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Hammer v. American Kennel Club |
Plaintiff sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against the American Kennel Club (AKC) for use of standards in dog show competitions for Brittany Spaniel dogs that require the docking of their tails. The issue in this appeal is whether Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 grants plaintiff, who wishes to enter his dog and compete without penalty in breed contests, a private right of action to preclude defendants from using a standard that encourages him to "dock" his Brittany Spaniel's tail. The Court of Appeals concluded that it would be inconsistent with the applicable legislative scheme to imply a private right of action in plaintiff's favor because the statute does not, either expressly or impliedly, incorporate a method for private citizens to obtain civil relief. In light of the comprehensive statutory enforcement scheme, recognition of a private civil right of action is incompatible with the mechanisms chosen by the Legislature.
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Hampton v.Hammons |
The five-year-old child hopped a fence, which was in disrepair, into his neighbor's yard to retrieve a ball. As he was trying to leave, he was severely bitten by a pit bull that the neighbor was keeping for his son. In reversing the judgment in part, the court held that the keeping of a pit bull might be a violation of Tulsa, Okla., Rev. Ordinances tit. 2, ch. 1, § (2)(d) (1973), so the child's negligence per se theory was actionable. The court held that the neighbor was the dog's owner as a matter of law under the dog-bite statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 4. sec. 42.1 (1981).
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Hannah v. State |
This case is an appeal of the defendant's conviction on multiple counts of aggravated cruelty to animals, and abuse or neglect of animals. Defendant appeals the felony convictions of aggravated cruelty to animals, arguing that the animal's pain and suffering was caused by neglect rather than any intentional acts. The animals were seized from the defendant's home, where they were found to be lacking food, water, space, and sufficient veterinary care. A veterinarian testified that the animals were underweight, dehydrated, and many had wounds that were not properly treated. Defendant argues that this treatment constitutes abuse or neglect, and that is what the legislature intended to be punished as a misdemeanor. The court considered the use of the word "torture" under the statute, finding that as the actor's conduct is intentional, and results in pain and suffering to the animal, the definition applies. Here, the court finds that there was sufficient evidence that the actions were intentional and resulting in pain and suffering, so the defendant tortured the animals. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. |
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Hannan v. City of Minneapolis |
This case held that a state statute permitting the control and ultimate destruction of dangerous animals does not preclude municipal controls that add to the breadth of public powers without regulating conditions expressly prohibited by statute. In the case, a dog owner sought review of municipal animal control division's order for destruction of his dog. The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance providing for destruction of dangerous dog did not conflict with statute and thus was not preempted by statute. The court stated that, after comparing the ordinance with the state statute, it was evident that the local provision is merely additional and complementary to the statute, permitting local action that the state statute does not prohibit. In fact,
state law expressly provides for local regulation, giving municipalities full authority to regulate "potentially dangerous dogs," as long as the regulations are not breed-specific.
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Hanrahan v. Hometown America, LLC |
While walking his dog one evening, the plaintiff's husband was attacked by fire ants. In an attempt to remove the ants off his person, the plaintiff's husband collapsed in the shower. Two days later, he died. As a representative for her husband's estate and in her own capacity, the plaintiff filed a negligence suit against her landlord. After the trial court granted the landlord's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff appealed. Affirming the lower court's decision, the appeals court reasoned that since the landlord did not harbor, possess, or introduce the fire ants onto the premises, the landlord owed no duty to the plaintiff.
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Hansen v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture |
Judie Hansen petitions for review of a final decision of the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture. Because the 8th Circuit has no jurisdiction over the matter, the petition is dismissed. |
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Harabes v. Barkery, Inc. |
Plaintiffs claim their pet dog, Gabby, died of medical complications after she was negligently subjected to extreme heat for an extended period of time at The Barkery, a dog grooming business. The Court observed that there is no New Jersey precedent permitting a pet owner to recover non-economic damages when a pet is negligently injured or killed; therefore, the court looked policy and rationale which underlies similar cases in this and other jurisdictions. The Court concluded that the difficulty in quantifying the emotional value of a companion pet and the risk that a negligent tortfeasor will be exposed to extraordinary and unrealistic damage claims weighed against allowing damages. Most significantly, the court found that public policy mitigated against allowing emotional distress and loss of companionship damages, which are unavailable for the loss of a child or spouse, for the loss of a pet dog.
