Dogs: Related Cases
Case name |
Citation | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Pless v. State | 648 S.E.2d 752 (Ga. App. 2007) |
In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction with the exception of that portion of his sentence requiring him to reimburse the county for his court-appointed attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, reversed the appellate court's holding and ruled that the trial court was authorized to impose the reimbursement of attorney fees as part of the sentence. On remand, the appellate court vacated that portion of its opinion that reversed the imposition of attorney fees and adopted the Supreme Court's opinion as its own; all other respects of the appellate decision, Pless v. State, 633 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. App., 2006), remain undisturbed. |
| Pless v. State | 633 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. App., 2006) | In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate court found that the evidence showed that in the months prior to the July 14 and August 1 incidents, Pless's dogs were repeatedly found loose in neighbors' yards and garages. Accordingly, evidence supported the conviction on the charge of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance under § 3-4-7(5). ("Public nuisance" is defined, among other things, as any animal which "[i]s found repeatedly at large."). On certiorari review, the Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Pless, 646 S.E.2d 202 (Ga. 2007) reversed judgment of Pless v. State, 633 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. App. 2006), and the case was then sent to Pless v. State, 648 S.E.2d 752 (Ga. App. 2007) on remand. |
| Plotnik v. Meihaus | 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 585 (Cal. App. 3 Dist.) |
A long history of bad neighborly relations resulted in the plaintiffs' dog sustaining injuries from being hit with a baseball; the injuries required surgery and post-operative care. While the plaintiffs brought many causes of actions against their neighbors, a father and his two sons, this case is significant in the realm of animal law because it held that a pet owner may recover for emotional distress under the trespass to personal property cause of action. The court, however, would not allow the plaintiffs to recover for their dog's injuries under the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action because they would have recovered duplicative damages for the same transactional event. |
| Portillo v. Aiassa | 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 755 (1994) |
In this California case, the plaintiff delivered beer to Race Street Liquors. As he was leaving the store, he was attacked by a German shepherd owned by the tenant. The jury found appellant-landlord did not have actual knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities prior to renewing the commercial lease. However, the jury found that he would have learned of the dog's dangerous propensities if he had exercised reasonable care in the inspection of his property and that he was negligent in failing to eliminate this dangerous condition. |
| Powell v. Adlerhorst Int'l, Inc. | 2015 WL 6756126 (D. Or. Nov. 4, 2015) (unpublished) | The plaintiff in this case brought suit after suffering a dog bite from a service dog that was purchased from defendant. The defendant was a corporation that purchased dogs from Europe and then sold them to police agencies to be used as service dogs. Plaintiff (a police officer with the Sherwood Police Department) filed suit asserting both a strict product liability and negligence claim for injuries sustained from dog bites. At issue here is whether the dog was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time the defendant sold it to the City of Sherwood. Defendant moved for summary judgment and the court denied the motion. The court ultimately held that a reasonable jury could find that defendant should have known about the dog’s aggressive behavior before selling it to plaintiff, thus making it liable for damages. |
| Prasad v. Wepruk | 2004CarswellBC946 |
Plaintiff Prasad, an elderly newpaper-deliverer, was attacked in the street by defendant owner Wepruk's usually chained guard-dog, which escaped due to a rusted chain. The court found the defendant strictly liable under the doctrine of scienter's subjective test: he knew the dog was aggressive, but kept it anyway and it harmed Prasad. He was also liable under the objective test for negligence, for not taking reasonable precautions to ensure the dog's chain was in good repair, in order to prevent foreseeable harm to others. damages of $35,000 were awarded for Prasad's injuries and lost future earnings. |
| Pratt v. Pratt | 1988 WL 120251 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1998) (unpublished opinion). |
A childless, divorcing couple sought divorce; trial court awarded couple's registered dogs to wife based on the best interest standard used for determination of custody of children. Appellate court held the best interest statute inapplicable to dogs, but stated that the trial court can award dogs based on evidence of mistreatment of the dogs by one of the parties. Because the trial court's determination had a reasonable basis in fact, the appellate court affirmed its decision. |
| Pray v. Whiteskunk | 801 N.W.2d 451 (S.D., 2011) |
In this South Dakota case, the plaintiff suffered a broken knee after Defendant's Rottweiler brook loose from its owner and ran toward the street, causing plaintiff to fall. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the dog owner and the city, specifically alleging the the city knew the dog was dangerous and failed to enforce its vicious animal ordinance. On appeal of the granting of summary judgment for the city, this court found that plaintiff failed to establish that the action taken by the city caused the harm to Pray or exposed her to greater risks, thereby leaving her in a worse position than she was in before the city took action. While this Court found that the city had actual knowledge of the dog's dangerousness, this alone is insufficient. |
