Anti-Cruelty

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Titlesort descending Summary
RI - Livestock - Chapter 26. The Rhode Island Livestock Welfare and Care Standards Advisory Board Council Act of 2012 This chapter is the Rhode Island Livestock Welfare and Care Standards Advisory Council Act of 2012. The act establishes a livestock care standards advisory council consisting of the state veterinarian, or his or her designee, and six public members. The council reviews and evaluates laws and rules of the state applicable to the care and handling of livestock and issues recommendations.
RI - Transportation - § 4-1-7. Live poultry containers This Rhode Island statute requires poultry be shipped in sanitary, warm, and ventilated containers.
RI - Vehicle - § 31-22-28. Transporting animals This Rhode Island law makes it unlawful for any person to transport any animal, whether for business or pleasure, in an open air motor vehicle unless certain requirements are met: (1) the animal is kept in an enclosed area of the vehicle; (2) the animal is under physical control of a person; or (3) the animal is safely restrained and harnessed by means other than a neck restraint. Violation results in a fine of $50 to $100, with an increase of up to $200 for each subsequent offense.
Riddle of the Nineteenth Century: Mr. Henry Bergh


A short article about the person of Henry Bergh who started the ASPCA and the adoption of first of the modern anti-cruelty laws.
Robertson v Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries


An Inspector of the RSPCA entered premises occupied by the respondent and seized 104 dogs under the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 which were then forfeited to the state. These actions were confirmed when the respondent sought an administrative review of the decisions and leave to appeal was refused. The respondent sought to raise numerous grounds of appeal against the prior refusal of leave to appeal, however, the appeal was struck out.
Robledo, Leandro Nicolás y otros s/ resistencia o desobediencia a la autoridad
Rogers v. State


Dog fighting case. Where the dog fighting area was in an open section of woods near the defendant's home, police officers were not required to obtain a search warrant before entering the defendant's property because of the "open fields" doctrine.
Rohrer v. Humane Soc'y of Washington Cty. In this Maryland appeal, appellant Rohrer questions the authority of the Humane Society to act under CR § 10–615 (the law that allows an officer of a humane society to take possession of an animal from its owner). Rohrer also challenges the legal ownership of the animals in state custody. The seizure of Rohrer's animals began in 2014, when an anonymous tip led humane investigators to Rohrer's farm. Field officers and a local veterinarian observed cattle that were "extremely thin" on Rohrer's farm. These concerns led to a search warrant of appellant's property. Due to the presence of dead animal bodies intermingled with the living, high piles of animal feces, and goats with hooves so overgrown they could not walk, the Humane Society (HS) and Sheriff's office seized all the animals under the warrant. The actual "seizure" resulted in a transfer of some animals to foster farms and an agreement between HS and Rohrer to adequately care for remaining animals on the property. Rohrer was charged with 318 misdemeanor counts of animal cruelty, eventually being found guilty on only 5 counts and sentenced to supervised probation. During the initial proceedings, Rohrer filed a "petition for return of seized animals" under CR § 10–615(d)(2). When the District Court gave conclusions on the petition, it lamented on the "lack of guidance" in the statute and noted that that the "statute really doesn't say" whether Rohrer would lose ownership of the animals. After the criminal trial, Rohrer again sought return of the animals after negotiations with the HS failed. The Circuit Court upheld the District Court's denial of the Petition for Return, finding the ruling was not clearly erroneous and it was not in the best interests of the animals to return to Rohrer. On a writ of certiorari to this court, Rohrer raises three issues: (1) can the HS seize an animal already in state custody from a search warrant; (2) must the seizure by the HS be justified by the conditions at the time of seizure or may it be based on previously observed conditions; and (3) how does a denial of a petition to return the animals affect the owner's property rights in the animals? In looking at prior codifications of the law as well as surrounding legislative history, the court first held that a HS officer may notify the owner of animal seized by the state in connection with a criminal warrant of its intent to take possession of the animal upon its release from state custody. Secondly, a HS officer may rely on previously-observed conditions to justify seizure under Section 10-615. The court noted that, similar to a search warrant, the factors justifying seizure can become weaker with time. So, when an owner files a petition for return, the HS has the burden of showing the court the seizure was necessary under the statute. In Rohrer's case, this Court found the District and Circuit Courts did not reach the question of whether the necessity supporting HS' possession of the animals continued. Since the animals were released after the criminal trial concluded, this Court stated that the District Court may now consider this question. Finally, the Court weighed in on whether the denial of a Petition for Return affects ownership interests. This Court declined to adopt the standard of "best interests" of the animals. Instead, the Court found that the function of the Petition for Return is to determine who has the right to temporarily possess an animal in question and this does not vest ownership rights in the animal if the petition is denied. This case was remanded to Circuit Court so that court can determine whether the final disposition of the criminal case and subsequent release of the animals held under the search warrant affects the disposition of Rohrer's Petition for Return of this animals.
Roose v. State of Indiana


Defendant was charged with criminal mischief and cruelty to an animal after dragging it with his car. The court concluded that, although some of the photos admitted were gruesome, the municipal court validly admitted the photos of the dog that defendant injured into evidence because the photos clearly aided the jury in understanding the nature of those injuries and the veterinarian's testimony as to the medical attention that the dog received.
Ross v. United States In this D.C. case, the appellate court reversed Niya Ross’s conviction for animal cruelty under D.C. Code §§ 22-1001 and 22-1002, stemming from her leaving her dog, Cinnamon, in a parked car on a 98-degree day for over an hour. The trial court had convicted Ross based on the inference that leaving a dog in a hot car with windows slightly open created a “plain and strong likelihood” of harm. However, the appellate court found the evidence insufficient, as the government failed to present specific proof of the car’s interior temperature or symptoms of heat-related distress in the dog, relying instead on “common knowledge” and general assumptions. The court emphasized that criminal convictions require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, grounded in evidence, not conjecture. The concurring opinion highlighted the ethical and practical considerations of using AI tools in judicial decision-making, while the dissent argued that the trial court’s reliance on common sense and the testimony of an experienced animal control officer sufficiently supported the conviction. Ultimately, the appellate court reversed the conviction and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal.

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