Animal Fighting

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Titlesort descending Summary
State v. Gaines


Defendant, who pleaded guilty to 2 counts of dogfighting, challenged the constitutionality of the dogfighting statute and appealed a court-imposed forfeiture of cash and other seized items. The Court of Appeals ruled that: (1) dogfighting statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; (2) statute did not violate equal protection or constitute cruel and unusual punishment on ground that violation constitutes fourth-degree felony while violation of statute prohibiting other animal fights is only a fourth-degree misdemeanor; and (3) despite guilty plea, forfeiture of cash and other items was erroneous absent establishment of direct connection with defendant's illegal dogfighting activities.
State v. Hartrampf


Defendant appealed a conviction for attempted involvement in animal fighting, arguing that the statutes at issue were unconstitutionally vague.  Since the defendant admitted he knowingly was among spectators at farm hosting a cockfighting event, the Court of Appeals held that a person of common intelligence could discern that defendant's conduct constituted a substantial step toward involvement in animal fighting.
State v. Nelson


Defendants in this Washington case appeal their convictions of animal fighting and operating an unlicensed private kennel. They contend on appeal that the trial judge abused her discretion by allowing an expert from the Humane Society to render an opinion on whether the evidence showed that the defendants intended to engage in dogfighting exhibitions. The Court of Appeals held that the judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting the expert's opinion. The opinions offered by the expert were based on the evidence and the expert's years of experience. The court found that the expert's opinion was a fair summary and reflected the significance of the other evidence offered by the prosecution. Further, the expert's opinion was proffered to rebut defendants' contention that the circumstantial evidence (the veterinary drugs, training equipment, tattoos, etc.) showed only defendants' intent to enter the dogs in legal weight-pulling contests. Defendants convictions for animal fighting and operating an unlicensed private kennel were affirmed.
State v. Scott
The appellant pled guilty to one count of animal fighting, one count of cruelty to animals, and one count of keeping unvaccinated dogs, and asked for probation. The trial court denied the appellants request for probation and sentenced him to incarceration. The appellant challenged the trial court's ruling, and

the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny probation, stating that the heinous nature of the crimes warranted incarceration.
State v. Weeks
Defendant was convicted of violating Ohio's animal fighting statute, and appealed. He challenged the conviction, arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The court upheld the conviction. The court ruled that although a portion of the statute was overly vague and broad, that portion was severable from the remainder. The court also held that defendant did not demonstrate that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him.
State v. Woods

Defendant was indicted on three counts of aggravated murder, one count of attempted aggravated murder, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of kidnapping in an incident following a dogfight. Following a jury trial, d

efendant was found guilty of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery and kidnapping. The court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court.
Stephens v. State



Defendant was accused and convicted of 17 counts of cruelty to animals for harboring fighting dogs in deplorable conditions. Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the probation terms. The appellate court found, in light of the evidence, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of cruelty to animals beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, defendant failed to overcome the presumption that the probation the trial court imposed was correct.
STEVENS, R.A.V., AND ANIMAL CRUELTY SPEECH: WHY CONGRESS'S NEW STATUTE REMAINS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROBLEMATIC Abstract: The constitutionality of restrictions on speech depicting actual cruelty to animals is a question that continues to divide courts and commentators. In U.S. v. Stevens, the Supreme Court struck down a 1999 ban on depictions of animal cruelty. The Court invalidated the ban on its face because, as written, the statute extended beyond acts of actual animal cruelty to other forms of unlawful animal harm, such as hunting out of season. Thus, the Court did not resolve the core question presented.



Congress responded by drafting a new statute, one narrowed to “crush” videos--obscene depictions of animal cruelty--in an effort to avoid constitutional problems. This new statute, however, continues to raise constitutional and public policy concerns--despite its recent upholding in the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Richards.



This article is the first to analyze the constitutional and public policy issues presented by Congress's new animal cruelty speech regulation. This article contends that the modified statute is poor public policy and remains constitutionally problematic. First, as a policy matter, the statute is ineffective because it fails to criminalize the most widespread and troubling form of animal cruelty speech: animal fighting videos. Second, the statute's overly narrow reach--limited to obscene depictions of animal cruelty--in fact increases its constitutional problems by triggering the “virulence” doctrine first articulated in R.A.V. Since courts are unlikely to view obscene depictions of animal cruelty as virulently “prurient” obscenity, as opposed to the kind of “morbidly” violent speech entitled to the protections of strict scrutiny as established in Brown, the statute will likely be invalidated.


The article concludes with an exploration of possible new legislation, which could effectively prevent animal cruelty, while also preserving free speech rights.
Texas Attorney General Letter Opinion 94-071


Texas Attorney General Opinion regarding the issue of whether staged fights between penned hogs and dogs constitutes a criminal offense. The Assistant Attorney General deemed these staged fights as violating the criminal cruelty laws.
The Humane Society of the United States, Plaintiff v. Amazon.com, Inc., JOHN DOE d/b/a UNDERGROUND, PITBULL BREEDERS ASSOCIATION The Plaintiff The Humane Society of the United States filed this complaint alleging unlawful trade practices pursuant to the Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”), D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904. This action for statutory penalties and appropriate injunctive relief arises from Defendants’ purposeful marketing, sale, and shipment of graphic dog fighting videos and cockfighting magazines in violation of federal criminal prohibitions and District of Columbia animal welfare laws. The videos and magazines depict and/or describe actual animal cruelty, as well as animal fights staged for the purposes of: (1) producing and selling more copies of the videos for commercial gain; and (2) unlawfully promoting the criminal enterprises of dog fighting and cockfighting. In particular, the magazines contain hundreds of criminal solicitations and feature advertisements for fighting birds, fighting dogs, and other contraband that render them unlawful under the following statutory schemes: federal Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2132 et seq .; the federal Depiction of Animal Cruelty Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 48; the D.C. Cruelty to Animals Statute, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1015(a)(1), (a)(5); the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371; and the D.C. conspiracy law, D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1805a(a).

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