| Prays v. Perryman | 262 Cal.Rptr. 180 (Cal.App.2.Dist.) |
In an action by a commercial pet groomer against a dog owner for injuries suffered by a dog bite, the trial court found as a matter of law that plaintiff had assumed the risk of a dog bite, and on that basis granted summary judgment in defendant's favor. At the time plaintiff was bitten, she had not yet begun to groom the dog and, in fact, had expressed to defendant her concern whether it was safe for her to do so since the dog was excited and growling. The Court of Appeal reversed. Assuming the veterinarian's rule extended to pet groomers, making the defense of assumption of risk available, it held that plaintiff had not as a matter of law assumed the risk of being bitten since, at the time of the bite, the dog was still under the exclusive control of defendant, who had uncaged it and was holding it on a leash. |
| Price v. Brown | 680 A.2d 1149 (Pa. 1996) |
The issue presented in this appeal is whether a complaint based upon an alleged breach of a bailment agreement states a cause of action for injury or death suffered by an animal that has been entrusted to a veterinarian for surgical and professional treatment. The court agreed with the trial court that the purpose for which an animal is entrusted to the care of a veterinarian is a material fact that must be considered in determining whether a plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law, and that Price's complaint failed to state a cause of action for professional negligence. The court held that allegations of breach of a bailment agreement are insufficient to state a cause of action against a veterinarian who has performed surgery on an animal when the animal suffers an injury as a result or does not survive the surgery. |
| Price v. Brown, V.M.D. | 131 Montg. Co. L. R. 150 (1994) | Plaintiff's bull dog went to defendant veterinarian for surgery to correct a prolapsed urethra. The dog died a few days later. The plaintiff then sought to recover the value of the dog on a strict theory of bailment. Defendant filed a preliminary objection asserting that this doctrine was inapplicable and could not afford relief. The court held that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim from which relief could be sought and dismissed the complaint. The court, however, allowed the plaintiff to amend the compliant.In holding to sustain the defendant's preliminary objection, the court reasoned that since veterinarians are part of a professional discipline, in order to recover damages for the injury or the death to an animal entrusted to a veterinarian's care, a plaintiff must prove professional negligence instead of a bailiff arrangement. |
| Price v. State | 911 N.E.2d 716 (Ind.App.,2009) |
In this Indiana case, appellant-defendant appealed his conviction for misdemeanor Cruelty to an Animal for beating his 8 month-old dog with a belt. Price contended that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because the statute's exemption of “reasonable” training and discipline can be interpreted to have different meanings. The court held that a person of ordinary intelligence would also know that these actions are not “reasonable” acts of discipline or training. Affirmed. |
| Priebe v. Nelson | 140 P.3d 848 (Cal. 2006) |
A kennel worker who was bitten by a dog while the dog was in the care of the kennel sued the owner of the dog under a theory of strict liability under a statute and under the common law. The court found that the dog owner was not liable to the kennel worker because under the "veterinarian's rule," the kennel owner had assumed the risk of being bitten by the dog. |
| PRIETO, GERMÁN LUIS C/ COLONNA LUCIANA ANDREA – ORDINARIO – EXPTE. N° 450237 | "PRIETO, GERMÁN LUIS C/ COLONNA LUCIANA ANDREA – ORDINARIO – EX Sentencia número 86 de la Cámara de Apelaciones de lo Civil y Comercial y en lo Contencioso Administrativo, de la ciudad de Río Cuarto de 26 de octubre de 2012 | Este caso involucra una disputa entre German Luis Prieto (demandante) y Luciana Andrea Colonna (demandada) sobre la propiedad de bienes muebles. El demandante alega haberlos adquirido durante su convivencia con la demandada y busca su restitución. La demandada argumenta que los bienes son parte de un patrimonio común debido a su relación de convivencia y sociedad de hecho, y niega la obligación de devolverlos. El tribunal, luego de analizar los argumentos, determina que el demandante tiene derecho a la restitución de los bienes, excepto en el caso del perro "Bauty", al considerar que este último ha desarrollado un vínculo emocional significativo con la demandada, y que su entrega podría causar un sufrimiento innecesario. En consecuencia, se revoca parcialmente la sentencia inicial, se ordena la restitución de los bienes y se le permite a la demanda quedarse con el canino. |
| PRIETO, GERMÁN LUIS C/ COLONNA LUCIANA ANDREA, EXPTE. N° 450237 - Bauty, the dog - Argentina | Sentencia definitiva numero: 86 "PRIETO, GERMÁN LUIS C/ COLONNA LUCIANA ANDREA – ORDINARIO – EXPSentencia número 86 de la Cámara de Apelaciones de lo Civil y Comercial y en lo Contencioso Administrativo, de la ciudad de Río Cuarto de 26 de octubre de 2012 | This case revolves around a dispute between German Luis Prieto (the plaintiff) and Luciana Andrea Colonna (the defendant) regarding the ownership of personal property acquired during their cohabitation. The plaintiff claimed sole ownership of the property assets and sought their return, while the defendant argued that these assets constituted community property acquired for their shared residence during their relationship. Additionally, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff granted her exclusive possession and gifted the property to her upon their separation, relieving her of any obligation to return it. The court held that the plaintiff had the right to take back the property, with the exception of Bauty, considering that the latter had developed a significant emotional bond with the defendant and that his surrender could cause unnecessary suffering. In the judge's view, dogs were not mere "things." Consequently, the judge upheld the lower court's decision in part, ordering all the assets to be returned to the plaintiff. At the same time, the defendant was allowed to retain custody of the canine companion. |
