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SC - Lien, boarding - § 29-15-60. Animal boarding facilities; liens upon animals for boarding expenses. |
This South Carolina law states that the owner of an animal boarding facility, at the end of an agreed upon term of boarding, shall have a lien upon any animal which is left for upkeep until the cost has been paid by the owner of the animal. The owner of the animal shall also be responsible for payment of the cost of care for the animal after notice of the lien. If the owner of the animal has not paid the cost after actual notice of the lien within ten days of such notice, the animal boarding facility owner may sell the animal after having advertised the time and place of the sale at least seven days before the sale is to be held. |
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SC - Veterinary - Chapter 69. Veterinarians. |
These are the state's veterinary practice laws amended in 2006. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. |
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Scharer v. San Luis Rey Equine Hosp., Inc. |
Horse owner sued veterinarians and equine hospital for professional malpractice after horse was euthanized less than two months after surgery to remove horse’s ovaries. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for defendants based on the one-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that equitable tolling did not apply because plaintiff was not prevented from pursuing her claim in a timely manner by the defendants or the court. A provision in the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act extending the statute of limitations by 90 days did not apply absent a claim for personal injury or wrongful death to a person.
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Schriver v. Raptosh |
This Idaho case addresses the recoverable damages for a pet owner following the death of a pet due to alleged veterinary malpractice and an unauthorized necropsy. The Schrivers sought non-economic damages, including emotional distress and loss of companionship, after their cat, Gypsy, died during a veterinary procedure and was subjected to a necropsy without their consent. The district court denied emotional distress damages under their trespass to chattels/conversion claim and granted summary judgment in favor of the veterinarian on claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and lack of informed consent. The court, however, applied the “value to owner” measure for economic damages, which the veterinarian cross-appealed. The court affirmed that pets are considered personal property under Idaho law, and damages for their loss are limited to economic value, excluding sentimental value or loss of companionship. Emotional distress damages are not recoverable under trespass to chattels or conversion claims but may be pursued under independent torts like intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court upheld the denial of negligent infliction of emotional distress, finding no duty of care owed by veterinarians to prevent emotional harm to pet owners. However, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim regarding the unauthorized necropsy, remanding it for jury determination as to whether the conduct was “extreme and outrageous.” The court also affirmed that lack of informed consent is not a standalone cause of action in veterinary malpractice cases, though it may inform claims of professional negligence. Finally, the court upheld the “value to owner” measure for economic damages, clarifying that it includes the pet’s unique characteristics but excludes sentimental value. The court denied the veterinarian’s request for attorney fees, as the primary issues of the litigation remain unresolved. |
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SD - Veterinary - Chapter 36-12. Veterinarians. |
These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. |
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Sexton v. Brown |
In this Washington case, Valeri Sexton and Corey Recla sued Kenny Brown, DVM, for damages arising from the death of their dog. Plaintiffs alleged a number of causes of action including negligence, breach of bailment, conversion, and trespass to chattels. The incident occurred after plaintiff's dog ran away while plaintiff was camping Marblemount area. Another party found the Yorkshire terrier and took it to defendant-veterinarian's office, the Pet Emergency Center (PEC). After being examined first by a one veterinarian, defendant-veterinarian Brown took over care and determined that the dog suffered from a life threatening condition; he then told the finders that if they did not want to pay for further care, they could have the dog euthanized. This court affirmed the trial court's decision that the medical malpractice act does not apply to veterinarians. It also affirmed the dismissal of Sexton's breach of bailment claim, finding that Brown was not a finder under relevant Washington law. The court did find that there were material issues of fact about the measure of damages, and reversed the decision to limit damages to the fair market or replacement value of the dog. Further, the court found genuine issues of material fact about whether Brown's actions were justified when viewed under the requirements of Washington's veterinary practice laws.
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Shera v. N.C. State University Veterinary Teaching Hosp. |
After an animal hospital caused the death of a dog due to an improperly placed feeding tube, the dog owners sued for veterinary malpractice under the Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals held that the replacement value of the dog was the appropriate measure of damages, and not the intrinsic value. Owners’ emotional bond with the dog was not compensable under North Carolina law.
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Sherman v. Kissinger |
A dog owner sued a veterinarian and a veterinary hospital after her dog died. The Court of Appeals held that the medical malpractice act did not apply to veterinarians, and thus, did not bar claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, trespass to chattels, and breach of bailment contract; the three-part analysis in McCurdy controlled the measure of damages and the burden of proof for damages; genuine issues of material fact about the market value of the dog, whether it could be replaced, and whether owner was entitled to present evidence of the dog’s intrinsic value, precluded summary judgment limiting owner's damages; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking expert’s testimony about the loss of the human-animal bond because owner was not entitled to emotional distress damages; and defendants were not entitled to attorney fees under the small claims statute.
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Southall v. Gabel |
This case resulted from the alleged negligent transport of a horse that resulted in a drastic change in the horse's temperament (to a "killer horse"), which ultimately led to its destruction by its owner. Before trial, defendant demurred to plaintiff's petition on the ground that the action was barred under R.C. s 2305.11, the act being 'malpractice' and therefore required to be brought within one year after the termination of treatment. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's decision overruling the demurrer to plaintiff's petition was correct, 'the petitioner is based on negligence for the transporting rather than malpractice.' Further, the Court held that until the Supreme Court speaks, veterinarians are not included in the definition of malpractice (reversed and remanded -
See
,
293 N.E.2d 891
(Ohio, Mun.,1972).
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Southall v. Gabel |
This action was brought by plaintiff as owner of a 3 year old thoroughbred race horse, named Pribal, against defendant, a veterinarian, charging defendant so mishandled the horse that it sustained physical injuries and emotional trauma; that the emotional stability of the horse worsened until finally it was exterminated. The court held that the evidence failed to show any proximate cause between the surgery that was performed on the horse and the subsequent care and transport of the horse by the veterinarian.
As the court stated, what caused Pribal to become mean and a "killer" is speculative; the O.S.U. Veterinary Clinic records in evidence did not indicate any causal relationship between the handling of Pribal by the defendant and the subsequent personality change resulting in Pribal becoming a "killer horse."
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