Cases

Case namesort descending Citation Summary
State v. Warren 439 P.3d 357 (Mt. 2019) Cathie Iris Warren was convicted of three felony counts of aggravated animal cruelty, five felony counts of aggravated cruelty, and a misdemeanor cruelty to animals count. Warren appealed contending that the district court erred by denying Warren’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of her commercial kennel property, denying Warren’s Baston challenge, and in imposing costs to be reimbursed by Warren under Montana law. Cathie Iris Warren operated a kennel on her residential property in Libby, Montana. Warren obtained her initial license to operate her business in 2013. In 2016 it was discovered that Warren was operating her kennel despite the fact that her business license had expired in October of 2015. In order to obtain a new license, Warren needed to have an inspection of her property. Warren ended up having three separate inspections of her property. After each inspection, Warren had failed to meet the requirements. The members of the Health Department who were involved in the inspections became concerned that the animals were not being adequately cared for and were not of good health. Warren could not provide appropriate vaccination records for all of her animals. A search warrant was executed on Warren’s property on August 2, 2016. Warren’s animals were seized the same day. Warren moved to suppress the evidence that was obtained arguing that a warrant was required for each inspection that had been conducted on her property. The court concluded that there was no search because Warren did not have an expectation of privacy in her commercial kennel operation that society would consider objectively reasonable. The trial court convicted Warren and found that Warren owed statutorily-imposed costs, including veterinary care, food and supplies, excess hours worked by county employees, and travel costs as well as the shelter’s lost revenue. Warren appealed her conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court of Montana found that Warren treated parts of her home as part of her kennel, therefore, those areas of her home that were searched were considered commercial property which is subject to a less significant expectation of privacy. The Court concluded that the administrative inspection fell within the applicable warrant exception, was reasonable, and did not require a search warrant. Warren also challenged the State’s peremptory challenge of a minority juror (Baston Challenge). The Court concluded that the District Court reached the right conclusion on the Baston challenge but for the wrong reason. Warren’s third challenge was whether the District Court erred in calculating the statutory costs owed by Warren. The Court found that the costs approved by the District Court were reasonably supported by the evidence. The Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the District Court.
State v. Washburn --- A.3d ----, 2024 WL 3629657 (Vt. Aug. 2, 2024) In this Vermont case, the defendant appealed a criminal division order granting the State's motion for civil forfeiture of his dog "Chad" based on a finding that he subjected the dog to cruelty. The first incident occurred in April 2022, where the defendant left Chad, a Siberian husky, locked in his vehicle on an "unseasonably warm" day where temperatures were in the high nineties. Two subsequent incidents occurred in the following months, culminating in defendant's arrest and a requirement that defendant surrender his dog. On appeal, defendant argues that the criminal division lacked jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding since Chad was not seized under 13 V.S.A. § 354, that the State failed to prove animal cruelty by clear and convincing evidence under 13 V.S.A. § 352. Defendant also argued that the criminal division erred in admitting lay witness testimony (the police officer) regarding the internal temperature of defendant's car under Vermont Rule of Evidence 701. The Supreme Court found that the dog owner's challenge to the dog's seizure was not an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. Since defendant conceded it was not raised below, the court held that it could not be raised for the first time on appeal. As to defendant's next argument that there was insufficient evidence, this court found clear and convincing evidence that established animal cruelty to warrant forfeiture, including the fact Chad had no access to water, the outside temperature was high, and the officer observed early stages of heat exhaustion in the dog. Finally, even if admitting the lay testimony of the officer as to internal car temperature was error, it "falls within the purview of harmless error" since the record provided an unchallenged temperature reading for that day and the officer observed closed windows and distress from the dog. The case was affirmed.
State v. Weekly 65 N.E.2d 856 (1946)

The court affirmed a conviction for stealing a dog by holding that it was a "thing of value" despite the traditional common law rule to the contrary and even though it was not taxable property.

State v. Weeks 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1090 Defendant was convicted of violating Ohio's animal fighting statute, and appealed. He challenged the conviction, arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The court upheld the conviction. The court ruled that although a portion of the statute was overly vague and broad, that portion was severable from the remainder. The court also held that defendant did not demonstrate that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him.
State v. West Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2963990 (Table) (Iowa App.)