| Propes v. Griffith | 25 S.W.3d 544 (Mo.App. W.D., 2000) |
At issue on this appeal to a punitive damages award, is whether defendant's conduct in shooting her neighbors' two dogs was privileged under a Missouri statute that allows a livestock owner to kill dogs that are in the act of chasing sheep. The court held that there was absolutely no evidence indicating the Propes' dogs, or for that matter that any dog, was the cause of the previous attack on the Griffiths' sheep and more sheep were attacked after the dogs had been euthanized. Upon review, the court held that the punishment and deterrence of Mrs. Griffith's conduct is the precise reason for assessing punitive damages and the award of punitive damages was not arbitrary. |
| Puckett v. Miller | 381 N.E.2d 1087 (Ind.App.,1978) |
In this Indiana case, a dog owner brought action against a farmer for the negligent destruction of his two "coon dogs." The lower court granted the farmer's motion for involuntary dismissal, and dog owner appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's two dogs, at time they were shot by defendant farmer, were “roaming unattended.” This meant that an attempt to find them had been abandoned, and they were, according to defendant's uncontradicted testimony, trying to get into defendant's chicken enclosure. Thus, defendant farmer was protected in his shooting of those dogs by state statutes that provided that any dog known to have worried any livestock or fowl or any dog found roaming over the country unattended may be lawfully killed. |
| Puppies 'N Love, v. City of Phoenix | 116 F. Supp. 3d 971 (D. Ariz. 2015) | Defendant City of Phoenix passed an ordinance that prohibited pet stores from selling dogs or cats obtained from persons or companies that bred animals; pet stores could only sell animals obtained from animal shelters or rescue organizations. Puppies 'N Love operated a pet store in Phoenix that sold purebred dogs obtained from out-of-state breeders. Puppies 'N Love and its owners sued the City, claiming primarily that the Ordinance violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution by closing the Phoenix market to out-of-state breeders and giving an economic advantage to local breeders. All parties, including Intervenor Humane Society of the United States (“HSUS”), filed motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Intervenor’s and the city’s motions, but denied Puppies ‘N Love’s motion, thereby upholding the ordinance. |
| Quave v. Bardwell | 449 So.2d 81 (La.App. 1 Cir.,1984) |
Plaintiff-appellee, Debbie Quave, filed this suit against defendant-appellant, Curtis Bardwell, seeking damages for the deliberate and unjustified killing of her german shepherd dog, Kilo Bandito. The court upheld an award of $2,650, finding that the assessment of damages for plaintiff’s dog was proper since they were based on the value paid, stud fees, medical care, loss of income, and replacement costs. |
| Queen v. State | 325 So. 3d 656 (Miss. 2021) | Defendant Tommie Queen was convicted of three counts of dog fighting contrary to Mississippi law. The resulting conviction began with in 2017 after a sheriff's officer received a call about dogs barking and possibly fighting. After being dispatched to defendant's property, the officer encountered multiple dogs on chains and dogs that were actively fighting each other. The officer obtained a search warrant and seized numerous items including heavy logging chains, bite sticks, intravenous (IV) bags containing saline, medicine bottles, vials of vitamins, muscle milk and other muscle-building items, several scales, and a treadmill. Approximately five or six badly injured dogs were taken to a veterinarian and humanely euthanized. The veterinarian visited the property the next day and euthanized three more dogs that were seriously injured. Defendant was convicted on three of the nine indicted counts of animal fighting and sentenced to three years on each count to run consecutively. On appeal here, defendant raised three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by tendering Kyle Held as an expert in the field of animal cruelty and dog fighting; (2) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Queen of dog fighting; and (3) whether the trial court erred by denying Queen's motion to recuse. As to the first issue on qualification of the expert witness, the proffered expert, Kyle Held, had been employed by the ASPCA for approximately ten years as the director of investigations. Not only was Held certified by the National Animal Control Association, but he had investigated dog fighting operations "probably a few hundred" times according to his testimony. This included the largest organized dog fighting seizure in history. Moreover, Held indicated he testified in approximately 100 animal cruelty or animal fighting cases and has been qualified as an expert six times in previous dog fighting cases. While defendant argued that Held should not be qualified as an expert because he did not hold any college degrees, this court found that argument without merit. Defendant's second argument challenged the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to support conviction. In particular, defendant notes