authorizes or permits it to be subjected to unnecessary torture, suffering or cruelty of any kind shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 7 years or imprisonment for not more than 2 1/2 years or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Other laws prohibit the dyeing of baby chicks, the docking of horse tails, and animal fighting, among other provisions. In 2010, the state made non-medically necessary devocalization of dogs or cats illegal. |
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MA - Cruelty, reporting - § 85. Department employees reporting animal cruelty, abuse or neglect; immunity from liability |
This Massachusetts statute provides that a state employee acting within the scope of his or her employment, who has knowledge of or observes an animal whom he knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of animal cruelty, abuse or neglect may report it to the entities that investigate these reports or any local animal control. The statute describes how to make the report, timing to submit, and who can make the report if 2 or more employees witness the abuse. The statute also makes clear that no person who makes a report shall be liable in any civil or criminal action if the report was made in good faith. |
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MA - Vehicle - § 22H. Safe transportation of animals |
In Massachusetts, transporting an animal in the back of a motor vehicle on a public way unless such space is enclosed or has side and tail racks to a height of at least 46 inches extending vertically from the floor, the animal is cross tethered to the vehicle, the animal is protected by a secured container or cage or the animal is otherwise protected in a manner which will prevent the animal from being thrown or from falling or jumping from the vehicle results in a fine of not less than $50. |
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Mack v. State of Texas (unpublished) |
The Texas Appeals Court affirmed the trial court's decision that failure to adequately provide for cattle such that they suffered from malnourishment constituted animal cruelty offense under Texas law. The court found that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that malnourished cow was one of the many domesticated living creatures on defendant's ranch, and was therefore an “animal” under the state law.
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Mackley v. State |
The Wyoming Supreme Court considers whether the jury was properly instructed on the charge of aggravated animal cruelty. The case stems from an incident where a dog escaped his owner and attacked the defendant's dogs at his front door. A local teenager grabbed the offending dog ("Rocky") and dragged him into the street as the dog fight carried on. The defendant responded by grabbing his gun and shooting Rocky as he was held by the teenager. A jury convicted defendant of both aggravated animal cruelty and reckless endangering. At the trial, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on both charges, arguing that the Wyoming Legislature has established that humanely destroying an animal is not animal cruelty and that the State did not provide evidence that he intentionally pointed a firearm at anyone, which defendant contends is necessary for the reckless endangering charge. On appeal here, the court first observed that defendant's challenge to a confusing or misleading jury instruction was waived because he negotiated with the prosecution to draft it. Further, the Supreme Court did not find an abuse of discretion where the district court refused defendant's additional instructions on the humane destruction of an animal in the jury instructions on the elements for the aggravated cruelty to animals charge. While defendant argued that the instructions should include subsection m from the statute, he only now on appeal contends that the subsection should have been given as a theory of defense. Thus, reviewing this argument for plain error, the Court found that defendant's theory that his killing was "humane" and thus excluded from the crime of aggravated cruelty was not supported by the language of the statute. In fact, such an interpretation not only goes against the plain language, but "then any animal could be killed, under any circumstances, as long as it is killed quickly." Defendant presented no evidence that the dog he shot was suffering or distressed and needed euthanasia. The trial court did not commit error when it declined to instruct the jury on subsection m. As to the reckless endangering conviction, the court also affirmed this charge as defendant showed a conscious disregard for the substantial risk he placed the teenager in regardless of whether he pointed the gun at the victim. Affirmed. |
