Farming or Food Production

Displaying 251 - 260 of 501
Titlesort descending Summary
IN - Health - Article 17. Animal Health and Animal Products. Chapter 18. Crimes and Infractions This set of Indiana laws covers diseased livestock and the sale of domestic animals. It also provides that a person responsible for livestock or poultry who knowingly or intentionally permits the livestock or poultry to run at large commits a Class B misdemeanor. Another provision states that a person may not import to or export from Indiana for the purpose of sale any dog under the age of eight (8) weeks unless the dog is transported with its dam.
IN - Humane Slaughter - Chapter 5. Meat and Poultry Inspection; Humane Slaughter Act This Indiana statutory section comprises both the state's meat processing laws and humane slaughter provisions. The state board responsible for carrying out this Act are empowered to adopt rules governing humane methods to make livestock or poultry insensible to pain before incision of an instrument for severance of the carotid arteries. The rules must conform as far as applicable to the regulations promulgated under the Federal Humane Slaughter Act. Most of the laws in this section pertain to inspection of commercial livestock facilities and the labeling of postmortem and antemortem animals. However, violation of the humane slaughter provisions appear to result in a Class B misdemeanor where there has been a "reckless violation."
IN - Registration of Cattle Premises - THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (REGISTRATION OF CATTLE PREMISES) RULES, 1978 The Rules, adopted under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, provide for the registration of premises having five or more heads of cattle kept for the purpose of profit. The owner of the premises must apply for a certificate and the premises shall be open for inspection at all reasonable times. On premises where milch cattle are kept, a copy of Section 12 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act must be displayed in the local language. The provision prohibits the performance of 'phooka' or 'doom dev '.
IN - Slaughter - PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (SLAUGHTER HOUSE) RULES, 2001 The Rules, drafted under the Prevention of Cruelty Act, 1960, regulates slaughterhouses where ten or more animals are slaughtered in a single day. Animals may not be slaughtered in slaughterhouses that are not recognized or licensed. Animals that are pregnant, or have offspring less than three months old, or are less than three years months old, or which have not been certified by a veterinary doctor as being in a fit condition, may not be slaughtered. The Rules prescribe conditions for welfare of animals that shall be slaughtered, as well as standards of hygiene that are to be followed by the slaughterhouse.
In Arkansas Which Comes First, the Chicken or the Environment?


This article looks at the effect of Arkansas' extensive poultry industry, which operates without regulation, on the environment, wildlife, fish and water quality.
In re Priv. Crim. Complaint Filed by Animal Outlook Animal Outlook (“AO”) appealed from the order that dismissed its petition for review of the disapproval of the Franklin County District Attorney's Office (“DA”) of multiple private criminal complaints. The requested charges stem from information obtained from an undercover agent who was employed at Martin Farms, where she captured video of cruel mistreatment of animals on the farm that AO contends constituted criminal animal cruelty. These data were complied into a table of 327 incidents, a letter of support from a veterinarian, and a legal memorandum that detailed how these incidents violated Pennsylvania law. AO submitted the gathered information to the pertinent authorities in January 2019 and the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) initiated an investigation which concluded more than a year later. Ultimately, the PSP issued a press release in March 2020 that indicated that the District Attorney had declined prosecution. After this, AO drafted private criminal complaints that were submitted to the Magisterial District Judge who concluded that the DA correctly determined that there was not enough evidence for prosecution. AO then filed a petition of review of the disapproval of its private complaints pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(B)(1) before the trial court, which again dismissed AO petition for review. AO filed this appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. In reviewing the trial court's decision, the Superior Court found that the trial court committed multiple errors of law. First, the trial court did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to moving forward with a prosecution and gave too much credit to the evidence from the Martin Farms veterinarian versus the undercover agent's testimony. The trial court went beyond its role of determining whether the evidence proffered supported each element of the crime charged and instead gave impermissible weight and credibility to Martin Farms evidence. Second, the court made a point of noting that Martin Farms voluntarily changed its practices after the investigation, which had no bearing on the legal sufficiency for criminal charges. The trial court also addressed "only a hand-picked few of the alleged instances of abuse," especially with regard to ignoring the non-anesthetized dehorning of calves. Thus, this court found that AO provided sufficient evidence to show prima facie cases of neglect, cruelty, and aggravated cruelty with respect to the incidents. The court then analyzed whether the record supported a defense of "normal agricultural operations" defense that would counter the charges. This court found that incidents like the dehorning of cattle that already had horns fused to the skull and extreme tail twisting and shocking were sufficient to overcome the affirmative defense. The trial court's dismissal of AO's petition for review was reversed and the trial court was ordered to direct the DA to accept and transmit charges for prosecution.
In re Tavalario