that the evidence was only circumstantial and no direct evidence showed that defendant was present when the dogs were fighting and injured. However, the court noted that defendant did not dispute that he was the owner of the property where the dogs were recovered (and over 40 other dogs found) and evidence of dog fighting (heavy logging chains, bite sticks, intravenous bags, scales, weight gain powders, treadmills, etc.) were found there. Based on Held's observations, training, and experience, Queen's property was used as a dog-fighting training yard. Further, the veterinarian who performed euthanasia on the dogs testified that there were bite wounds consistent with dog fighting This Court observed that it previously recognized that things like treadmills, dietary supplements, and break sticks of indicative of dog fighting enterprises. Finally, the way the dogs were tied out in the yard with the chains and minimal space between the dogs is “typical on almost every yard that [he] had been on” and was indicative of dog fighting training. Defendant's last contention is that the trial court erred by denying his motion for recusal because Judge Debra Blackwell was previously employed as an assistant attorney general in the district where defendant's indictment was returned. The court found no evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the validity of the presumption that Judge Blackwell was both qualified and unbiased. Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed. |
| R v. Shand | R. v. Shand, 2007 ONCJ 317 | In R v Shand 2007 ONCJ 317 (CanLII), the court examined the necessary elements required to established the “willful” mens rea component present in Canadian Federal Criminal Statute s. 429. The accused was charged with three counts of animal cruelty contrary to s.446 of the Criminal Code in relation to a dog in her care. The court found that on two of the counts that the accused was had acted "wilfully" because she was either "reckless or indifferent as to her dog's condition." |
| R. v. Baird | 1994 CarswellNWT 58 |
The defendant, George Baird, was charged on indictment that he caused bodily harm to Amelia Debogorski by criminal negligence stemming from his keeping of dangerous dogs. While the dogs self-evidently proved to be highly dangerous to the victim, there was little evidence of their prior dangerous intent simply because they ran at large. As a result, the court then found that there was reasonable doubt whether the danger was known and recognized by Mr. Baird prior to the attack. The court found that there insufficient proof to find that Baird acted with "wanton and reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons.” The court also observed that while there may or may not have been civil negligence, this was not enough to sustain a conviction for criminal negligence. |
| R. v. McConkey | 2008 CarswellAlta 156 |
In this case, the defendants pleaded guilty to violations of the Animal Protection Act after a peace officer for the humane society found four dogs in distress due mainly to a lack of grooming. On appeal, the defendants did not contest the amount of the fines, but suggested that the court should consider the economic status of the defendants (both were on government assistance). The court found that the conduct of the defendant and the level of the distress experienced by the dogs over a long period of time was an aggravating factor in determining the fine. With regard to a Section 12(2) prohibition to restrain future animal ownership, the court was reluctant to inflict stress on the animals still residing at the home by removing them from their long-time home. |
| Rabideau v. City of Racine | 627 N.W.2d 795 (Wis. 2001) |
Pet owner could not recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress after a police officer shot her dog. While the court recognized the bond between owner and pet, public policy prevented such recovery. However, under the proper circumstances, a person could recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress for the loss of a pet. |
| Rabon v. City of Seattle | 957 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1998) |
Petitioner dog owner sought an injunction against a Seattle ordinance that allowed the city to destroy a vicious dog once the owner has been found guilty of owning a vicious dog (two lhasa apsos) . The majority held that the state statute regulating dogs did not preempt field of regulating dangerous dogs and the city ordinance did not irreconcilably conflict with state statute. Notably, Justice Sanders filed a strong dissent, pointing out that these dogs are the primary companions for the elderly petitioner. While the state law regulating dangerous dogs allows cities to regulate "potentially dangerous dogs," the Seattle ordinance in question fails to make a distinction between the two types of dogs. Justice Sanders wrote: "As Mr. Rabon notes, if the City were correct, dog owners and defense attorneys would find themselves arguing the bite was so vicious that the dog qualifies as "dangerous" in order to spare the dog's life." Thus, the ordinance "eviscerates" the dual definition and violates the overriding state law on dangerous dogs. |
| Rabon v. City of Seattle (II) | 34 P.3d 821 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2001) |
This Washington case constitutes plaintiff's second appeal in extended litigation aimed at preventing the City of Seattle from destroying his dogs after a jury convicted him of the criminal charge of owning vicious dogs. The case began when Rabon filed a civil suit seeking an injunction against having his dogs destroyed. This present appeal is from an order dismissing his constitutional claims against the City on summary judgment. In affirming the order of summary judgment, this court held that a person's interest in keeping a vicious dog as a pet is not so great as to require a more careful procedure than is provided by Seattle's administrative and hearing process. The fact that plaintiff did not have a right to an immediate pre-deprivation hearing before the dogs were seized and impounded is justified by the strong public interest in prompt action to prevent more attacks. |
