Endangered Species

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Titlesort descending Summary
PA - Endangered Species - Chapter 104. Wild Resource Conservation This set of Pennsylvania laws comprises the state's endangered species provisions. Section 2167 makes it unlawful for any person to bring into or remove from this Commonwealth, or to possess, transport, capture or kill, or attempt, aid, abet or conspire to capture or kill, any wild bird or wild animal, or any part thereof, or the eggs of any wild bird, which are endangered or threatened species. It is the duty of every officer having authority to enforce this title to seize all wild birds or wild animals, or any part thereof, or the eggs of any wild bird, which have been declared endangered or threatened. Any commerce in endangered species is also prohibited. For a first violation, a person may have his or her hunting privileges revoked for 7 years. A second violation during that period may result in forfeiture of the privilege to hunt for 10 years. A third violation brings the forfeiture to 15 years.
Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources


The action alleged that defendants, Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources and chairman, violated the Endangered Species Act by maintaining feral sheep and goats in an endangered bird's critical habitat. Defendant had maintained feral sheep and goats within the critical habitat of the endangered palila bird. The practice degraded the bird's habitat. The court upheld summary judgment for the plaintiff, finding that maintenance of the herd constituted a taking under the Act.
Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources


Fearing potential prosecution under a county ordinance and a state statute for carrying out a Stipulated Order that protects an endangered species (the Palila), defendants, joined substantially by the plaintiffs, sought a motion for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted the defendants’ motion because federal law, the Stipulated Order, preempted both state and county law. The court therefore stated that so long as defendants, or their duly-appointed agents, were acting to enforce the specific terms of the Stipulated Order, they may conduct an aerial sighting over the Palila's critical habitat and shoot any ungulates sighted in that area without fear of violating (1) Hawaii County Code §§ 14–111, –112, & 1–10(a); or (2) HRS § 263–10.
People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium PETA, an animal rights organization, brought this action in July 2015 to enjoin the Miami Seaquarium. The injunction would force the marine park to relinquish possession of a killer whale, Lolita, by releasing her to a sea pen. The grounds for this injunction is an alleged violation of section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act by the marine park when they confined the killer whale in such conditions that the confinement amounted to a taking of the endangered species of animal. PETA specifically alleged that the marine park took Lolita by harming and harassing her, citing thirteen different injuries that were directly caused by her confinement quarters. When Lolita’s species was recognized as an endangered species by the Act, it specifically excluded captive members of the species. Just two months prior to filing suit, PETA had successfully lobbied to have that exclusion removed from the listing, enabling the suit itself. The district court held for summary judgment in favor of the marine park, saying that to have taken an animal would require a grave threat or potential for a grave threat to the animal’s survival, and PETA did not provide evidence of conduct that met that standard. In this appeal, the court affirms the district court’s summary judgment, but disagrees with their standard for a taking of an animal. After lengthy analysis of the statutory language, this court lowers the standard to posing a threat of serious harm to the animal, rather than death of the animal. However, this court also holds that PETA did not prove that the Seaquarium’s confinement of Lolita met this standard either. Affirmed.
People for Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Plaintiff People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners (“PETPO”) filed the instant lawsuit against United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Daniel M. Ashe, in his official capacity as Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Noreen Walsh, in her official capacity as Regional Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's Mountain Prairie Region, the United States Department of the Interior, and Sally Jewell, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Interior (collectively “Defendants”), challenging the constitutional authority of the federal government to regulate take of the Utah prairie dog on non-federal land under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Friends of Animals (“FoA”) intervened as a Defendant. The case before the District Court rests on the parties' opposing motions for summary judgment. The District Court found that although the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to do many things, it did not authorize Congress to regulate takes of a purely intrastate species that had no substantial effect on interstate commerce. Congress similarly lacked authority through the Necessary and Proper Clause because the regulation of takes of Utah prairie dogs was not essential or necessary to the ESA's economic scheme. Therefore PETPO's Motion for Summary Judgment was GRANTED, with prejudice; Defendants' Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment was DENIED, with prejudice.
Held 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g) Unconstitutional
PETA v. Tri-State Zoological Park PETA brought this action against defendants Tri-State Zoological Park of Western Maryland, Inc., Animal Park, Care & Rescue, Inc., and Robert Candy (collectively, “Tri-State”). Prior to this lawsuit, Tri-State was home to two lemurs, five tigers, and two lions which are all protected under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). More than half of the protected species housed at Tri-State died. PETA alleged violations of the ESA. PETA contended that the animals were subjected to harm and harassment and that Tri-State committed a “take” as defined by the ESA as a result of unsanitary living conditions, poor diets, and inadequate shelter and enrichment. The district court found that PETA had standing to bring suit. The court also found that each of the respective animals had been subjected to a take under the ESA. The court ultimately held that it would enter a separate order declaring that the Defendants violated the ESA by unlawfully taking the remaining big cats and maintaining possession of them. The Court permanently enjoined the Defendants from ever owning or possessing any endangered or threatened species and terminated the Defendants’ ownership and possessory rights to the animals. The Defendants’ motion to stay was denied.
Playing Noah


In “Playing Noah,” John Copeland Nagle investigates the difficulty of protecting all endangered species through the implementation of the Endangered Species Act. In doing so, Nagle looks at utilitarian arguments and concludes that these arguments do not justify treating all species equally. Instead, Nagle concludes that religious, moral, or ethical arguments provide a better justification. Specifically, Nagle contends that the book of Genesis provides a compelling case for protecting all endangered species.
Polar Bears
Proceso No. 15111-2014-0152 Jaguar Killing , 2015 - Ecuador This case regards a defendant who shot and killed a jaguar, which was an endangered species, allegedly in the name of defense and necessity. The plaintiff argued that the defendant did not require defense or true necessity, that he had to prove that he did not kill the jaguar, and that in circumstances of uncertainty, the court should hold in favor of nature (in dubio pro natura). The defendant was not a hunter and was not actively hunting the jaguar. Ecuadorian environmental law states that anyone who “hunts” a legally protected species will be punished with incarceration. The court discussed concepts of Ecuadorian constitutional law, rights of nature, and the juxtaposition of human beings working within the habitats of wild, and potentially predatory, animals. After a detailed discussion, the court accepted the appeal and unanimously agreed to punish the defendant with six months' prison time.
Proceso No. 15111-2014-0152 matanza de un jaguar, 2015 - Ecuador Este caso se refiere a un acusado que disparó y mató a un jaguar, que era una especie en peligro de extinción, supuestamente en defensa propia y por necesidad. El demandante alegó que el demandado no requería defensa propia o verdadera necesidad, que tenía que probar que no había matado al jaguar y que, en circunstancias de incertidumbre, el tribunal debía fallar a favor de la naturaleza (in dubio pro natura). El acusado no era cazador y no estaba cazando activamente al jaguar. La legislación medioambiental ecuatoriana establece que cualquier persona que "cace" una especie legalmente protegida será castigada con penas de prisión. El tribunal debatió conceptos del derecho constitucional ecuatoriano, los derechos de la naturaleza y la yuxtaposición de seres humanos que trabajan en el hábitat de animales salvajes y potencialmente depredadores. Tras un debate detallado, el tribunal aceptó el recurso y acordó por unanimidad castigar al acusado con seis meses de prisión.

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