This appeal presents a challenge by Anthony Tavalario to the manner in which the State Agricultural Development Committee (SADC) determines whether keeping horses on property constitutes a "commercial" agricultural operation that exempts the property from local zoning and other land use restrictions as the result of the preemptive force of the Right to Farm Act, N.J.S.A. 4:1C-1 to -10.4. The SADC found that Tavalario's use of the land did not qualify for protection under the Act, because he could not demonstrate that, as of July 3, 1998, his operation produced "agricultural or horticultural products worth $2,500 or more annually" as required by the definitional section of the Act. Tavalario contends on appeal that the SADC erred because it failed to consider as income in 1998 uncollected stud fees, the imputed value of a horse sold as a broodmare in 2002 for $8,000 and another horse sold in 2003 for $5,400, and race winnings of an undisclosed amount allegedly awarded at an unspecified time after 1998. The court found no grounds for reversal of the SADC's interpretation of the production requirements of the definition of "commercial farm" found in N.J.S.A. 4:1C-3 or its application to Tavalario's case.
Indiana v. Massachusetts A coalition of multiple states filed a lawsuit against Massachusetts in the U.S. Supreme Court. Thirteen states, Indiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, filed suit against the state of Massachusetts in response to the animal welfare laws created by Massachusetts Question 3. The states claimed to have direct standing to challenge the Massachusetts law because state agencies and instrumentalities own and operate farms that are subject to the Massachusetts law and wish to continue to sell products to other states, including Massachusetts. The states also claimed parens patriae standing on behalf of farmers and consumers within their borders that would be affected by the Massachusetts law. The plaintiff states filed suit in the U.S. Supreme Court requesting that the Court declare the Massachusetts law unconstitutional. The Court denied the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint because hearing the case would not be an appropriate use of the Court’s original jurisdiction. The Court stated that, in order to resolve plaintiff’s challenge and address the issues of standing and the merits of the case, the Court would need to resolve complex factual disputes. The Court reasoned that such disputes are better suited to resolution in federal district court, not the U.S. Supreme Court.
Iowa Pork Producers Association v. Bonta The Iowa Pork Producers Association, an organization that represents Iowa-based industrial pig farmers, filed a lawsuit in federal district court alleging that California’s Proposition 12 is unconstitutional. Proposition 12, a ballot measure that California voters passed in 2018, mandates that pregnant pigs must be housed with a certain amount of space in order for products made from such livestock to be sold in California. Proposition 12 also bans the sale of pork meat from producers that do not comply with the housing requirements, including sales from out of state producers. Plaintiff contended that Proposition 12 violates the dormant commerce clause in that it discriminates against interstate commerce, directly regulates extraterritorial conduct, and that even if it regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. The court looked to the purpose of Proposition 12, which is intended to prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm animal confinement, which also threaten the health and safety of California consumers, and increase the risk of foodborne illness and associated negative fiscal impacts on the state of California. The court found that this purpose is not discriminatory, and that there is no hint of economic protectionism. The court also found that there is no discriminatory effect, as the statute treats all producers the same by imposing the same requirements. The court also denied the extraterritoriality claim because Proposition 12 is not a price control or price affirmation statute and, therefore, does not directly regulate extraterritorial economic conduct. The court also found that the burden imposed on commerce was not clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. The court’s precedent states that even if producers will need to adopt a more costly method of production to comply with Proposition 12, such increased costs do not constitute a substantial burden on interstate commerce, and higher costs to consumers do not qualify as a substantial burden on interstate commerce. The district court dismissed the case, holding that plaintiffs failed to raise serious questions as to the merits of the claims.
It's Eleven O'Clock, Do You Know Where Your Chicken Is? The Controversy Surrounding the National Animal Idenitifiaction System and Its Application to Small and Organic Farmers


Parts I and II track the history and development of the NAIS. Part III introduces the opposition of small and organic farmers to the NAIS, and Part IV explores that opposition. Part V explores legal challenges to the NAIS, and Part VI explores the policy challenges. Part VII examines the USDA's response to small and organic farmers' concerns with the NAIS. Finally, Part VIII suggests possible solutions to small and organic farmers' issues raised by the NAIS.

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