Colorado Cases

Case namesort descending Citation Summary
Barger v. Jimerson 276 P.2d 744 (Colo. 1954)

In order for liability to attach in an action for damages for personal injuries resulting from a dog attack, defendants had to have notice of the vicious propensities of their dog.  Even though the dog had never attacked a person before, a natural fierceness or disposition to mischief was sufficient to classify the dog as "vicious."  Finally, it is permissible for the jury to consider the loss of earning capacity of plaintiff resulting from the injuries as an element of damages.

BURLINGTON & M.R.R.R. IN NEBRASKA v. CAMPBELL 59 P. 424 (Colo.App. 1899)

In Burlington & M.R.R.R. in Nebraska v. Cambell , 14 Colo. App. 141 (Colo. Ct. App. 1899), plaintiff’s horse was killed by a train. Although the court reversed the verdict for the plaintiff for failure to prove defendant’s negligence, the court allowed witness testimony on the market value of the mare.

Caswell v. People 536 P.3d 323 (Colo., 2023) This case concerns several charges of animal cruelty against petitioner Caswell. A welfare check was conducted by a deputy at the Lincoln County Sheriff’s office in response to a report on Ms. Caswell. After two welfare checks were conducted, the deputies executed a search warrant at the Caswell residence, resulting in the seizure of sixty animals. These animals lacked sufficient food or water, were kept in enclosed spaces filled with feces and urine, and many of the animals were underweight or had untreated medical problems. Respondent, the People of the State of Colorado, charged Ms. Caswell with forty-three class six counts of cruelty to animals, which were charged as felonies because Ms. Caswell had prior convictions of misdemeanor animal cruelty on her record. The jury found Caswell guilty of all forty-three counts and sentenced her to eight years of probation, forty-three days in jail, and forty-seven days of in-home detention. An appeal followed and the holding was affirmed. Petitioner filed for certiorari and the Supreme Court of Colorado granted. Here, petitioner argues that the use of her prior convictions for animal cruelty to enhance her charges to felonies violates the Sixth Amendment and article II of the Colorado Constitution. The court first considered whether the legislature meant to make the statutory provision used to enhance Caswell’s sentence as an element versus a sentence enhancer. The court here listed five factors to consider whether a fact is an element or sentencing factor: (1) the statute's language and structure, (2) tradition, (3) the risk of unfairness, (4) the severity of the sentence, and (5) the statute's legislative history. Four of these five factors signaled a legislative intent to designate it a sentence enhancer, so the court concluded that the legislature intended to designate the fact of prior convictions as a sentence enhancer rather than an element. The court also concluded that the sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment or article II of the Colorado Constitution, and affirmed the holding of the lower court.
Clyncke v. Waneka 157 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2007)

In this Colorado case, an inexperienced horse rider who was injured in fall from horse during a horse roundup, brought an action under the Colorado Equine Activities Statute against the owners of riding stable. The lower court, after a jury trial, entered a judgment for the stable owners. On appeal at the Supreme Court, the Court found that the Equine Statute places a two-pronged duty on sponsors; a sponsor is liable when he or she fails to make reasonable efforts to determine either a participant's ability to engage in the equine activity or a participant's ability to manage a particular horse. Here, a new trial was in order because the result may have been different if court had properly instructed the jury regarding the exception from civil liability for the sponsor.

Colorado Dog Fanciers v. City and County of Denver 820 P.2d 644 (Colo. 1991) The plaintiffs, dog owners and related canine and humane associations (dog owners), filed a complaint in the Denver District Court against the defendant, City and County of Denver (city), seeking both a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the "Pit Bulls Prohibited" ordinance, Denver, Colo., Rev.Mun.Code § 8-55 (1989), and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement.  The dog owners in this case claim the ordinance is unconstitutional, violating their rights to procedural and substantive due process and equal protection, is unconstitutionally vague, and constitutes a taking of private property.
Hartlee v. Hardey Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 5719644 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2015)

Plaintiffs filed suit against a veterinarian and a number of police officers who were involved in their prosecution of animal cruelty. Plaintiffs Switf and Hatlee worked together on a Echo Valley Ranch where they provided care and boarding for horses. In February 2012, Officer Smith went to Echo Valley Ranch to conduct a welfare check on the horses. Officer Smith noticed that the horses seemed to be in poor condition, so he requested that a veternarian visis the ranch to inspect the horses. Dr. Olds, a local veterinarian, visited the ranch and wrote a report that suggested that the horses be seized due to their current state. Officer Smith initially served plaintiffs with a warning but after returning to the ranch and noticing that the horses’ condition had worsened, the horses were seized and plaintiffs were charged with animal cruelty. In this case, plaintiffs argued that the veterinarian had wrote the medical report for a “publicity stunt” and that this report influenced Officer’s Smith’s decision to seize the horses and charge plaintiffs with animal cruelty. The court ultimately found that the veterinarian’s report was not made as a “publicity stunt,” especially due to the fact that the report was filed privately and not made available to the public. Also, the court found that there was no evidence to suggest that the veterinarian and the officers were working with one another in a “conspiracy” to seize the horses and charge plaintiffs with animal cruelty.
Holcomb v. City and County of Denver 606 P.2d 858 (Colo., 1980)

