Dangerous Dog

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Titlesort descending Summary
Overview of Breed Specific Legislation (BSL) Ordinances


Breed Specific Legislation (BSL) is created when a municipality or a county believes a certain breed of dog poses a hazard to the public health, safety, and welfare. While this website does not contain every ordinance relating to BSL, it does contain many samples of how BSL can be constructed. For more information on your city's or county's ordinances, please contact the city or county of interest.

Overview of Dangerous Dogs in the Laws of Canada


This brief summary talks about the Canadian legal approach to dog-related injuries. It discusses the common law approach and the statutory response to dog-related injuries in Canada's provinces and territories.

Overview of Municipal Animal Control Ordinances


This overview discusses the power of municipalities to enact ordinances. It then highlights some common subjects for animal care and control within municipal codes.

Overview of States that Prohibit BSL This document lists the states that prohibit the regulation of dogs by local governments based on breed, commonly known as breed-specific legislation. The laws are divided into two general categories: (1) states that prohibit breed-specific legislation (BSL) in all animal regulation (10 states); and (2) states that prohibit BSL in dangerous/vicious dog laws (16 states). In total, there are approximately 22 states with some sort of anti-BSL legislation (combining both (1) and (2) together, and not counting DE, IL, and VA twice because they have both such laws). The pertinent part of the legislation is included in this list as well as a link to the actual laws. A further distinction has to be made in the application of some of these laws in the dangerous dog category. Some laws state that municipalities may not regulate dangerous dogs based solely on breed while other laws simply say that breed cannot be used to prove a dangerous dog declaration.
PA - Dangerous - § 459-507-A. Construction of article (dangerous dogs) This Pennsylvania statute provides the construction of the dangerous dog chapter in the state. It outlines the exceptions under the dangerous dog law as well as the enforcement procedure for one who is attacked by such dog. It also specifically states that any provisions of local ordinances relating to dangerous dogs are hereby abrogated. Further, a local ordinance otherwise dealing with dogs may not prohibit or otherwise limit a specific breed of dog.
PA - Dog Law - Chapter 8. Dogs (consolidated dog laws) These statutes represent Pennsylvania's Dog Law, and contain provisions related to licensing, rabies quarantines, kennels, and the dangerous dog chapter. The significant features of the law include a statewide control requirement for dogs (Section 305) and provisions for "dangerous dogs" (Section 501 et. seq.). Under the latter, any person may kill any dog which he sees in the act of pursuing or wounding or killing any domestic animal, including household pets, or pursuing, wounding or attacking human beings, whether or not such a dog bears a required license tag. There is no liability on such persons in damages or otherwise for such killing.
PA - Ordinances - § 459-1201. Applicability to cities of the first class, second class, second class A and third class This Pennsylvania statute provides that cities of the first and second class are not affected by state dog licensing programs; existing city-level programs remain in effect. With cities of the third class, certain provisions of the state article on dog licensing shall not apply if the city has established a licensing program by ordinance.
Panattieri v. City of New York

Ceasar, a mixed breed dog, was seized by police after he killed another dog and injured the other dogs’ owner. Petitioners, Kristina & Douglas Panattieri, owned Ceasar and demanded his return to their custody. They also challenged the determination by Respondent, Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), to execute Ceasar pursuant to the New York City Health Code (24 RCNY) § 161.07. The Petitioners argued that Ceasar’s execution would be unconstitutional under the City Code because it was preempted by the state statute, Agriculture & Markets Law § 123.The Supreme Court, New York County, denied their petition and held that the New York City Health Code was not preempted by the state statute. The Court reasoned that the Agriculture and Markets Law § 107(5), which governed licensing, identification, and control of dogs, expressly allowed municipalities to enact their own Codes governing dangerous dogs. However the City Codes were to incorporate standards that were as or more protective of public health and safety than those set forth in the state statute. The New York City Code met the requirement and was therefore not preempted by state law.

Parker v. Parker


Plaintiff and his 12 year-old quarter horse were visiting defendant at defendant's property when defendant's dog rushed at the horse causing it to run into a steel fence. The horse suffered severe head trauma, which necessitated its later euthanization. Plaintiff filed suit for damages asserting liability under common law negligence and O.R.S. 609.140(1) - the statute that allows an owner to recover double damages where livestock is injured due to being injured, chased, or killed by another person's dog. The appellate court agreed with plaintiff that O.R.S. 609.140(1) creates an statutory cause of action independent from negligence. Further, the court found that plaintiff fell within the class of persons the statute aims to protect because the legislature did not intend to limit the statute's application to property owned by the livestock's owner.

People v. Beam



Defendant was charged with owning a dog, trained or used for fighting, that caused the death of a person and

 filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that M.C.L. § 750.49(10); MSA 28.244(10) was unconstitutionally vague.  The court granted defendant's motion, finding the terms "without provocation" and "owner" to be vague, and dismissed the case.

The prosecutor appealed, and the Court of Appeals held that statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Reversed.



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