In this Iowa case, the defendant, West, shot his neighbor's dogs after the dogs were seen running the perimeter of his deer-pen, agitating 15 of his deer in the process. Defendant was subsequently convicted of two counts of animal abuse charges and fifth degree criminal mischief.  On appeal, West argued that the section 351.27 (a provision that allows a person to kill a dog caught in the act of worrying livestock) provides an absolute defense to the charges of animal abuse and that he had the right under the facts and this statute to summarily kill Piatak's dogs because they were worrying and chasing his deer. He also contended that the statute has no additional “reasonableness” requirement, and the trial court was incorrect to graft the “reasonably acting” standard from the animal abuse law. The appellate court agreed, finding that section 351.27 provides an absolute defense to a charge of animal abuse under section 717B.2.

State v. Wilson --- P.3d ----, 2019 WL 4955178 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019) Defendant Robert Wilson appeals his conviction of first degree animal cruelty, which arose from an incident at an archery club when Wilson shot a large dog in the hindquarters (70lb. "Dozer") with an arrow after that dog attacked Wilson’s small dog ("Little Bit"). (Dozer recovered from his injuries.) Wilson argues that his action was lawful under RCW 16.08.020, which states that it is lawful for a person to kill a dog seen chasing, biting, or injuring a domestic animal on real property that person owns, leases, or controls. The trial court declined to give defendant's proposed jury instruction based on this statutory language, finding that it only applied to stock animals and not when a dog was injuring another dog. The court did, however, permit the common law defense that allows owners to take "reasonably necessary action" in defense of their animals, which the State must then disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, this court noted that no Washington court has interpreted RCW 16.08.020 in a published case. Under common law cases that allow a person to kill an animal to defend his or her property, the court found those cases require the killing be "reasonably necessary." While the parties dispute whether the statute requires that the actions be "reasonably necessary," the appellate court first found Wilson was still not entitled to a dismissal of charges because he could not establish that the location where he shot the arrow at Dozer was land that he "owned, leased, or had control over" per the statute. As to the Wilson's next argument that the trial court erred in not giving his proposed instruction for RCW 16.08.020, the appellate court agreed. While the trial court found that the statute only applied to stock animals, the appellate court noted that the law does not define the term "domestic animal." Using the plain dictionary meaning for "domestic" - "belonging to or incumbent on the family" - and for "domestic animal," this court stated that "Little Bit certainly belonged to Wilson's family" and a dog fits the meaning of "domestic animal." Finally, the court found that the "reasonably necessary" requirement from the common law cases on shooting domestic animals cannot be grafted onto the statutory requirements of RCW 16.08.020. Thus, the trial court's refusal to give defendant's proposed instruction based on RCW 16.08.020 cannot be grounded in the reasonably necessary common law requirement. The trial court's refusal to give the proposed instruction was not harmless. As such, the appellate court reversed Wilson's conviction and remanded the action for further proceedings.
State v. Wilson 464 So.2d 667 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.,1985)

In this Florida case, the state appeals a county court order that granted appellee's motion to dismiss two counts of an information and which also declared a state statute to be unconstitutional. Defendant-appellee was arrested for having approximately seventy-seven poodles in cages in the back of a van without food, water and sufficient air. In her motion to dismiss, defendant-appellee alleged that the phrases “sufficient quantity of good and wholesome food and water” and “[k]eeps any animals in any enclosure without wholesome exercise and change of air” as contained in sections 828.13(2)(a) and (b) were void for vagueness. In reversing the lower court, this court held that the prohibitions against depriving an animal of sufficient food, water, air and exercise, when measured by common understanding and practice, are not unconstitutionally vague.

State v. Witham 876 A.2d 40 (Maine 2005)

A man ran over his girlfriend's cat after having a fight with his girlfriend.  The trial court found the man guilty of aggravated cruelty to animals.  The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court, holding the aggravated cruelty to animals statute was not unconstitutionally vague.

State v. Wood 2007 WL 1892483 (N.C. App.)