| Ramapo v. Hi-Tor Animal Care Center, Inc. | Judgment 10050423 (2010) | This court was asked to determine whether a dog shoul be declared dangerous pursuant to section 108 (24) (a) of the Agriculture and Markets Law. The case is unusual in one aspect as the respondent is an animal shelter and the alleged victim is an animal control officer from another township. The Justice Court found the shelter dog was not 'Dangerous' pursuant to Agriculture and Markets Law. Interestingly, the court found the reasonable person standard in the statute to be problematic and in need of legislative amendment restoring in appropriate language the consideration of evidence of vicious propensity. |
| Ramirez v. M.L. Management Co., Inc. | 920 So.2d 36 (D. Fla. 2004) |
In this Florida dog bite case, the appellant asked the court to limit the application of a case that held that a landlord has no duty to third parties for injuries caused by a tenant's dog where those injuries occur off the leased premises. The child-tenant injured in this case was bitten by the dog of another tenant in a park adjacent to the apartment complex where she lived. The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the landlord because the boundary of the premises is not dispositive of the landlord's liability. |
| Range v. Brubaker | Slip Copy, 2008 WL 5248983 (N.D.Ind.) |
Plaintiff brought a civil rights action against Defendants employed by the City of South Bend, Indiana (the “City”), part of the allegations being that Defendants unlawfully failed to interview Plaintiff for a position on the Animal Control Commission (the “Commission”). During discovery, Defendants filed a, after Defendants had already disclosed the names of such individuals. The United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division granted Defendants’ motion for a protective order to bar the disclosure of the home addresses of the Commission’s volunteer members, finding that Defendants provided “a particular and specific demonstration of fact” such that Plaintiff’s discover of the Commission members’ addresses should be barred, and that the relative lack of relevance of the discovery sought did not outweigh the potential harm caused by disclosure of the Commission members’ addresses. |
| Ranwez v. Roberts | 601 S.E.2d 449 (Ga. 2004) |
Plaintiff brought claims against her tenant neighbor and the property owner after she was viciously attacked by her tenant neighbor's four pit bulls. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision holding the property owner was an out-of -possession landlord. |
| Ranwez v. Roberts | 601 S.E.2d 449 (Ga.App., 2004) |
In this Georgia case, after sustaining severe injuries inflicted during a vicious attack by four pit bulls, Helene Ranwez sued her tenant neighbor and the owner of the rental property, Scott Roberts. The crucial question in this case was whether an out-of-possession landlord has liability for a tenant's dog bite. Roberts contended that because he had relinquished possession and control of the premises to his tenant, Glenn Forrest, he could not be held liable for Ranwez's injuries as a matter of law. In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court held that an out-of-possession landlord's tort liability to third persons is subject only to the statutory provisions of OCGA § 44-7-14, which makes it clear that a landlord who relinquishes possession of the premises cannot be liable to third parties for damages arising from the negligence of the tenant. |
| Raymond v. Bujold | 199 A. 91 (N.H.,1938) |
A finder of a lost dog did not become the "keeper" of the dog when he tied it up and summoned the owner to retrieve it. The finder was therefore entitled to sue the owner for damage caused by the dog. |
| Rego v. Madalinski | 63 N.E.3d 190 (Ohio Ct. App., 2016) | In this case, appellee's dog attacked appellant's dog while on appellee's property. Veterinary bills were over $10,000, and the municipal court capped compensatory damages at the fair market value of animal of $400, reasoning that animals are considered personal property. On appeal, this court discusses situations where veterinary costs are appropriate as damages, such as veterinary malpractice suits or where the animal had special characteristics like pedigree, training, or breeding income. Though this case does not fit into those categories, the court recognizes a ‘semi-property’ or 'companion property' classification of animals, and reverse the municipal court and remand for a damages hearing. |
| Reid v. Kramer | Not Reported in N.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 2866091 (Mich. Ct. App. July 2, 2019) | In July of 2017, Alpena County Animal Control Officer Michelle Reid, filed a complaint against the respondents alleging that a black and tan German Shepherd named Bruiser had attacked or bit a person. The victim, Joshua Henderson, testified that as he was jogging past the respondents’ house, Bruiser ran toward him and bit his left bicep and left forearm. The Respondents stated that Bruiser had never attacked or bitten anyone before and was raised around children. The prosecutor clarified that euthanization was not being sought at the time, however, the district court found that Bruiser had caused serious injury to Henderson and noted the possibility of Bruiser injuring children in the future and ordered Bruiser to be destroyed. The Respondents appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the district court’s decision. The Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Respondents argued that the circuit court erred in determining