Impound or Animal Control

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Titlesort descending Summary
MN - Ordinances - 366.01.Chapter 366. Town Board; Board of Audit. Town Board. This Minnesota statute provides that the supervisors of each town constituting a town board are empowered to license and regulate the presence or keeping of dogs or domestic animal pets when deemed to be in the public interest.
MN - Ordinances - Chapter 365. Town General Law. Town Meeting Powers. Under this Minnesota statute, town electors at their annual town meeting, are empowered to exercise control over a number of activities relating to dogs. They can decide the locations of pounds, set the number of poundmasters, and discontinue a pound. The electors may make orders and bylaws on restraining horses, cattle, sheep, swine, and other domestic animals from going at large on roads. They may also make orders and bylaws on the impounding of domestic animals going at large and fix penalties for violations of the orders and bylaws. The electors may let the town board pass an ordinance for licensing dogs and cats and regulating their presence, keeping, and running at large in the town. The electors are also granted the authority to provide for a specific activity that is within any of the following categories: the promotion of health, safety, order, and convenience, and the general welfare.
MO - Dog Ordinances - Chapter 77. Third Class Cities. This Missouri statute provides that a city council may tax, restrain and prohibit the running at large of dogs, and provide for their destruction when at large contrary to ordinance, and impose penalties on the owners or keepers thereof.
MO - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws These Missouri statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include laws for impounding loose dogs, licensing, rabies control, and the Animal Care Facilities Act, which regulates commercial breeders/pet shops.
MO - Impound - Chapter 273. Dogs--Cats. Local Option Dog Tax. This Missouri statute provides that every city or town marshal of every incorporated city or town shall seize and impound all dogs found running at large without collars around their necks. These dogs will be kept for a period of one week after which they shall be put to death by humane methods. The statute further states that any marshal who shall fail or refuse to take up and impound any such dog shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof fined not less than five dollars nor more than twenty-five dollars.
MO - Ordinances - Chapter 79. Fourth Class Cities. Police and Health Regulations This Missouri statute provides that a local board of aldermen may tax, regulate and restrain and prohibit the running at large of dogs, and provide for their destruction when at large contrary to ordinance, and impose penalties on the owners or keepers thereof.
Moreland v. Marion County, Miss.


Plaintiff brought action against Marion County (“County”) and several animal control officers (“Officers”) in their official capacities, after the Officers crossed county lines and confiscated several dogs that appeared severely dehydrated and malnourished, and euthanized at least one dog.

 

On Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Hattiesburg Division held that since there was no evidence to indicate that Defendants’ actions were anything more than negligence not rising to the level of reckless disregard, Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants should be dismissed.

 

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, finding that the record did not support a finding of a pattern of inadequate training rising to the level of deliberate indifference to known or obvious consequence, and that the Officers’ actions could not be found to be a known or obvious result of the County’s training.

 

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice.

 
Moser v. Pennsylvania Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals


After the defendants confiscated mare without a warrant and required that the plaintiff surrender another mare and a few other animals in order to avoid prosecution, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for violating the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Civil Rights Act and Pennsylvania statutory and common law. However, the plaintiffs lost when the district court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment on all counts.
Mostek v. Genesee County Animal Control


Defendant officer removed a gravely-ill cat that needed veterinary care from Plaintiff's backyard. Plaintiff sued alleging Fourth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff disclaimed ownership of the cat, thus her property rights were not violated by the seizure. Officer was shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity, because animal control officers may enter property and remove animals that appear to be in danger.
Mouton v. State

San Antonio Animal Care Services (ACS) responded to a call about 36 pit bull terriers that were chained, significantly underweight, and dehydrated. The dogs also had scarring consistent with fighting. Police obtained a search warrant and coordinated with ACS to seize the dogs. While the dogs were being secured, Appellant Terrence Mouton arrived at the residence. He told the officers that he had been living at the residence for a couple of weeks, but that he did not own all of the dogs and was holding them for someone else. Mouton was convicted in the County Court of cruelty to non livestock animals. On appeal, Mouton argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the Appellee, the State of Texas, failed to prove that the animals were in his custody. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Mouton was responsible for the health, safety, and welfare of the dogs on his property and that the dogs were subject to his care and control, regardless of whether he was the actual owner of each animal. A reasonable jury could have also found that Mouton was “aware of, but consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that he failed to provide proper nutrition, water, or shelter for the dogs.

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