Dangerous Dog

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Titlesort descending Summary
AR - Ordinances - § 14-54-1102. Dogs running astray. This Arkansas statute provides that municipal corporations have the power to prevent the running at large of dogs and the injuries and annoyances associated with them. Further, this statute allows municipalities to authorize the destruction or impoundment of dogs if found in violation of ordinance. However, prior to destroying the dog, the municipality shall give the dog's owner at least five (5) days' notice of the date of the proposed destruction of the dog by certified mail if the dog carries the owner's address.
AR - Pine Bluff - Breed - Sec. 5-43. - Dangerous dog declaration/pit bull dogs restricted.


In Pine Bluffs, Arkansas, it is unlawful to keep any pit bull dog except as provided in section 54-3, with exceptions for pit bulls owned by local, state or federal agencies, used by law enforcement, or as a service animal by a handicapped or disabled person. Pit bulls must be registered, be vaccinated for rabies, be sterilized, and the owner must be at least 21 years old and keep liability insurance of $100,000. The dog must be properly confined with warning signs, and a leash and muzzle must be used.
Arellano v. Broward

Plaintiff Lisa Arellano suffered a dog bite and injury to her big toe after being attacked by a guard dog. The Defendant, Broward K–9/Miami K–9 Services, Inc. (“K–9”), owned two guard dogs. The guard dogs escaped K-9 after the business was burglarized, and the chain link fence was cut. The dogs entered Arellano’s neighborhood and she believed that the dogs belonged to one of her neighbors. Arellano fed and sheltered the dogs for about five days, and took steps to find the dogs' owner. However, Arellano also had pet dogs of her own. Eventually, one of the guard dogs attacked one of Arellano's dogs. When Arellano intervened in the attack between the two dogs, she was injured. Eventually, Animal Control determined that K–9 owned the guard dogs. Arellano then brought a statuory damages claim for strict liability against K-9 under Florida’s dog bite statute. The Circuit Court, Miami–Dade County, entered summary judgment in favor of K-9 and determined as a matter of law, that Arellano's actions constituted a superseding, intervening cause, thereby precluding her statutory dog bite claim against the Defendant, K-9.  Plaintiff, Arellano appealed.  The District Court of Appeals, held that triable issues of fact existed as to whether, and to what extent, K-9's liability under the statute should be reduced because of allegedly negligent actions by Arellano. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the circuit court decision and reasoned that Florida's dog bite statute imposes strict liability on dog owners, subject only to a plaintiff's comparative negligence, which in this case must be determined by the trier-of-fact. K-9's liability under the statute should only be reduced because of the allegedly negligent actions of Arellano. The court also reversed the resulting cost judgment in K–9's favor. The case was remanded to the trial court.
Attacking the Dog-Bite Epidemic: Why Breed-Specific Legislation Won't Solve the Dangerous-Dog Dilemma


Part I of this Note examines the growing problem of dog bites and dog-bite related deaths ("canine homicides") through statistical analysis. This part also provides a description and history of pit bull terriers, currently the most frequent target of breed-based laws. Part II examines common criticisms and concerns that accompany each type of law, and provides an overview of additional legislation that has been enacted to reduce the number of dog bites and attacks. Finally, Part III concludes that breed-specific legislation is an ineffective and inefficient means of combating the dog-bite epidemic. This part argues that dangerous-dog laws are a more effective, albeit imperfect, solution to the problem and proposes non-breed-based supplemental legislation that can be enacted to reduce the public threat posed by dangerous dogs.
Auster v. Norwalk


Plaintiff, while on church premises, was bitten by a church employee's dog.  Plaintiff seeks damages from church under the state dog bite statute, which imposes strict liability for damages on the dog's keeper.  The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled in favor of the church, reasoning that a non-owner must be responsible for maintaining and controlling the dog at the time the damage is done in order to be held liable under the statute.
Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church


The plaintiff, Virginia Auster, brought this action pursuant to General Statutes § 22-357FN1 to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the dog of an employee of the defendant, Norwalk United Methodist Church.  Ms. Auster was a visitor who was on the premises to attend a meeting in the parish house when she was bitten by dog of church employee, who lived in an apartment in the parish house. 

After a jury trial, the verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.  (See summary judgment appeal, 2004 WL 423189).  The Appellate Court held that church was not a “keeper” of the church employee's dog for purposes of statute which imposed strict liability on the keeper of any dog that did damage to the body or property of any person.  The court reversed the judgment and remanded the action for a new trial on the issue of common-law negligence
Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church (Unpublished)


In this unpublished Connecticut opinion, the defendant-church owned property and leased a portion of the premises to one of its employees, Pedro Salinas.  The plaintiff was attacked by a dog, owned by Salinas, while lawfully on the defendant's premises.  The plaintiff appealed a summary judgment ruling in favor of defendant.  On appeal, the court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether defendant-church was a "harborer" of the dog under Connecticut law.  Because Salinas and the church had no formal lease agreement, dispute existed as to the exact parameters of Salinas' exclusive control of the premises where his dog roamed.  There also existed a material fact regarding the church's knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities because it had twice previously attacked a person. (Note the jury trial decision in favor of plaintiff was later overturned in

Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church

, --- A.2d ----, 94 Conn.App. 617, 2006 WL 797892 (Conn.App.)).
Aversa v. Bartlett


Plaintiff was awarded $100,000 for past pain and suffering and $200,000 for future pain and suffering after she was bitten in the face by Defendant's dog.  Defendant appealed on the basis that the jury award for future pain and suffering was unreasonable compensation.  The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court modified the judgment to be $75,000 for past pain and suffering after Plaintiff stipulated to the decrease.
AZ - Dog - Arizona Consolidated Dog Laws These Arizona statutes comprise the laws relating to dogs and animal bites. Included are provisions related to registration, collaring, and vaccination of dogs. With regard to dangerous dogs, Arizona law provides that a person with knowledge of a dog's vicious propensity must also keep the dog in an enclosed yard or confined area with a sign indicating the dog's vicious tendencies.
AZ - Dog Ordinances - Powers and duties of board of supervisors (dogs/animals) This Arizona statute provides that each county board of supervisors may regulate dogs, including the designation of a county enforcement agent, contracting with any city or town to enforce the provisions of any ordinance enacted by such city or town for the control of dogs, and for the unincorporated areas of the county, by ordinance, regulate, restrain and prohibit the running at large of dogs and the excessive and unrestrained barking of dogs. They may also establish either civil or criminal penalties for violations of the above ordinances and establish a rabies quarantine zone.

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