Endangered Species

Displaying 31 - 40 of 452
Titlesort descending Summary
Antle v. Commonwealth In Antle v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed Bhagavan "Doc" Antle's convictions for purchasing endangered lion cubs while upholding his conspiracy convictions related to wildlife trafficking. The court strictly construed Virginia Code § 29.1-564, finding it prohibits sale and transportation of endangered species but not purchases, despite evidence that Antle routinely acquired lion cubs at just two weeks old for commercial exploitation. However, the court affirmed the conspiracy convictions under § 29.1-505.1, applying the third-party exception to Wharton's Rule because Antle's daughters participated in transporting the cubs, extending the criminal enterprise beyond a simple buyer-seller transaction. The decision highlights both the limitations of statutory language in wildlife protection and how conspiracy laws can address gaps in combating trafficking, while emphasizing that courts cannot expand penal statutes beyond their plain meaning, even for ethically reprehensible conduct.
April in Paris v. Becerra Plaintiffs are a collection of businesses that distribute and sell products made from alligator and crocodile parts. They brought this suit to enjoin the provisions of a California law that would criminalize the sale and possession of alligator and crocodile parts in California. They argue that these laws would cause them to lose sales, lead to inventory liquidation, and cause job loss. The court found that the injury plaintiff were alleging was economic in nature, and that they would be likely to suffer an irreparable injury by the California law. Plaintiffs also argue that the California law is expressly preempted by the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and that trade in these species is authorized by an exemption under the regulatory "special rules" of the ESA. The court found that these exceptions applied to plaintiff's trade and possession of the animal parts, granted the injunction to enjoin California from enforcing the laws until final disposition of the case.
AR - Endangered Species - 002.00.1-05.27. Endangered Species Protected This Arkansas regulation states that it is illegal to import, transport, sell, purchase, take or possess any endangered species of wildlife or parts thereof except as provided.
AR - Endangered Species - Endangered, Threatened, and Nongame Species Preservation Arkansas law provides that it is the intent of the State to protect rare, threatened, and endangered species. This policy also provides for the protection of critical habitat for these species.
ARFF, Inc. v. Siegel


Resort developer and president of an animal performance company received an injunction against an animal rights group limiting their ability to both picket the resort and distribute pamphlets claiming that the big cats were abused.  Appellate court reversed, finding that the picketing regulations burdened more speech than necessary and that the restriction on distributing pamphlets was a prior restraint not justified by a compelling state interest.
Argentina - Endangered species - Ley 25.463, 2001 This law declared the Panthera onca, also known as yaguareté, Jaguar, overo tiger or painted onca, a natural monument. Ley 25.463/01 instructs the National Park Administration and the Directorate of Wildlife and Flora of the Nation to work together on the management plan for the species in the areas of its jurisdiction, making sure it is in accordance to the national faunal policy. The Enforcement Authority will guarantee the planning and execution of preventive measures in cases in which a specimen becomes circumstantially harmful to humans or their productive activities.
Argentina - Endangered species - Ley Nº 24.702, 1996
Argentina - Marine mammals - Ley 23.094, 1984 This law declares the southern right whale a natural monument within Argentine jurisdictional waters and subject to the rules established by Law No. 22.351, which regulates the concerning procedures for the declaration of national parks, natural monuments, and national reserves.
Arizona Cattle Growers' Association v. Salazar



Arizona Cattle Growers’ Association (Plaintiff) challenged Fish and Wildlife Service's (Defendant) designation of critical habitat for Mexican spotted owls under the Endangered Species Act. The issues were whether Defendant impermissibly included unoccupied areas as critical habitat, and whether Defendant impermissibly employed the baseline approach in its economic analysis. The Court held that 1) Defendant did not designate unoccupied areas as critical habitat because “occupied” areas included areas where the species was likely to be present, and 2) that Defendant properly applied the baseline approach because the economic impact of listing a species as endangered was not intended to be included in the economic analysis of the critical habitat designation.
Art & Antique Dealers League of Am., Inc. v. Seggos This case involves a challenge by The Art and Antique Dealers League of America, Inc. and The National Antique and Art Dealers Association of America, Inc. (collectively, "Plaintiffs") against New York State's Environmental Conservation Law § 11-0535-a (the "State Ivory Law"), which restricts the sale and display of ivory articles. Plaintiffs argued that the State Ivory Law is preempted by the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) and violates their First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the preemption claim and granted summary judgment to the State on the First Amendment claim. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the preemption claim but reversed the grant of summary judgment on the First Amendment claim, holding that the State's "Display Restriction" on ivory items was more extensive than necessary to serve the State's interest in preventing illegal ivory sales. The court directed the entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, barring enforcement of the Display Restriction against Plaintiffs' members. Judge Sullivan dissented, arguing that the ESA preempts the State Ivory Law, rendering the First Amendment issue moot. The court relied on the State's concession that the Display Restriction implicates commercial speech but declined to establish a precedent on whether such displays constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.

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