United States
Title |
Summary |
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| Com. v. Linhares |
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| Com. v. Raban |
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| Com. v. Seyler |
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| Com. v. Trefry | The Defendant Trefry, left her two sheepdogs, Zach and Kenji, alone on the property of her condemned home. An animal control officer noticed that Kenji was limping badly and took him to a veterinarian. Both dogs were removed from the property three days later. The Defendant was convicted of two counts of violating statute G.L. c. 140, § 174E(f ), which protects dogs from cruel conditions and inhumane chaining or tethering. The Defendant appealed. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Barnstable held that: (1) neither outside confinement nor confinement in general is an element of subjecting dogs to cruel conditions as prohibited by statute; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support finding that the defendant subjected her dogs to cruel conditions. The Appeals Court reasoned that the defendant subjected her dogs to cruel conditions in violation of the statute because by the time they were removed, the dogs were “incredibly tick-infested” and “matted,” and Kenji had contracted Lyme disease and sustained a soft shoulder injury to his leg. An animal control officer also testified that the defendant's home was cluttered on the inside and overgrown on the outside. The yard also contained items that posed a danger to the animals. There was also sufficient evidence to infer that, while the dogs could move in and out of the condemned house, the dogs were confined to the house and fenced-in yard. The area to which the dogs were confined presented with every factor listed in § 174E(f)(1) as constituting “filthy and dirty” conditions. Also, "Zach's and Kenji's emotional health was further compromised by being left alone virtually all day every day" according to the court. Therefore the Defendant’s conviction was affirmed. |
| Com. v. Zalesky |
In this Massachusetts case, the defendant was convicted of cruelty to an animal, in violation of G.L. c. 272, § 77. On appeal, the defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt; specifically, that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that his actions exceeded what was necessary and appropriate to train the dog. A witness in this case saw defendant beat his dog with a plastic "whiffle" bat on the head about 10 times. The defendant told the officer who arrived on the scene that he had used the bat on previous occasions, and did so to “put the fear of God in [the] dog.” At trial, a veterinarian testified that the dog suffered no trauma from the bat, but probably experienced pain if struck repeatedly in that manner. The court found that defendant's behavior fell under the ambit of the statutes because his actions were cruel, regardless of whether defendant viewed them as such. Judgment affirmed. |
| Comm'n on Hum. Rts. & Opportunities ex rel. Pizzoferrato v. Mansions | The Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Wendy and Rudy Pizzoferrato, holding that they failed to establish their housing discrimination claim under General Statutes § 46a-64c. The case arose when the defendants, The Mansions, LLC, initially approved the Pizzoferratos’ request for an accommodation to keep two emotional support dogs—despite a "no pets" policy—but later rescinded approval for the second dog, demanding additional documentation to justify its necessity. The trial court found that the defendants violated fair housing laws by constructively denying the accommodation request, ruling that Wendy had a mental disability under § 46a-51(20) either because she had a "record of" generalized anxiety disorder or was "regarded as" disabled by the defendants, and that two dogs were necessary for her equal enjoyment of the dwelling. On appeal, the Appellate Court agreed that Wendy qualified as disabled under the "record of" prong based on her therapist’s diagnosis, even if imperfectly documented, but rejected the trial court’s conclusion that two dogs were "necessary" under the statute. Relying on federal precedent, particularly Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Assn., the court held that "necessary" means indispensable, not merely preferable, and the plaintiffs failed to show that both dogs were essential rather than simply beneficial. Because the defendants offered to allow one dog—an alternative that would have satisfied Wendy’s needs—the court found no violation of fair housing laws and reversed the judgment. The decision clarifies that while housing providers must reasonably accommodate disabilities, plaintiffs must demonstrate that requested accommodations are truly essential, not just advantageous, to secure legal protection. |
| Commercial Dog Breeders and Puppy Mills | |
| Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson |
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| Commonwealth v. Adams | The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for animal cruelty under G. L. c. 272, § 77, after witnesses observed him repeatedly punch his dog in the head while visibly angry in a public park, purportedly to stop the dog from attacking a groundhog. The defendant claimed he acted to protect the groundhog and minimized harm by "pulling his punches," but eyewitnesses testified he struck the dog forcefully five to ten times over 30–40 seconds, with one bystander confronting him about the beating. At trial, the judge excluded the defense’s veterinary technician expert from testifying about the dog’s pain response and "prey drive," and declined to give requested jury instructions on bona fide discipline and defense of another animal. The court held that excluding the expert testimony was either harmless or cumulative, as the jury heard other evidence about the dog’s lack of injuries and aggressive behavior. Furthermore, the standard jury instructions—which required the Commonwealth to prove the defendant inflicted "severe or unnecessary pain without justifiable cause"—adequately covered his theories of defense, making supplemental instructions unnecessary. Thus, finding no reversible error, the court upheld the conviction. |
| Commonwealth v. Arcelay | The appellant Arcelay appeals his conviction for the summary offense of cruelty to animals after he left his two small Yorkie dogs were found inside of his vehicle on an 87 to 90 degree day for approximately two hours at Willow Grove Naval Air Station. The dogs were rescued from the car and survived (law enforcement gave the dogs water and placed them inside an air conditioned building). After receiving a citation for leaving the animals, appellant entered a plea of not guilty and appeared for the Magisterial Judge. He was found guilty and assessed fines and costs of $454.96. At a Summary Appeal de novo hearing, the officers who responded to the scene presented evidence, including testimony on the dogs being in the car for two hours and photographs of the area showing no shade was available. Appellant testified that he was retired from the Reserves and was at the base to set up for a family picnic. During the morning, he indicated that he checked on the dogs every fifteen minutes. Appellant testified that "he believes the public overreacts when they see dogs in a car" and he was upset that someone had gone into his vehicle to remove the dogs. The court ultimately found appellant guilty of the summary offense, but put appellant on a probation for three months in lieu of fines and costs, taking into account Appellant's lack income. On the instant appeal, appellant first questions whether the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction to hear this matter since it occurred on a military installation. Appellant also raises whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law for the cruelty to animals conviction. As to the jurisdictional argument, the court here found the issuance of the summary citation at the military base was appropriate. The court observed that it is well-settled that military and non-military courts may exercise concurrent subject matter jurisdiction for criminal matters. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction, where his conduct in leaving the dogs in a closed car on a hot, summer day presented an unreasonable risk of harm. The judgment was affirmed. |