Plaintiff entered an oral agreement for defendant to board and train her horse, Talladega.  The horse died within  two months from starvation, and the Harnett County Animal Control found three other horses under defendant's care that were underfed, and seized them.  The jury trial resulted in a conviction of two counts of misdemeanor animal cruelty from which the defendant appeals.  However, this court affirms the jury's conviction, stating that the assignment of error is without merit and would not have affected the jury's conviction. 

State v. Woods 2001 WL 224519 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.) Defendant was indicted on three counts of aggravated murder, one count of attempted aggravated murder, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of kidnapping in an incident following a dogfight. Following a jury trial, d efendant was found guilty of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery and kidnapping. The court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court.
State v. Wright 393 P.3d 1192 (Or.App.,2017) Defendant was convicted of four counts of aggravated animal abuse in the first degree after he drowned all six cats that lived with him in a water-filled trash can. On appeal, defendant challenged the exclusion of evidence that he had an intellectual disability and that he had a character for gentleness toward animals. Defendant asserts such evidence would have shown he did not act with the requisite malicious intent that the state was was required to prove. It would have been relevant in demonstrating his mental state when committing the offenses, according to defendant. The appellate court found that the lower court did not err with regard to excluding defendant's reference to an intellectual disability. The testimony at trial describing his "intellectual disability" was more of a general reference and not relevant to his mental state. On the issue of character evidence of defendant's gentleness toward animals, the appellate assumed the lower court erred because the state conceded it was harmless error in its brief. In agreeing with the state that the error was harmless, the court found any further evidence would have been cumulative because other testimony spoke to defendant's gentle character toward animals. The matter was remanded for resentencing due to errors in sentencing.
State v. Ziemann 705 N.W.2d 59 (Neb.App.,2005)

The petitioner-defendant challenged her criminal conviction for cruelly neglecting several horses she owned by asserting that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated. However, the court of appeals side stepped the petitioners claim that she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a farmstead, that she did not own or reside on, because she leased the grass on the farmstead for a dollar by invoking the “open fields” doctrine.    The court held that even if such a lease might implicate the petitioners Fourth Amendment rights in some circumstances, the petitioner here was only leasing a open field, which she cannot have a legitimate expectation of privacy in.

Stauber v. Shalala 895 F.Supp. 1178 (W.D.Wis.,1995)

Court found that milk consumers failed to prove that milk gained from rBST-treated cows contains higher levels of antibiotics, tastes different, or differs in any noticeable way from "ordinary" milk. That consumers might demand mandatory labeling was not enough to require labeling; rather, the FDA was required to ensure that products are not misbranded and consumer demand could not require the FDA to forgo this duty.

Steagald v. Eason 797 S.E.2d 838 (2017)

In this case, Gary and Lori Steagald sued the Eason family, alleging that the Easons failed to keep their dog properly restrained and were therefore liable under OCGA § 51-2-7. Lori Steagald suffered injuries after the Easons dog attacked her while she was visiting the Easons home. The Easons filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that they had no reason to know that the dog was vicious or dangerous and therefore were not liable under the statute. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals affirmed the motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the lower court’s decision. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that the Eason family was liable under the statute because they did have reason to believe that the dog could potentially be vicious or dangerous. The Court focused on the fact that the dog had previously “growled and snapped” at the Easons while being fed. The Court held that although the dog had never bit anyone prior to Lori Steagald, it was reasonable to assume that the dog could potentially bite and injure someone given the fact that it had a history of snapping and growling. As a result, the Court reversed the Easons motion for summary judgment and determined that the question of whether or not the Easons are liable under the statute is a question for the jury. 
Steiner v. U.S. 229 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1956)

Defendants were charged with knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States, smuggling and clandestinely introducing into the United States merchandise, namely, psittacine birds, which should have been invoiced; by fraudulently and knowingly importing merchandise and by knowingly receiving, concealing and facilitating the transportation and concealment of such merchandise after importation, knowing the same to have been imported into the United States contrary to law.  Appellants contend that the birds mentioned in count 1 were not merchandise, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.A. § 545. The court found there was no merit in this contention.  Further, this importation subjected defendants to the felony provision of the Lacey Act and defendants were properly sentenced under the felony conspiracy portion of the Act.