In this Colorado case, the defendant was convicted in the county court of keeping dogs in a residential zone in violation of zoning ordinance.  The question before the court was whether section 2-3(3)(a) provides ascertainable standards which can be constitutionally enforced by the zoning administrator.  The court held that the ordinance is sufficiently specific to pass constitutional muster.  The Court also held that the zoning ordinance relating to accessory uses allowed in residential zones provided sufficient guidelines for it to be constitutionally enforced by the zoning administrator and that the municipality had not delegated to the zoning administrator the authority to determine by regulation the number of dogs which may be kept in a residential zone as an accessory use. 

Legro v. Robinson 328 P.3d 238, aff'd but criticized (Colo.App., 2012)

While participating in a bicycle race on Forest Service lands, plaintiff (Legro) was attacked seriously injured by defendants' (Robinsons') dogs. The Robinsons held a grazing permit from the Forest Service for the land where the injury occurred and the dogs were acting as predator control dogs there. On appeal, this court agreed with the lower court that the Robinsons were landowners for purposes of the Premises Liability Act (PLA) and this did in fact abrogate the plaintiffs' common law claims. However, as a matter of first impression, the court  determined that the PLA does not abrogate the statutory dog bite claim. As to the predator control dog exception, the court found that while the dogs were working as predator control dogs, the issue is whether the dogs were on property "under the control of" the Robinsons at the time. Under these facts, a grazing permit, without more, does not establish control for the predator dog exception of the dog bite law.

Lindauer v. LDB Drainlaying, Inc. 555 P.2d 197 (Colo.App. 1976)
In this Colorado case, the owners of a thoroughbred racehorse brought a negligence action to recover for injuries to his horse against the corporation that  installed underground pipe on property leased by plaintiffs. The lower court entered judgment on a verdict awarding damages to plaintiffs. On appeal, this court held that the evidence of negligence and contributory negligence was sufficient for jury where defendant physically left an unfinished project for two months where the horse was injured. Defendant still owed a duty of care that it would have owed as contractor. However, plaintiffs were not entitled to damages for care and feeding of injured horse.
McCausland v. People McCausland v. People, 145 P. 685 (Colo. 1914) Action by the People of the State of Colorado against William J. McCausland.  From a judgement overruling defendant's motion to dismiss and finding him guilty of cruelty to animals, he brings error.  Affirmed.
Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v. Cheyenne Mountain Zoological Soc'y 562 P.3d 63, reh'g denied (Colo., 2025) This Colorado case involves the appeal of the dismissal of a habeas corpus proceeding. The appeal asked the Colorado Supreme Court to decide whether the liberty interests protected by the "great writ of habeas corpus" extend to nonhuman animals. Petitioner Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (“NRP”) contends that the district court erred in dismissing its habeas petition because the five elephants that are the subject of the petition, Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo (“the elephants”), lacked standing to seek relief via the great writ. These elderly elephants live at the Cheyenne Mountain Zoo (“CMZ”) and where NRP asserts they were unlawfully confined. In support of this contention, NRP submitted affidavits from several animal biologists who stated that these intelligent and complex creatures are suffering from psychological disorders and stress from being in captivity. The Zoo countered with a motion to dismiss, arguing the elephants received extraordinary care and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because the elephants do not have standing to seek habeas relief. After the district court granted the motion to dismiss, this court sought to determine whether habeas corpus relief extends to nonhuman animals. The court first looked at Colorado's statutory grant of authority for habeas relief. In doing so, the court found that the statute grants "any person" the ability to seek habeas relief from illegal confinement or restraint of liberty. While "person" is not defined in the law, the court found other statutory definitions that limit "person" to mean "human being." This definition is bolstered by the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "person." Since Colorado's law explicitly limits habeas corpus relief to "persons," the court was unpersuaded by NRP to expand the writ to animals based on common law interpretations. Further, the court noted that even if the statute did not say "person," it would still not be persuaded to expand the writ because no other jurisdiction has recognized "personhood" for nonhuman species, expansion would have "unintended consequences" for interactions between humans and animals, and there is no evidence the Colorado legislature ever intended to recognize animals as legal persons in the statute. This court affirmed the district court's finding that Colorado's writ of habeas corpus does not apply to nonhuman animals.
People v. Bergen 883 P.2d 532 (Col. Ct. App. Div. III 1994)

Defendant, a journalist, attempted to film a dogfight for an investigative story on dogfighting following the passage of a Denver ordinance forbidding the ownership of bull terriers (pitbulls).    Defendant videotaped two separate fights and dogs "training" by running on treadmills.  After the story aired, public outcry lead to a police investigation as to the source of the dogfighting footage, which lead to the arrest of the defendant and her cameramen for dogfighting and perjury.