that Bruiser was a dangerous animal and that the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser caused death or serious injury or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals concluded that Bruiser fit the definition of a dangerous animal under the statute, however, the Court agreed with the Respondents that the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that Bruiser caused serious injury or was likely to cause death or serious injury in the future. In order for an animal to be destroyed, it must be more than dangerous. Henderson’s injuries consisted of scrapes, puncture wounds, and three stitches. Those injuries did not rise to the level of a “serious injury” as defined under MCL 287.321(e) which defines serious injury as permanent, serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health, or serious impairment of bodily function. The district court did not properly interpret MCL 287.322 and based their decision solely on the fact that Bruiser had bitten someone once and concluded that because of that, the court knew that Bruiser was more likely to do so again. The circuit court erred by affirming the district court’s order because the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser had caused serious injury or death to a person or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the district court. |
| Repin v. State | 392 P.3d 1174 (Wash. Ct. App., 2017), review denied, 188 Wash. 2d 1023, 398 P.3d 1137 (2017) |
In this case, Robert Repin sued Washington State University (WSU) and WSU veterinarian, Dr. Margaret Cohn-Urbach after his dog suffered complications while being euthanized. Repin argued that Cohn-Urbach was grossly negligent in performing the euthanasia which caused his dog pain and prolonged her death. Ultimately, Repin sued for breach of contract, reckless breach of contract, professional negligence, lack of informed consent, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and conversion. The trial court dismissed all of Repin’s claims and Repin appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and found that Repin was unable to provide sufficient evidence to establish that a reasonable jury may be able to find in his favor. As a result, the Court of Appeals dismissed Repins claims. |
| Resolucion No. 07, 2023 - Caso Kira - Peru | 00045-2023-1-0905-JR-PE-02 | La demandante presentó esta demanda en nombre de uno de sus perros, Kira. La demandante asistió a una reunión social con sus hijos y dejó a sus dos perros, Kira y Logan, jugando fuera. La demandante regresó a su casa y descubrió que su vecino, el demandado, había cometido un acto de zoofilia contra Kira. El tribunal examinó varias cuestiones constitucionales y teorías de la pena. Sopesó los factores de lo que el demandado había hecho a Kira con su falta de antecedentes y su escasa probabilidad de reincidencia. El tribunal decidió que el demandado debía cumplir 17 meses de encarcelamiento y pagar multas civiles por el sufrimiento tanto de la demandante como de Kira. También se basó en la cuestión del bienestar de los animales su decisión de prohibir al demandado la "tenencia" de animales para reducir aún más el riesgo de reincidencia. En definitiva, el tribunal basó sus decisiones en motivos de bienestar animal y condena de la crueldad hacia los animales. |
| Resolucion No. 07, 2023 - Kira's case - Peru | Expediente: 00045-2023-1-0905-JR-PE-02 | The plaintiff brought this case on behalf of one of her dogs, Kira. The plaintiff attended a social gathering with her children and left their two dogs, Kira and Logan, playing outside. The plaintiff returned to their home to find that their neighbor, the defendant, had committed an act of bestiality against Kira. The court discussed several constitutional questions and theories of punishment. It weighed the factors of what the defendant had done to Kira with his lack of prior record and low chance of recidivism. The court decided that the defendant was to serve 17 months of incarceration and was required to pay civil fines for the suffering of both the plaintiff and Kira. Rooted in the issue of animal welfare, too, was its holding in prohibiting the defendant from “keeping” animals to further reduce the risk of recidivism. Ultimately, the court based its decisions on grounds of animal welfare and condemnation of cruelty towards animals. |
| Resolucion No. 10, 2022, Exp No. 00158-2021-0-1018-JR-CI-01, Perrita Munay - Peru | Resolución N° 10, Santiago, 28 de febrero de 2022, Juzgado Civil de Santiago Corte Superior de Justicia de Cusco | En este caso, la perrita mestiza de la demandante, llamada Munay, fue atacada y gravemente herida por los dos rottweilers de la demandada, que estaban sueltos y sin bozal. La demandada sabía que sus rottweilers eran considerados una "raza potencialmente peligrosa" y tenía documentación que confirmaba su responsabilidad sobre ellos. El tribunal otorgó a la demandante una indemnización por su sufrimiento emocional y gastos relacionados, reconociendo que el ataque la afectó emocionalmente porque su perro es considerado parte de su familia bajo el concepto de una familia multiespecie. El tribunal señaló que las mascotas no deben ser vistas simplemente como propiedad, sino como seres que pueden formas vínculos emocionales significativos con sus dueños. |
| Resolucion No. 10, 2022, Munay, the dog - Peru | Resolución N° 10, Santiago, 28 de febrero de 2022 | In this case, the plaintiff's mixed breed dog, named Munay, was attacked and seriously injured by the defendant's two unleashed and unmuzzled rottweilers. The defendant knew her rottweilers were considered a "potentially dangerous breed" and had documentation confirming her responsibility for them. The court awarded the plaintiff damages for her emotional suffering and related expenses, recognizing that the attack impacted her emotionally because her dog is considered part of her family under the concept of a multispecies family. The court noted that pets should not be viewed merely as property but as beings with meaningful bonds to their owners. |