Stennette v. Miller 316 Ga.App. 425, 729 S.E.2d 559 (Ga.App., 2012)

Plaintiff Stennette was providing in-home nursing care while she was bitten multiple times by Defendant Miller's dog. Stennette appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Miller in Stennette's personal injury action. This Court affirmed that decision because Stennette failed to provide adequate evidence showing triable issues on whether the dog had a vicious propensity and whether Miller knew of that propensity. However, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to Miller on Stennette's claim that Miller negligently performed a voluntarily-undertaken duty to keep the dog away from her when she was at the house, because the evidence created genuine issues of material fact as to this claim.

Stephens v. City of Spokane Slip Copy, 2007 WL 3146390 (E.D.Wash.)

Before the court here is defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion to certify a class. Plaintiffs claim is based on Spokane's "barking dog" ordinance" for which they were each issued an infraction by animal control officers. Plaintiffs contend the ordinance is void for vagueness. The court disagreed, finding that the ordinance has incorporated the reasonableness standard and is presumptively constitutional. In the ordinance, the citizen of average intellect need not guess at the prohibition of allowing an animal to unreasonably disturb persons by “habitually barking, howling, yelping, whining, or making other oral noises.”

Stephens v. State Stephans v. State, 3 So. 458 (Miss. 1887) (Arnold J. plurality).

The Mississippi Cruelty to Animal statute was applied to the Defendant who killed several hogs that were eating his crops.  The lower court refused to instruct the Jury that they should find him not guilty, if they believed that he killed the hogs while depredating on his crop and to protect it, and not out of a spirit of cruelty to the animals.  The Supreme Court of Mississippi found it to be an error by the court to refuse to give such instructions because if the defendant was not actuated by a spirit of cruelty, or a disposition to inflict unnecessary pain and suffering, he was not guilty under the statute.

Stephens v. State 247 Ga. App. 719 (2001)

Defendant was accused and convicted of 17 counts of cruelty to animals for harboring fighting dogs in deplorable conditions. Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the probation terms. The appellate court found, in light of the evidence, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of cruelty to animals beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, defendant failed to overcome the presumption that the probation the trial court imposed was correct.

Stephens v. Target Corp. 482 F.Supp.2d 1234 (2007)

Lamp owners sued the lamp’s manufacturer and seller under Washington Products Liability Act, alleging that  lamp caused a fire that injured their dog. The District Court held that Plaintiffs could not recover damages for emotional harm arising from injury to their dog. The appropriate measure of damages for personal property is market value, but if it has none, then the value to the owner is the proper measure. Plaintiffs' recovery was limited to the actual or intrinsic value of the dog.

Stevens v. Hollywood Towers and Condominium Ass'n 836 F.Supp.2d 800 (N.D. Ill. 2011) Plaintiffs brought the instant suit contending that their Condo Board's refusal to accommodate the need for an emotional support animal forced them to sell their condo. The Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. After finding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to unrestricted access for their dog despite a no pet waiver and after needing more facts to determine whether Defendants restrictions on Plaintiffs’ access to the building were reasonable, the District Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under the Federal Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). The District Court also found Plaintiffs' interference or intimidation allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. However, the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim because Plaintiffs had not contended that Defendants unreasonably used their own property to interfere in Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their home, but rather, contended that Defendants made rules that interfered with the Plaintiff's ability to use the common areas of the property as they wished. Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was also dismissed because Plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged that Defendants' conduct was extreme or outrageous. Finally, the constructive eviction claim was dismissed because more than a year had past between the owners’ accommodation request and the sale of their condominium. In sum, Counts I, II, and III went forward, but the remainder of the complaint was dismissed. Additionally, Defendant Sudler Building Services was dismissed from the complaint.
Stoffels v. Harmony Hill Farm 2006 WL 3699549 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006)

An owner of a horse farm acquired a new horse that had only recently been broken in and got a woman with some health problems to ride the horse. The horse bucked and threw the defendant off the horse causing injury. The court held that even though riders assume the risk of most injuries, a horse owner can be liable for failure to take reasonable measures to match the rider to a suitable horse.