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Harby v. Harby |
This Florida case involves an appeal of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. With respect to animal law, the wife appealed the trial court's distribution of family dogs, Liberty and Nico, to the former husband. According to testimony, the dogs were bonded to each other. The former wife testified that the family adopted Liberty "to be an emotional support dog" and was her constant companion. The former wife testified that she cared for the dogs when they were adopted in 2013 and 2014 until the parties separated in 2017. Since that separation, the dogs have been in the husband's possession and care. The trial court determined that the dogs were marital property and that the wife appeared to be in good health with no physical or mental disabilities. Further, both parties agreed the dogs should not be separated from each other and the court found the dogs had been in the husband's possession since the parties separated. On appeal, the wife argues that the trial court's distribution of the family dogs to Former Husband was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by the record. In particular, the wife contends that one of the dogs is her emotional support animal and former husband expressed no desire or claim for the dogs in testimony. The court first observed that Florida is not one of the handful of states with statutes that give pets a special property status in distribution of marital assets. Instead, animals are considered personal property. Here, the court found both parties have cared for the dogs at times and the husband cared for them after the parties separated in 2017. And, while the court found that Liberty was "emotionally comforting," there was no evidence that the former wife had a disability and that Liberty provided emotional support to alleviate an effect of such disability. Thus, the role Liberty played was to provide comfort and companionship like most household pets. Since the trial court also considered each party's sentimental interest in the pets, including the children's attachment since they resided primarily with the former husband, there was no showing that the court abused its discretion in awarding the dogs to former husband. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion by awarding the family dogs to the former husband. |
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Hardrick v. City of Detroit |
In January of 2005, the Detroit City Council passed an ordinance granting special police powers to officers working in the Animal Control Division (ACD). The ordinance allowed ACD officers to have “the right of entry without a warrant” for the purpose of capturing or restraining any animal. Detroit residents filed a petition arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional and the court granted a petition for a preliminary injunction on the basis that the ordinance violated the Fourth Amendment. Following the injunction a number of residents filed suit seeking damages against the City of Detroit arguing that the City improperly seized their pets and failed to provide adequate post-deprivation remedies. Lastly, the residents argued that the City operated its animal shelter in a “grossly negligent manner” after numerous dogs suffered severe illnesses after having been taken to the shelter for quarantine by the ACD. The court reviewed the testimonies of the individual residents who claimed that their pets had been improperly seized and determined that the seizures of the pets were “objectionably reasonable.” In order to determine whether the seizures were “objectionably reasonable” the court stated that it “must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake by analyzing the totality of the circumstances.” Ultimately, the court found that it was reasonable for the officers to have seize the pets in each situation based on the facts presented and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Detroit. Finally, the court reviewed the residents’ arguments pertaining to the Fourteenth Amendment and held that because the vast majority of the pets were found “unrestrained, unlicensed, abandoned by their owner, or accused of biting another animal or human,” the City’s interest in protecting the public was far greater than any “pre-seizure due process owed to the plaintiffs.” As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. With regard to the residents’ claim about the state of the City’s animal shelter, the court declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the claim. |
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Hardsaw v. Courtney |
In this Indiana case, the Hardsaws appeal a jury verdict in favor of the Courtneys stemming from their complaint for damages against the Hardsaws after their daughter Kimberly was attacked and bitten by the Hardsaws' dog who was under the supervision of the Hardsaw's 12-year-old daughter at the time of the attack. The Courtneys alleged negligent entrustment. On appeal, the Hardaws argue that, as a matter of law, absent evidence of prior viciousness, they could not have been negligent in entrusting Buster to their daughter and, thus, that this case should not have been submitted to the jury. The court found that the question of whether owner's entrustment of the control and restraint of a dog to a child was reasonable under the circumstances is a question for the jury. Here, the dog was restrained in the yard by a chain, but he was left under the care and supervision of a twelve-year-old child who had no previous experience supervising him. The judgment was affirmed.
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