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Protecting the Wildlife Trust: A Reinterpretation of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act |
This Article attributes the failure of the ESA after thirty years to a basic flaw in interpreting one of the ESA's core provisions, section 7. Section 7 imposes a dual mandate on federal agencies to develop programs for the conservation of listed species, and to insure that federal actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service and NOAA Fisheries Service have failed to develop any regulation implementing the affirmative conservation program requirement, and they have interpreted the no jeopardy prohibition in a manner that allows imperiled species to drift closer and closer to extinction. This Article suggests a reinterpretation of section 7 in accordance with wildlife trust principles.
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Pulaski v. Chrisman |
Residents of a mobile home park attempted to get injunction preventing the conversion of their mobile home park into a community campground. Plaintiffs claimed violation of the Endangered Species Act due to the possible removal of endangered species during the renovation. The court held it did not have jurisdiction to entertain part of plaintiffs Endangered Species claim because of a procedural violation and that plaintiffs failed to show violation of the Endangered Species Act was likely on the remainder of their claims.
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Purpose of the ESA Chart |
The purpose of the chart is to provide Attorneys and lay persons a quick guide for use and research of state endangered species acts. The chart is broken down into nine columns providing information to what agency, listing criteria, prohibited acts, penalties, habitat protection, unique provisions, number of endangered species, links to agencies websites and the legal citation.
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RECONCILING POLAR BEAR PROTECTION UNDER UNITED STATES LAWS AND THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FOR THE CONSERVATION OF POLAR BEARS |
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Recovery of the Gray Wolf under the ESA |
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Red Wolf Coalition v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service |
The plaintiffs, Red Wolf Coalition, filed suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) alleging that USFWS had violated Sections 4, 7, and 9 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and also failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) when it allowed for the lethal or non-lethal taking of red wolves on private land. In response to the plaintiffs’ claim, USFWS asked the court to limits its review to the administrative record arguing that any discovery outside the administrative record would violate the Administrative Procedure Act’s scope and standard or review. The court decided not to limit the scope of review, stating that the plaintiffs’ claims fell under the citizen suit provision of the ESA and those types of law suits allow for discovery. Also, plaintiffs made a motion for a preliminary injunction to stop USFWS from conducting or authorizing the take of wild red wolves on private land whether or not the wolf has been a threat to humans, pets, or livestock. In order for the plaintiffs’ to succeed on this motion, the plaintiffs needed to make a clear showing of four elements: (1) plaintiffs’ are likely to succeed on the merits of the claim, (2) plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in plaintiffs’ favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. The court found that the plaintiffs’ were able to establish the first element because plaintiffs demonstrated that USFWS failed to adequately provide for the protection of red wolves by allowing for the taking of red wolves on private land, which may jeopardize the population’s survival in the wild. Next, the court held that plaintiffs’ were able to establish the irreparable harm requirement based on the fact that the threat to the red wolf population would clearly decrease their ability to enjoy red wolves in the wild and the possibility of the “decline or extinction of the species would cause them to suffer irreparable harm.” Lastly, the court found that granting the preliminary injunction would be in the public interest because “the equitable scales are always tipped in favor of the endangered or threatened species.” For those reasons, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. |
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Regulation for Nonessential Experimental Populations of the Western Distinct Population Segment (DPS) of the Gray Wo |
This overview compares the proposed regulation (68 FR 15879) and the changes made in the recent final rule (70 F.R. 1286) that concerns the Western Distinct Population Segment for the Gray Wolf (Canis lupus).
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RI - Endangered Species - Chapter 37. Endangered Species of Animals and Plants. |
These Rhode Island statutes set out the legislative policy and definitions related to state endangered species law, including the definition of "animal" and what constitutes an "endangered species." By statute commerce is strictly prohibited, as it it illegal to "buy, sell, offer for sale, store, transport, import, export, or otherwise traffic in any animal or plant or any part of any animal or plant whether living, dead, processed, manufactured, preserved, or raw if the animal or plant has been declared to be an endangered species by either the United States secretaries of the interior or commerce or the director of the Rhode Island department of environmental management." Violation of the Act results in fines from $500-5,000 or up to one year imprisonment, or both. |
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Ringling Brothers On Trial: Circus Elephants And The Endangered Species Act |
In February 2009, the case of American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, et al. v. Feld Entertainment, Inc. was heard in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. This Article, written as the case went to trial, analyzes the standing, ESA, and take issues presented in this case and ultimately concludes that the district court should find that the plaintiffs do have standing, the ESA does apply to the captive Asian elephants, and FEI’s actions do constitute takings and should be enjoined.
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Rowley v. City of New Bedford |
This opinion concerns the City of New Bedford, Massachusetts' motion to dismiss plaintiff Rowley's (formerly plaintiff "Friends of Ruth & Emily, Inc.") citizen suit for injunction under the federal Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that two Asian Elephants, Ruth and Emily, were mistreated by the Buttonwood Park Zoo in New Bedford by chaining their legs, housing them in inadequate facilities, failing to provide proper socialization, and failing to provide adequate veterinary care, which gives rise to a "taking" under Section 9 of the ESA. Rowley claims that she is a member of the zoological society there and visits the elephants on a "near daily basis," resulting in “an aesthetic, emotional, and spiritual relationship with Ruth and Emily over the years.” The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asked both parties to brief on the issue of standing for the instant action. The court first noted that the ESA expressly authorizes citizen suits for injunctive relief. To survive a motion to dismiss, Rowley must, through facts, clearly demonstrate standing, and then the court must analyze those facts under a multi-pronged approach. To begin, the court distinguished cases that established the proper "animal nexus" for injury in fact with those that did not meet that finding. Here, Rowley's complaint established injury in fact because she lives in New Bedford, is a member of the Zoo's Zoological Society, and observes the elephants on a near daily basis. Rowley alleges that the maltreatment of Ruth and Emily injures this ability because she observes their ongoing suffering while in substandard captivity. The court was not persuaded by New Bedford's claim that Rowley has not established injury in fact because she has no specialized training in wildlife or animal welfare. In fact, this claim ignored precedent from this very circuit that "aesthetic injury" can be established by viewing animals in inhumane conditions. In addition, the court rejected New Bedford's "nonexistent requirement into the injury in fact analysis" that Rowley must have observed or will observe Asian elephants in their native habitats. As a result, the court found Rowley properly established injury in fact. As to the next requirement of causation, the court found that Rowley sufficiently alleged that the Zoo's actions caused the harm complained of for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss. Finally, as to redressability, the court found that Rowley's request for a declaratory judgment as to the Zoo's treatment of Ruth and Emily, and an injunction prohibiting the Zoo from euthanizing the elephants met this prong. New Bedford's contention that Rowley's further suggestion of moving the elephants to a sanctuary in Tennessee impaired her redressability argument because Rowley did not propose how the cost of relocation would be funded was also rejected. At this stage, the court does not need to determine whether this solution is necessary or feasible. The District Court ultimately held that Rowley demonstrated sufficient standing to pursue her claims. Hence, New Bedford's motion to dismiss was denied. |