Stolte v. Hammack 716 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. App., 2011)

After home owner’s roommate was attacked by a pit bull inside the home, the victim filed suit against owner under the vicious animal and the premises liability statutes. The Court of Appeals held that, because the roommate knew about the dog’s vicious propensity to the same extent as the owner, the owner was not liable. Plaintiff must present evidence that the owner had superior knowledge of the dog's temperament for the owner to be liable.

Storms v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc. 120 P.3d 126 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2005)

This Washington discrimination case was brought by a dog owner (Storms) with psychiatric conditions against a store and its managers who refused to allow her to stay in store with her alleged service dog. The dog was trained to  put herself between Storms and other people so as to keep an open area around Storms and alleviate her anxiety (a symptom of her post-traumatic stress syndrome). The appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against Fred Meyer for refusing to allow her to shop accompanied by her dog. Testimony showed that Brandy had been specifically trained to help Storms with her particular disability by placing herself in between Storms and others in a way that alleviated her anxiety, which was further corroborated by testimony that Brandy engaged in such behavior. Thus, evidence showed that the defendants' violated RCW 49.60.215 by not allowing Storms to do her own shopping within the store because she was accompanied by a service animal.

Stout v. U.S. Forest Service 2011 WL 867775 (2011)

Plaintiff ranch owners grazed cattle within the Murderer's Creek Wild Horse Territory (WHT), an area in which the threatened Middle Columbia River steelhead was present. The Forest Service approved a wild horse management plan in the area, but failed to prepare a Biological Assessment (BA) to determine whether the plan was likely to affect the threatened species, and whether formal consultation with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) was necessary. The Forest Service’s failure to comply with section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) was arbitrary and capricious, and was ordered to consult with NMFS on its plan.

Strahan v. Linnon 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314 (1st Cir.)

Coast Guard vessels struck and killed Northern Right whales. Plaintiffs claim that these incidents constitute takings in violation of the ESA and MMPA. Court holds that the Coast Guard could implement reasonable and prudent alternatives that would reduce the striking of whales.

Strawser v. Wright 610 N.E.2d 610 (Ohio App. 12 Dist., 1992)

Plaintiff sued defendant dog breeders after defendants misrepresented that the dog had been vaccinated as a newborn against Parvo.  In affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on the issue of negligent infliction of emotional distress the court noted that dogs are considered property in Ohio.  While the court sympathized "with one who must endure the sense of loss which may accompany the death of a pet; however, we cannot ignore the law . . . Ohio law simply does not permit recovery for serious emotional distress which is caused when one witnesses the negligent injury or destruction of one's property."

Stray from Heart, Inc. v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene of City of New York 20 N.Y.3d 946 (N.Y., 2012)

Petitioner, an animal rescue organization, filed suit seeking the enforcement of the Animal Shelters and Sterilization Act. The court held that the act does not provide for a private right of action for money damages. Instead, the legislative history reveals the law was designed to benefit the general public in New York City as well as stray cats and dogs. The court affirmed the lower court's decision with costs.

Strickland v. Davis 221 Ala 247 (1930)

A case involving an automobile accident in which the court declared that photographs may be authenticated by a party having personal knowledge of the location and who can verify that the photos substantially represent the conditions as they existed at the time in question.

Strickland v. Medlen -397 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2013)

The Supreme Court of Texas considers petitioner's appeal from the court of appeals' decision holding that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. The facts underlying the action involved the improper euthanization of respondents' dog, Avery. They sued for Avery's “sentimental or intrinsic value” because the dog had little or no market value and was irreplaceable. The trial court found that Texas law barred such damages, and dismissed the suit with prejudice. The Court of Appeals of Texas became the first court to hold that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. The Supreme Court reverses that decision here, ruling that dogs are ordinary property, with damages limited to market value, and noneconomic damages based in relational attachment are not permitted.