People v. Harris --- P.3d ---- 2016 WL 6518566 (Colo.App.,2016) Harris was convicted for twenty-two counts of cruelty to animals after dozens of malnourished animals were found on her property by employees of the Humane Society. On appeal, Harris raised two main issues: (1) that the animal protection agent who was an employee of the Humane Society was not authorized to obtain a search warrant to investigate her property and (2) that the mistreatment of the twenty-two animals constituted one continuous course of conduct and that the lower court violated her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause by entering a judgment on twenty-two counts of animal cruelty. The Court of Appeals reviewed the issue of whether the animal protection agent had the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property and determined that the agent did not have the proper authority. The Court looked to the state statute that specifically stated that only “state employees” were able to investigate livestock cases. In this case, the animal protection agent was employed by the Humane Society and was not a state employee; therefore, he did not have the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property. However, the Court found that there was no constitutional violation with regard to the search warrant because it was still obtained based on probable cause. For this reason, the Court denied Harris’ request to suppress evidence that was submitted as a result of the search warrant. Finally, the Court reviewed Harris’ argument regarding her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court found that under the statute dealing with animal cruelty, the phrases “any animal” and “an animal” suggests that a person commits a separate offense for each animal that is mistreated. Essentially, the Court held that the language of the statute “demonstrates that the legislature perceived animal cruelty not as an offense against property but as an offense against the individual animal.” As a result, Harris’ rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were not violated and the Court upheld the lower court’s decision.
Roalstad v. City of Lafayette 363 P.3d 790 (Col. Ct. App. Div. III , 2015) The origins of this matter began when the City of Lafayette (City) charged Defendant/Appellant with violating its municipal ordinance regarding vicious animals. Defendant/Appellant requested a jury trial pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. The municipal court denied the request. Defendant/Appellant appealed the district court's dismissal of her C.R.C.P. 106 and declaratory judgment action in which she challenged the municipal court's denial of her request for a jury trial. The sole issue on appeal was whether the offense for which Defendant was charged under the City's ordinances was a “petty offense” under C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109, which would entitle her to a jury trial under that statute. Since the municipal ordinance imposed fines that met that definition and because it was not a crime at common law, the court concluded the offense met the definition of “petty offense;” Defendant/Appellant was therefore entitled to a jury trial in municipal court pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. Further, because the ordinance and the state Dangerous Dog law were counterparts and because the ordinance was criminal in nature, the vicious animal offense was not exempt from the “petty offense” definition. Accordingly, the district court’s order was reversed.
Salazar v. Kubic 370 P.3d 342 (Col. Ct. App. Div. VI, 2015) At her facility, Defendant raised and housed more than 200 mice and rats to be sold as feed for snakes and other carnivores. Until March 2013, Defendant had a valid license issued under Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act (PACFA), but it expired. Upon the expiration Defendant kept operating her facility despite a cease and desist order from the Colorado Commissioner of Agriculture. The trial court granted the Commissioner's request for a permanent injunction to prevent Defendant from operating without the required PACFA license and from violating the cease and desist order. On appeal, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that her rodents were outside PACFA’s “pet animal” definition, despite the fact the mice and rats she sold were used as food, not household pets. Additionally, the court found rats and mice did not fit within the statutory exemptions for livestock or “any other animal designated by the Commissioner.” The court was also unpersuaded that Defendants rodents were “working animals” because there was no indication that she used them to perform any function that could be considered “work.” The district court’s decision was affirmed.
State v. Morison 365 P.2d 266 (Colo.1961)

Cattle owners sued the state and its agricultural commission for negligently performing the duty to use proper steps to prevent the spread of a contagious disease after they bought dairy cows at a sale that subsequently infected their herd. The owners were forced to sell their herd of dairy cows. The Supreme Court held that the owners could recover the difference between fair market value of their herd before and after it contracted the disease, loss of profits due to diminished milk production from cows before sale, value of silage or feed that had been contaminated, and reasonable costs of disinfecting the farm, but not for loss of profits for the dairy operation after they sold the cows, or loss of progeny.

Winkler v. Colorado Dept. of Health 564 P.2d 107 (Colo. 1977)

In 1974, the Colorado Department of Health adopted certain regulations, the conceded effect of which is to prohibit importation of pets for resale from states whose licensing laws and regulations for commercial pet dealers are not as stringent as those of Colorado. The regulations exempt from this prohibition persons who import pets not for resale and exclusively for breeding purposes or for personal use. After the regulations were upheld by the Denver district court, the plaintiffs, who are commercial pet importers, brought this appeal. The court found these arguments to be unpersuasive and, accordingly, affirmed the judgment of the trial court.