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CA - Importation - Chapter 2. Of Other and Miscellaneous Offenses (653o - 653r) |
These California laws relate to the importation of certain animals parts for commercial purposes. Under the law, it is unlawful to import into this state for commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of any polar bear, leopard, ocelot, tiger, cheetah, jaguar, sable antelope, wolf (Canis lupus), zebra, whale, cobra, python, sea turtle, colobus monkey, kangaroo, vicuna, sea otter, free-roaming feral horse, dolphin or porpoise (Delphinidae), Spanish lynx, or elephant. It is unlawful to import into this state for commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of any crocodile or alligator. Commencing January 1, 2022, it is unlawful to import into this state for commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of an iguana, skink, caiman, hippopotamus, or a Teju, Ring, or Nile lizard. Section 653p makes it unlawful to posses with the intent to sell any part or dead body of any species on the federal endangered species list or species covered under the MMPA. Section 653q makes it illegal to import for commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of any seal. |
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CA - Mammals - § 4700. Taking or possession prohibited; scientific research; legal imports; |
This statute enumerates the fully protected mammals in the state of California. These animals may not be taken or possessed at any time. The statute also specifically states that permits or licenses to take these animals will not be issued, with a possible exception in the case of necessary scientific research. |
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CA - Marine - Chapter 10.5. Marine Life Protection Act. |
In this act, the California Legislature finds and declares a need to reexamine and redesign California's marine protected area systems to increase its effectiveness at protecting the state's marine life, habitat, and ecosystems. To improve the design and management of that system, the Marine Life Protection Program was adopted. A few of the Program's goals are to protect the natural diversity and abundance of marine life, to help sustain, conserve, and protect marine life populations, and rebuild those that are depleted. |
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Cabinet Resource Group v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service |
The Forest Service builds roads in National Forests, and has to determine what density of road coverage is safe for grizzly bear survival in making its Land Use Plan. Here, the Land Use Plan did not violate the Endangered Species Act, because an agency action is not required to help the survival of an endangered species, it simply may not reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the endangered species, grizzly bears. However, because the Forest Service relied upon a scientific study with acknowledged weaknesses to make its road standards, but failed to adequately address those weaknesses in its Final Environmental Impact Statement, the Forest Service violated NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act).
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Can We Stand for It? Amending the Endangered Species Act with an Animal-Suit Provision |
This article argues that the intent of the ESA would be realized if the standing requirements under the act were expanded to include an animal-suit provision in addition to the citizen-suit provision. The article begins with a brief discussion of the legislative history and the statutory requirements of the ESA, and then delineates the doctrine of standing generally. It concludes that the enactment of an animal-suit provision in the ESA would be consistent with the intent behind the ESA, would be a valid exercise of congressional power, would satisfy the principles inherent in the Court's approach to standing, and could be comfortably realized through next friend representation of qualified animal plaintiffs.
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Caribbean Conservation Corp., Inc. v. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Com'n |
The petitioners' challenge is whether the Legislature can require the newly created Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) to comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), when adopting rules or regulations in respect to those species of marine life that are defined as endangered, threatened, or species of special concern. The petitioners are not-for-profit groups and individuals who allege several statutory sections unconstitutionally usurp the constitutional authority of the FWCC to regulate marine life. The FWCC and the Attorney General (respondents) disagree and argue that the Legislature can require the application of the APA and that the statutes that delineate power to the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) are constitutional. The issue was whether the creation of the FWCC also gave it power to regulate endangered, threatened, and species of special concern or whether that power remained with the DEP. The court found that such power remained with the DEP regarding endangered and threatened species of marine life. However, it could discern no statutory basis in effect on March 1, 1998, for the DEP having regulatory or executive power in respect to a category of marine species designated "of special concern" so that portion of the challenged statutes was held unconstitutional.
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Carpenters Indus. Council v. Salazar |
Plaintiffs, Carpenters Industrial Council, among several, averred that the FWS, in designating the owl as a "threatened species," violated the National Environmental Policy Act, the ESA, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Defendant, the FWS, confess legal error as to the northern spotted owl’s 2008 Critical Habitat Designation and 2008 Recovery Plan and ask that the court: (1) remand and vacate the 2008 Designation; (2) remand the 2008 Plan; and (3) order the FWS to revise its recovery plan and, if necessary, thereafter complete a new critical habitat designation. First, as to Defendant’s request to remand the designation, the court held that it, in fact, has such authority to do so, and such action is moreover appropriate, since the Washington Oversight Committee erred in proffering "jeopardizing" advice to the FWS. However, as to the whether the 2008 Designation may be vacated, the court concluded that it lacked the authority to do so "at this stage of the litigation." As to whether the 2008 Recovery Plan may be vacated, the court held that, given the interconnectedness of the 2008 Designation and the 2008 Plan, remand is appropriate.
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Cascadia Wildlands v. Dep't of Fish and Wildlife |
Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission ("Respondent") removed the species Canis lupus (gray wolf) from the list of species protected under the Oregon Endangered Species Act (OESA). Cascadia Wildlands, Center for Biological Diversity, and Oregon Wild ("Petitioners") sought judicial review of the amendment to Oregon law. The Petitioners contended that the decision to delist exceeded the commission’s statutory authority and did not comply with applicable rulemaking procedures. After the Petitioners filed their petition, the Oregon legislature passed House Bill 4040 which ratified the administrative rule that the Respondent promulgated delisting the gray wolf. The Respondents argued that the passage of the bill made the Petitioners' petition for judicial review moot. The Petitioners argued that the Oregon law ratifying the administrative rule had no legal effect and was merely an expression of legislative agreement. The Court held that the legislature using the word “ratify” in the statute indicated that they intended to confirm that the Commission’s rule delisting the gray wolf was legally satisfied, therefore, rendering judicial review moot. The Petitioners also contended that the statute violated the separation of powers because the statute performed an entirely judicial function by neither appealing nor amending the statute. Petitioners asserted that evaluating whether a particular agency satisfied requirements of law is a fact-specific inquiry which is reserved for the court. The Court held that the statute did not violate the separation of powers. The Court ultimately held that the Petitioners' rule challenge was moot. The petition for judicial review was ultimately dismissed. |
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Casting Aside the Myth: Why Science is Never the Sole Factor in ESA Delisting |
This paper illustrates the need and importance for this shift in understanding, and suggest corresponding revisions to the ESA. It gives an overview of the recovery plan provisions and delisting process of the ESA. The paper gives an overview of a recently delisted species, the Western Great Lakes Distinct Population Segment (“WGL DPS”) of the gray wolf, which serves to illustrate in detail the more general analysis of ESA implementation. The paper also provides a framework for the importance behind identifying policy decisions and having greater accountability and consistency in decision-making.
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Center for Biological Diversity v. Badgley |
The Center for Biological Diversity and eighteen other nonprofit organizations appealed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. The Center claimed the Secretary of the Interior violated the Endangered Species Act by making an erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious determination that listing the Northern Goshawk (a short-winged, long-tailed hawk that lives in forested regions of higher latitude in the northern hemisphere and is often considered an indicator species) in the contiguous United States west of the 100th meridian as a threatened or endangered species was not warranted. In the absence of evidence that the goshawk is endangered or likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future, the court found the FWS's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and affirmed the summary disposition.
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