Strickland v. Pinellas Cty. --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 6518761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2018) Andy G. Strickland appealed an order dismissing with prejudice his complaint for declaratory relief against Pinellas County. The request stems from letters he received from Animal Services of Pinellas County about his dog. Strickland and a neighbor were involved in a dispute after their dogs attacked each other. The neighbor filed a complaint with Animal Services claiming that Strickland's dog was the "aggressor dog" and then sent a letter to the Pinellas County Board of Commissioners. The County then sent two letters to Strickland, the first informing him that his dog had exhibited dangerous propensities, and the second, from an assistant county attorney, informing him of the possible criminal ramifications for keeping a dangerous dog or being an "Irresponsible Pet Owner" under the county code. As a result of these letters, Strickland filed a complaint in circuit court saying that he was not afforded any opportunity to dispute those claims and that he is entitled to have the threat of criminal prosecution removed. The County moved to dismiss Strickland's complaint arguing that he failed to allege a justiciable controversy and a bona fide dispute between the County and him. The County claimed that there were no legal findings made with respect to Strickland's dog and that the letters were possible ramifications and explanations of law. The trial court agreed and granted the County's motion, finding the letters were not accusatory and the case presented no justiciable issue. On appeal here, this court upheld the lower court's order because Strickland's allegations did not present a bona fide dispute. Both letters emphasized that his dog had not been classified as dangerous and that no action was being taken by the county. A speculative fear by Strickland that he may be subject to future consequences does not warrant declaratory relief and does not show imminent danger of prosecution. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed Strickland's complaint. Affirmed.
Strong v. United States 5 F.3d 905 (1993)

The appeal in this case does not contest the denial of a permit to conduct dolphin feedings cruises. The position of the plaintiffs-appellees is that the Secretary of Commerce has no authority to consider feeding to be a form of harassment or to regulate it. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs-appellees and found it clearly reasonable to restrict or prohibit the feeding of dolphins as a potential hazard to them.

Students for Ethical Treatment of Animals (SETA) v. Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee of University of Oregon (IACUC) 833 P.2d 337 (1992)

Appeal of a circuit court decision finding a summary judgment that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit where a state university student organization and other parties brought suit against the university committee that supervised animal research, including a research proposal for cranial surgery on Macaque monkeys. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs had an interest in the governmental decisions of the committee, had established a denial of access related to that interest, thus had standing to bring the suit.

Sturgeon v. Frost 872 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2017) In this case, Sturgeon sought to use his hovercraft in a National Preserve to reach moose hunting grounds. Sturgeon brought action against the National Park Service (NPS), challenging NPS’s enforcement of a regulation banning operation of hovercrafts on a river that partially fell within a federal preservation area in Alaska. Alaskan law permits the use of hovercraft, NPS regulations do not; Sturgeon argued that Park Service regulations did not apply because the river was owned by the State of Alaska. Sturgeon sought both declaratory and injunctive relief preventing the Park Service from enforcing its hovercraft ban. On remand, the Court of Appeals held that regulation preventing use of hovercraft in federally managed conservation areas applied to the river in the National Preserve. While the hovercraft ban excludes "non-federally owned lands and waters" within National Park System boundaries, this court found that the waterways at issue in this case were within navigable public lands based on established precedent. The district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants was affirmed.
SuiÁa impetraram este HABEAS CORPUS REPRESSIVO, em favor da chimpanzÈ "SuiÁa" (nome cientifico anthropopithecus troglodytes), macaca que se encontra enjaulada no Parque Zoobot‚nico Get˙lio Vargas (Jardim ZoolÛgico de Salvador), situado na Av. Ademar de Barros
Suica - Habeas Corpus

First case to consider that a chimpanzee might be a legal person to come before the court under a petition for Habeas Corpus.

Sullivan v. Ringland 376 A.2d 130 (N.H. 1977) A New Hampshire husband and wife owned their dog jointly when they divorced. The husband planned to take care of the dog while the wife relocated. Instead, he gave the dog away to a friend with a young son. The court held that the wife’s replevin action was not available against the donee of a cotenant.
Summit County Board of Health v. Pearson 809 N.E.2d 80 (Ohio 2004)

In this Ohio case, appellant, Lorenza Pearson, appealed from a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas that affirmed a decision of the Summit County Board of Health finding that his property was a public health nuisance.  Lorenza and Barbara Pearson were the owners of property where they kept a collection of exotic and domestic animals, including lions, tigers, leopards, bears, foxes, pigeons, dogs, and an alligator. At the time of the Board of Health hearing, they had 44 large cat species and 16 black bears.  The court held that the administrative body’s determination of a public nuisance resulting from unsanitary confinement of exotic pets was not arbitrary and capricious, and was “supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence.”

Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture 275 F.3d 432 (C.A.5 (Tex.),2001)

The Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision that the Federal Meat Inspection Act focuses on the processes used by a manufacturer and not the product itself, and that the presence of Salmonella bacteria in the meat does not necessarily make a product "adulterated" because the act of the cooking meat normally destroys the bacteria.

Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture 113 F.Supp.2d 1048 (N.D.Tex.,2000)

North Federal District Court of Texas ruled that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) only empowered the Food Safety and Inspection Services to prevent the United States Department of Agriculture from allowing companies to sell adulterated meat to the public. To find meat adulterated under FMIA requires that the processor's plants conditions are insanitary, thus the FSIS should focus on the manufacturing process and not the final product to determine that a plant is insanitary.

Sutton v. Sutton 243 S.E.2d 310 (Ga.App. 1978) Plaintiff brought an action in tort against his father for injuries incurred in attempting to help his father and younger brother recapture an escaped bull. The defendant appeals from judgment for the plaintiff.
Swanson v. Tackling 335 Ga. App. 810 (2016) This is an interlocutory appeal by the dog owners (the Swansons) in a personal injury lawsuit for a dog bite. The court in this case overruled the lower court’s ruling that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgement after defendant’s dog bit a child but the dog had never shown a propensity to injure anyone prior to the incident. Plaintiff was suing defendant after defendant’s dog bit plaintiff’s child on the arm and head. Plaintiff argued that defendant is responsible for the injuries caused by the dog because the defendant neglected to properly restrain the dog. The court reversed the lower court’s decision and held in favor of defendant, stating that there was no evidence that was presented to indicate that defendant could have or should have known that the dog would act in this way towards the child. In order to prevail, the plaintiff needed to present evidence that the dog had acted in a similar way in the past.
Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue 940 F.3d 387 (7th Cir., 2019) The Plaintiff, Jamie and Sandra Swartz, acquired several horses, goats, and a donkey to keep on their farm in Indiana. In April of 2013, the county’s animal control officer, Randy Lee, called a veterinarian to help evaluate a thin horse that had been observed on the Swartzes’ property. Lee and the veterinarian visited the Swartzes’ on multiple occasions. The veterinarian became worried on its final visit that the Swartzes’ were not properly caring for the animals. Lee used the veterinarian’s Animal Case Welfare Reports to support a finding of probable cause to seize the animals. Subsequently, the Superior Court of Indiana entered an order to seize the animals. On June 20, 2014, the state of Indiana filed three counts of animal cruelty charges against the Swartzes. However, the state deferred prosecuting the Swartzes due to a pretrial diversion agreement. The Swartzes filed this federal lawsuit alleging that the defendants acted in concert to cause their livestock to be seized without probable cause and distributed the animals to a sanctuary and equine rescue based on false information contrary to the 4th and 14th amendments. The district court dismissed the Swartzes' claims to which, they appealed. The Court of Appeals focused on whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Swartzes’ claims. The Court applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by those who lose in state court challenging state court judgments. Due to the fact that the Swartzes’ alleged injury was directly caused by the state court’s orders, Rooker-Feldman barred federal review. The Swartzes also must have had a reasonable opportunity to litigate their claims in state court for the bar to apply. The Court, after reviewing the record, showed that the Swartzes had multiple opportunities to litigate whether the animals should have been seized, thus Rooker-Feldman applied. The case should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine at the outset. The Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Swido v. Lafayette Insurance Co. 16 So.2d 399 (La.App. 3 Cir., 2005)

In this Louisiana case, a prospective horse buyer filed an action against the prior sellers and their insurer to recover for injuries when she attempted to ride a horse offered for sale by the initial buyer. At the time of the injury, the horse was under the custody of the original sellers who were paid an additional amount to have the horse trained. The Court of Appeal held that sale of horse was perfected when the first buyer paid the sale price, even though the first buyer paid an additional amount for the sellers to finish training the horse. On the negligence issue, the court found the "green-broke" horse did not present an unreasonable risk of harm when the potential buyer attempted to ride it bareback as to assign strict liability to the prior sellers who had custody of the horse. 

