Dangerous Animal
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Flikshtein v. City of New York |
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French and Spanish Animal Laws | |
GA - Avondale Estates - Chapter 1: General Provisions & Chapter 4: Animals and Fowl |
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GA - Bite - § 51-2-6. Dogs, liability of owner or keeper for injuries to livestock | This Georgia statute represents the state's relevant dog bite strict liability law. While the law imposes strict liability for injury to a person, the dog (or other animal) must first be considered "vicious" or "dangerous," which can be as simple as showing the animal was required to be leashed per city ordinance. Second, the animal must be at large by the careless management of the owner. Finally, the person injured must not have provoked the animal into attacking him or her. |
Gallick v. Barto |
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Galloway v. Kuhl |
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Gilreath v. Smith |
While pet sitting for Defendants Bruce and Jodi Smith, Plaintiff Josephine Gilreath was attacked and injured by the Smiths' rooster, which caused a serious infection with long-term consequences. Plaintiff Gilreath filed suit, but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on the ground that Gilreath assumed the risk. Gilreath appealed to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and reasoned that Gilreath assumed the risk of injury based on the state statutes of owners of land under OCGA § 51-3-1, as keepers of a vicious or dangerous animal under OCGA § 51-2-7, and as required by a Roswell city ordinance. The Court reasoned that at prior pet-sittings at the Defendants home, Gilreath had been warned that the rooster would attack and that a garbage can lid was useful for controlling the rooster. Second, Gilreath has not raised an issue of fact regarding whether the Smiths had superior knowledge of the risks associated with the danger. Gilreath, a professional pet sitter with at least nine years of experience, admitted that she had a responsibility to educate herself about the animals she takes care of yet she failed to do so for roosters. Third, Gilreath admitted that she chose to take the job knowing that she had been told that the rooster would attack. Gilreath also contends that the Smiths violated a Roswell city ordinance, but she failed to introduce a certified copy of the ordinance and thus failed to prove this claim. |
Gromer v. Matchett |
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Gruber v. YMCA of Greater Indianapolis | An eleven-year-old boy was at a YMCA camp when a pig—which had never injured anyone or exhibited any dangerous propensities—stuck its head between the bars of its pen and grabbed the boy's hand, causing injuries. The boy and his mother sued the camp, and the camp filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the camp. On appeal, the boy and his mother asked the court to change the standard for liability of owners of domestic animals to that of strict liability when the animal was not a cat or dog. Since the Indiana Supreme Court precedent was clear that this general rule applied to all domestic animals—and not just cats and dogs—the court declined their invitation to alter the standard. The trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the camp was therefore affirmed. |
Hanrahan v. Hometown America, LLC |
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