| Resolución Nro. 03, Exp 01128-2023-0-1814-JR-PE-03, Caso "Dachi" - Peru | 01128-2023-0-1814-JR-PE-03 | Este es el caso de un hombre apuñaló repetidamente a "Dachi," elperro de su novia. Los hechos se dieron después de que ella le confesara que tenía una aventura con su amigo. El hombre había estado bebiendo y consumiendo drogas y en su ira, actuó violentamente contra Dachi como venganza contra su novia. Dachi sobrevivió, pero los veterinarios no estaban seguros de cuánto tiempo viviría ni de su calidad de vida. Más tarde se descubrió que el hombre tenía inestabilidades psicológicas y había cometido varios delitos más. Fue declarado culpable de delitos contra la propiedad y crueldad con los animales y se le impuso una pena de encarcelamiento y una multa civil. |
| Resolucion N° 07, 2023, Caso Kira - Peru | RESOLUCION N° 07, 2023 | En este caso, la demandante presentó esta demanda alegando daño contra el patrimonio y actos de crueldad. La demandante asistió a una reunión social con sus hijos y dejó a sus dos perros Kira y Logan, jugando fuera. La demandante regresó a su casa y descubrió que su vecino, el demandado, había cometido un acto de zoofilia contra Kira. El tribunal examinó varias cuestiones constitucionales y teorías de la pena. Sopesó los factores de lo que el demandado había hecho a Kira con su falta de antecedentes y su escasa probabilidad de reincidencia. El tribunal decidió que el demandado debía cumplir 17 meses de encarcelamiento y pagar multas civiles por el sufrimiento tanto de la demandante como de Kira. También se basó en la cuestión del bienestar de los animales su decisión de prohibir al demandado la "tenencia" de animales para reducir aún más el riesgo de reincidencia. En definitiva, el tribunal basó sus decisiones en motivos de bienestar animal y condena de la crueldad hacia los animales. |
| Resolution No. 3, Exp Resolución Nro. 03, 01128-2023-0-1814-JR-PE-03, Dachi, the dog - Peru | 01128-2023-0-1814-JR-PE-03 | In this matter, a man repeatedly stabbed his girlfriend’s dog, “Dachi,” after she confessed to having an affair with his friend. The man had been drinking and taking drugs, and in his anger, took violent action against Dachi as revenge against his girlfriend. Dachi survived, but veterinarians were unsure of how long Dachi would live or her quality of life. The man was later found to have psychological instabilities and had committed several other crimes. He was convicted of crimes against property and cruelty to animals and was given an incarceration sentence and a civil fine. |
| Resolution N° 07, 2023, Caso Kira - Peru | CUARTO JUZGADO PENAL UNIPERSONAL TRANSITORIO SEDE CARABAYLLO, Resolucion No. 7, 2023 | The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant, arguing the defendant committed a crime against his patrimony and cruel acts against animals under the criminal code. The plaintiff attended a social gathering with her children and left their two dogs, Kira and Logan, playing outside. The plaintiff returned to their home to find that their neighbor, the defendant, had committed an act of bestiality against Kira. The court discussed several constitutional questions and theories of punishment. It weighed the factors of what the defendant had done to Kira with his lack of prior record and low chance of recidivism. The court decided that the defendant was to serve 17 months of incarceration and was required to pay civil fines for the suffering of both the plaintiff and Kira. Rooted in the issue of animal welfare, too, was its holding in prohibiting the defendant from “keeping” animals to further reduce the risk of recidivism. Ultimately, the court based its decisions on grounds of animal welfare and condemnation of cruelty towards animals. |
| Rhoades v. City of Battle Ground | 63 P.3d 142 (Wash. 2002) |
Exotic pet owners challenged on equal protection grounds an ordinance that banned exotic pets, yet allowed dangerous dogs under certain conditions. The court, in upholding the ordinance, found a rational relationship between the regulation and the public interest in preventing exotic pet attacks. |
| Riad v. Brandywine Valley SPCA, Inc. | --- A.3d ----, 2024 WL 2885283 (Del. June 10, 2024) | In 2019, Plaintiff was bitten by a dog while at a facility operated by Brandywine Valley SPCA (“BVSPCA”), a non-profit animal welfare organization that takes in stray or surrendered animals and offers some of those animals for adoption. The bite occurred at the BVSPCA facility where a large dog named "Ceelo" was housed. Ceelo had previously lunged at a veterinarian during intake and vaccination. Plaintiff Riad was bitten on the hand while waiting to adopt Ceelo, who was on a leash held by a BVSPCA employee. After the incident, Ceelo was eventually euthanized due to a "noticeable decline in behavior." In 2021, Riad filed a personal injury complaint in Superior Court based on: (1) 16 Del. C. § 3053F, the dog bite strict liability statute; and (2) negligence. The Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of the organization and the plaintiff appealed. The primary question on appeal is whether an animal welfare organization is exempt from strict liability under the statute. The lower court held that the statute does not apply to such organizations based on two previous Superior Court opinions that concluded the legislature's intent when enacting the statute was “to rein in irresponsible dog owners who were keeping vicious dogs as pets by eliminating the ‘one free bite rule.'" Here, the Delaware Supreme Court found that reliance misguided as the statutory text contains only limited exceptions and a clear definition of the word "owner." The Court found that it "inappropriate for the Superior Court to engage in a speculative inquiry into the General Assembly's intentions at the time of the dog bite statute's enactment." The Court was not persuaded by BVSPCA's suggestion that the separation of definitions for "animal shelter" and "owner" implied that the term owner does not include animal shelter. The plain language of the statute does not exempt an animal welfare organization from the definition for owner. In addition, BVSPCA's argument that this interpretation disfavors public policy was also rejected by the Court since the statute is unambiguous. Finally, the Court held that, contrary to BVSPCA's assertions, expert witness testimony was not required by law to establish the degree of care a reasonably prudent person must exercise in controlling an aggressive dog. The Superior Court's entry of summary judgment was reversed. |