Swilley v. State 465 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. App. 2015) In the indictment, the State alleged Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly tortured or in a cruel manner killed or caused serious bodily injury to an animal by shooting a dog with a crossbow, a state jail felony. The dog in question was a stray, which fell within the statutory definition of an “animal.” After a jury found Appellant guilty, the trial court assessed his punishment at two years' confinement in a state jail. On appeal, Appellant contended that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard evidence of an extraneous offense also involving cruelty to animals. Since the video that mentioned the extraneous offense was admitted without objection, the court held the Appellant waived the error and the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's motion for mistrial or by giving the instruction to disregard and overrule Appellant's first issue. Appellant further asserted the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The court, however, held the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly tortured or in a cruel manner killed or caused serious bodily injury to an animal by shooting it with a crossbow. The trial court's judgment was therefore affirmed.
Sykes v. Cook Cty. Circuit Court Prob. Div. 837 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2016), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (Oct. 27, 2016) This case dealt with the plaintiff's denial of the use of her service dog while in a courtroom to present a motion. After the denial, the plaintiff filed an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) action, alleging that there was a violation for denial of reasonable accommodations under the ADA. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, because as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The Court of Appeals agreed, and held that as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state court losers challenging state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Additionally, the district court held that it should exercise Younger abstention because the proceeding was ongoing and because the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to raise her federal claims about her dog in state court, but the Court of Appeals held that "Younger is now a moot question because there is no ongoing state proceeding for [the Court of Appeals] to disturb." As a result, the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was AFFIRMED.
Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Minnesota 486 F.3d 85 (8th Cir. 2007)
A man who was bitten by a police dog brought a § 1983 action against two cities and police officers for violating his Fourth Amendment rights; the man also brought some state laws claims against the defendants as well. When the district court granted Minnesota’s motion for summary judgment, the park occupant appealed and the appeals court reversed the lower court’s decision. The appeals court also granted a petition to rehear, en banc, the question of the city’s municipal liability and found that the city was entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Circuit Judge Gibson filed a dissenting opinion and was joined by Wollman, Bye, and Melloy.
Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, MN 437 F.3d 1289 (8th Cir. 2006)

After an 8th Circuit decision to affirm the district court's summary judgment against Szabla and to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the City of Brooklyn Park, the City of Brooklyn Park filed a petition requesting a hearing en blanc. The 8th Circuit granted the petition, but limited the en blanc hearing to the issues raised in the city’s petition.  In all other respects, however, the Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Mn., 429 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 2005) panel opinion and judgment were reinstated. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Minnesota, 486 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2007).

Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Mn. 429 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir., 2005)

A homeless man was mistaken for the driver of a crashed car while sleeping in a public park and was bitten by a police dog.  The homeless man brought claims under Section 1983 claiming his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the police department and city, but the Court of Appeals remanded the issue of excessive force. Rehearing en Banc Granted in Part, Opinion Vacated in Part by Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, MN , 429 F.3d 1289 (8th Cir., 2006).

T. , J. A. s/ infracción Ley 14.346 Id SAIJ: FA12340061 The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court that sentenced the Defendant to eleven months of imprisonment after finding him criminally responsible for acts of cruelty in violation of Article 1 of Ley 14.346 against a stray dog. The Defendant was found guilty of sexually abusing a dog, who he forced into his premises. The dog’s genital area was sheared and she had serious injuries, which the veterinarian concluded were clear signs of penetration. The Supreme Court referred to the Chamber of Appeals on Criminal Matters of Parana "B.J.L. s/ infracción a la Ley 14.346", of October 1, 2003, where the referred court stated that “the norms of Ley 14.346 protect animals against acts of cruelty and mistreatment, is not based on mercy, but on the legal recognition of a framework of rights for other species that must be preserved, not only from predation, but also from treatment that is incompatible with the minimum rationality." Further, "the definition of ‘person’ also includes in our pluralistic and anonymous societies a rational way of contact with animals that excludes cruel or degrading treatment."

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