| Richard v. Hoban | 1970CarswellNB126 |
The child plaintiff was attacked and bitten by a chained German Shepherd after she put her arm around the dog's neck to hug or play with it; she sustained scarring lacerations of her head, cheek and eyelid that required 5 days' hospitalization after plastic surgery. The trial judge earlier held that because the dog, had two months previously, bitten a young boy on the face and ear in an unprovoked attack, the owner had prior knowledge of the dog's propensity to bite children, yet he kept the dog regardless. The owner was thus strictly liable under the doctrine of scienter. The Court of Appeal reversed this holding, with two judges finding that the boy in the earlier attack had been injured accidentally by the dog's dew-claw, rather than being bitten, so that there was insufficient notice to the dog's owner of any vicious propensity; thus he was not strictly liable in scienter. |
| Richardson v. Fairbanks North Star Borough | 705 P.2d 454 (Alaska, 1985) |
This case concerns the proper measure of damages for the death of a pet dog caused by a municipality's negligence after the Fairbanks North Star Borough Animal Shelter violated a Borough ordinance and mistakenly killed the Richardsons' pet dog, Wizzard. The court indicated it is willing to recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for the intentional or reckless killing of a pet animal in an appropriate case. However, the court held that in this case, the Richardsons made an offer of proof regarding their emotional distress and the evidence in the record indicates that the trial judge properly made a threshold determination that the severity of the Richardsons' emotional distress did not warrant a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. |
| Ridley v. Sioux Empire Pit Bull Rescue, Inc. | 932 N.W.2d 576 (S.D., 2019) | Plaintiff Ridley was walking at a campground where she was attacked and injured by a pit bull type dog belonging to Sioux Empire Pit Bull Rescue, Inc. (SEPR) and in the care of Susan Tribble-Zacher and Harry Podhradsky. At the time, the dog was tethered to a tree near the Zacher and Podhradsky campsite. SEPR functions as a pit bull fostering organization that takes pit bulls from situations of abuse and neglect and places them with foster providers until a permanent home can be found. The lower court granted both Zacher's and Podhradsky's motions for summary judgment, which Ridley appeals in this instant case. On appeal, Ridley claims the trial court erred by incorrectly weighing the evidence by viewing the facts in a light most favorable to SEPR instead of plaintiff. The appellate court disagreed, finding that the motion for summary judgment was granted on the basis that the injury to Ridley was not foreseeable. The court rejected Ridley's argument that pit bull type dogs have inherently dangerous breed tendencies and, as a result, the attack was foreseeable and the keepers should be held to a higher standard of care. The court noted that South Dakota law does not support any "breed-specific standard of care," and that every dog is presumed tame so that the burden is on a plaintiff to prove otherwise. The dog who attacked Ridley had no prior history of aggression toward humans to make the attack on Ridley foreseeable. In addition, the fact that Zacher and Podhradsky may have violated a policy by SEPR to keep the dog in a two-week "shutdown period," where the dog would not travel outside the home, did not make it foreseeable that the dog would attack Ridley. Thus, the defendants did not breach their duty of reasonable care toward Ridley. The motions for summary judgment were affirmed. |
| Rivero v. Humane Soc. of Fayette County | Slip Copy, 2009 WL 18704 (W.D.Pa.) | Plaintiffs brought action against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendants violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution after Defendant dog control officers removed Plaintiffs’ dog from their home during an investigation into a report of a dead dog. The United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania granted Defendant Township’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that Plaintiffs’ allegations, standing alone, do not state a claim against Defendant-Township, and that Plaintiffs failed to provide any factual support for their state law claims. |
| Rivers v. New York City Hous. Auth. | 694 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (N.Y.App.Div.1999) | In this case, the appellate court said that in order for the landlord to be held liable for injuries sustained as result of attack by tenant's pit bull, it must be demonstrated that the animal had vicious propensities and that landlord knew or should have known of these propensities. The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the vicious nature of pit bulls, rather than letting the trier of fact determine whether the pit bull had displayed any signs of vicious or violent behavior prior to the incident. The order denying the defendant's motion for summary judgement dismissing the complaint was reversed. |